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Developing Sectoral Mechanisms in the Transition Period towards a New Climate Treaty 
Kurzbeschreibung 
Ziel dieses Forschungsvorhabens ist die Untersuchung von sektoralen Ansätzen in ei-
nem internationalen Regime der Klimapolitik, mit Fokus darauf eine Brücke zwischen 
existierenden und zukünftigen Mechanismen und Instrumenten zu schlagen. Hierfür 
analysieren wir zunächst die Diskussionen und Entwicklungen zu sektoralen Ansätzen 
in bestehenden und zukünftigen UNFCCC-Mechanismen. Das Vorhaben untersucht, 
welche sektoralen Ansätze unter NMM oder NAMAs angewendet werden könnten. Die 
Analyse basiert auf einem breiten Set von Untersuchungsindikatoren. Dazu werden die 
von Vertragsstaaten bei der UNFCCC eingereichten Vorschläge ausgewertet und eine 
quantitative Analyse der CDM-, PoA- und NAMA-Pipeline vorgenommen. Die Analyse 
wird gestützt von Interviews mit UNFCCC-Verhandlungsteilnehmern, Vertretern der 
Wissenschaft und Kohlenstoffmarktakteuren. Eine Betrachtung von potenziellen Barri-
eren für die Einführung sektoraler Ansätze und die Entwicklung entsprechender Lö-
sungsvorschläge, sowie abschließende Empfehlungen runden die Studie ab. 
Abstract 
This study analyses how sectoral approaches are evolving in existing and future mitiga-
tion mechanisms, and how they can help shaping the transition period to a new climate 
regime most effectively. The analysis is based on an evaluation of recent UNFCCC sub-
missions, a desk review of the relevant literature and databases, as well as a set of semi-
structured expert interviews. The desk review is complemented by an analysis of a set of 
indicators regarding the potential of the identified sectoral elements standardized base-
lines, programme of activities, sectoral crediting and trading, as well as domestic policy 
instruments for NMM/FVA and NAMAs, by differentiating and structuring the analysis 
according to various institutional, technical and political aspects. A reflection of relevant 
barriers for adoption of sectoral approaches, as well as opportunities to overcome them 
is provided together with a set of recommendations for political decision makers. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Hintergrund und Ansatz 
Ziel dieses Forschungsvorhabens ist die Untersuchung von sektoralen Ansätzen in ei-
nem internationalen Regime der Klimapolitik, mit Fokus darauf eine Brücke zwischen 
existierenden und zukünftigen Mechanismen und Instrumenten zu schlagen. Hierfür 
analysieren wir zunächst die Diskussionen und Entwicklungen zu sektoralen Ansätzen 
in bestehenden und zukünftigen UNFCCC-Mechanismen. Sektorale Ansätze für den 
CDM werden seit Einführung des Mechanismus diskutiert, und haben sich in Form von 
programmatischem CDM (PoA) und standardisierten Baselines (SB) bereits etabliert 
bzw. werden als ernsthaftes Reforminstrument des Mechanismus verstanden. Unter 
dem Neuen Marktmechanismus (NMM) und dem Framework for Various Approaches 
(FVA) werden zudem Ansätze zukünftiger marktbasierter Mechanismen diskutiert. Die 
konkretesten Ansätze stellen hier sectoral crediting und trading dar. Zudem diskutiert 
die internationale Gemeinschaft die Rolle von bereits existierenden nationalen Vermin-
derungsmaßnahmen (NAMAs) in diesem Kontext, unter welchen diverse nationale Poli-
tikmaßnahmen gefasst werden können. Das Vorhaben untersucht, welche sektoralen 
Ansätze unter NMM oder NAMAs angewendet werden könnten. Die Analyse basiert auf 
einem breiten Set von Untersuchungsindikatoren. Dazu werden die von Vertragsstaaten 
bei der UNFCCC eingereichten Vorschläge ausgewertet und eine quantitative Analyse 
der CDM-, PoA- und NAMA-Pipeline vorgenommen. Die Analyse wird gestützt von In-
terviews mit UNFCCC-Verhandlungsteilnehmern, Vertretern der Wissenschaft und 
Kohlenstoffmarktakteuren. Eine Betrachtung von potenziellen Barrieren für die Ein-
führung sektoraler Ansätze und die Entwicklung entsprechender Lösungsvorschläge, 
sowie abschließende Empfehlungen runden die Studie ab.  
Potenzielle sektorale Ansätze 
Der programmatische Ansatz im CDM, PoA, konnte sich als fester und relevanter Be-
standteil des CDM etablieren. Insbesondere hinsichtlich der sektoralen und geographi-
schen Ausdehnung des CDM spielen PoAs mittlerweile eine zentrale Rolle, beispielswei-
se in Afrika. Dabei kommen einige PoAs bereits nah an eine sektorweite Ausdehnung 
von Minderungsaktivitäten heran, sollten sie vollumfänglich umgesetzt werden. Insge-
samt genießt das PoA Konzept eine hohe Akzeptanz, auch über den CDM hinaus.  
PoAs sind als Instrument sowohl unter dem NMM als auch unter NAMAs grundsätzlich 
möglich. Im Gegensatz zur CDM Standardisierung benötigen PoAs deutlich weniger 
Aufmerksamkeit und Einbindung der Regierung im Gastgeberland. Dieser Umstand 
dürfte sich unter dem NMM oder NAMAs ändern, da hier eine deutlich stärkere Rolle 
für nationale Autoritäten im Gastgeberland vorgesehen ist, welche nicht zuletzt erhebli-
che Kapazitäten binden dürften. Andererseits kommt etwa der CDM Policy Dialogue zu 
dem Schluss, dass eine Kombination von PoAs mit SBs eine schlagkräftige Option für 
zukünftige Mechanismen darstellen kann, insbesondere hinsichtlich einer simplifizier-
ten Anwendbarkeit auch von sektorweiten Aktivitäten (im weiteren auch als “CDM+” 
Option bezeichnet). Gleichwohl sind noch fundamentale Anpassungen des PoA Konzep-
tes notwendig, insbesondere auf institutioneller Ebene mit Hinblick auf die Übertra-
gung des zentralen PoA Koordinators und der einzelnen Projektpartner auf das Konzept 
sektoraler Ansätze unter dem NMM. Hier müssten zum Beispiel die Verantwortlichkei-
ten von der PoA Koordination auf die Ebene der Regierung verlagert werden, was eine 
Reihe von Herausforderungen hinsichtlich Kapazitäten, Verwaltungsarchitektur und 
Anreizstruktur hervorbringen würde.  
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Ein weiterer sektoraler Ansatz unter dem CDM ist die Einführung so genannter stan-
dardisierter Baselines. SBs berücksichtigen Daten eines breiten Spektrums oder gesam-
ten Sektors, und haben das Potenzial grundsätzlich für alle zulässigen CDM Aktivitäten 
in dem Bereich, Sektor oder Land anwendbar zu sein. Der Standardisierungsprozess 
steckt gleichwohl noch in den Kinderschuhen und wird sich in den kommenden Jahren 
weiter entwickeln; insbesondere das Verhältnis von Umweltintegrität und erwünschten 
niedrigen Transaktionskosten steht hierbei im Vordergrund.  
SBs sind grundsätzlich ein sehr gut passendes Instrument für den Einsatz unter NMM 
oder NAMAs, da sie primär als aggregiertes Konzept gedacht sind, und nicht einzelne 
Projekte berücksichtigen. Es ist aber zu berücksichtigen, dass sich durchaus Unter-
schiede bezüglich der zukünftigen Anwendbarkeit von SBs unter NMM oder NAMA er-
geben, in etwa hinsichtlich des Zentralisierungsgrades oder regulatorischen Anforde-
rungen. Bezüglich Kapazitätsanforderungen oder Indikatoren für Transaktionskosten 
muss zwischen Akteursgruppen unterschieden werden, da etwa Standardisierung für 
Marktakteure auch mit erhöhten Transaktionskosten, und für Gastgeberländer mit 
komplexeren Kapazitätsanforderungen einhergehen kann.  
Hinsichtlich zukünftiger Mechanismen werden sektorale Ansätze erörtert, die im Rah-
men der UNFCCC Verhandlungen zu NMM, FVA und NAMAs diskutiert werden. Hier-
bei werden eher politikbasierte Ansätze, welche unter dem CDM bislang keine Rolle 
spielen, reflektiert. Die relevantesten Ansätze dabei sind Sectoral Crediting und 
Sectoral Trading unter dem NMM. Crediting und Trading sind beide eher für Anwen-
dungen mit sehr breitem Spektrum erdacht (sektorweit, landesweit), und eignen sich 
daher per se als sektoraler Ansatz, was sich auch in den EU Vorschlägen für sectoral 
crediting und trading niederschlägt. Die regulatorischen und administrativen Anforde-
rungen sind hierbei insbesondere auf internationaler Ebene, aber auch auf Ebene der 
Landesregierung signifikant. Anlagenbetreiber sind hingegen weniger direkt beein-
flusst, obgleich sie natürlich sämtliche nationale Politikmaßnahmen welche durch die 
Mechanismen angereizt und umgesetzt werden „erfahren“. Crediting und – zu einem 
noch höheren Grad – Trading stellen hohe Anforderungen an die Qualität der verfügba-
ren Daten. Die derzeitigen Vorgaben zur Berichterstattung unter ICA und im Rahmen 
von BURs müssen ihre Praxistauglichkeit erst noch unter Beweis stellen. Es scheint 
daher wahrscheinlicher, dass sowohl crediting als auch trading eher unter einem zent-
ralistisch organisiertem Mechanismus wie dem NMM eingesetzt werden, zumal NAMAs 
bislang keine Zertifizierung und Handelbarkeit von THG Emissionen zulassen.  
Im Rahmen zukünftiger Mechanismen und NAMAs werden die Regierungen der Gast-
geberstaaten eine herausragende Rolle tragen müssen, deutlich stärker als heute unter 
dem CDM. Dies ist insbesondere dadurch bedingt, dass die Regierungen nationale Poli-
tikmaßnahmen zur THG Reduktion konzipieren und diese auch umsetzen müssen. Im 
Vergleich werden striktere internationale Vorgaben unter einem zentralistisch organi-
sierten NMM wahrscheinlich besser Umweltintegritätsstandards erfüllen können. 
Gleichwohl existiert weder der NMM noch ein FVA bislang. Im Gegenzug sind NAMAs 
ein bereits definiertes und angewandtes Instrument – nahezu jede beliebige Politik-
maßnahme kann heutzutage als NAMA deklariert werden (im Rahmen der UNFCCC 
Vorgaben). Allerdings fehlen noch ausreichend monetäre Anreize für eine stärkere Aus-
breitung des NAMA Konzepts.  
Barrieren für die Umsetzung  
Auf Basis der Ergebnisse der analytischen Untersuchung identifiziert das Vorhaben 
Schlüsselbarrieren, welche der Umsetzung sektoraler Ansätze entgegenstehen, und 
formuliert Lösungsvorschläge um diese Barrieren zu überwinden. Für jeden untersuch-
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ten Ansatz werden hierbei die Akteursgruppen “UNFCCC”, “Nationale Regierungen”, 
und “Marktakteure” betrachtet. Aufgrund des noch sehr vagen Charakters sektoraler 
Ansätze sind die identifizierten Lösungsansätze für einzelne Barrieren sehr allgemein, 
und sollten daher eher als Diskussionsgrundlage dienen.  
Identifizierte Herausforderungen oder Barrieren für die UNFCCC Ebene umfassen die 
Erstellung von Vorschriften und Normen, die Ausstellung von Zertifikaten, eine man-
gelnde Klimaschutz-Mechanismus "Infrastruktur", den Mangel an Nachfrage und 
Marktaufsicht sowie ein "institutionelles Vakuum" im Umgang mit Preisvolatilität von 
Zertifikaten. Herausforderungen für nationale Regierungen umfassen die nationale 
Umsetzungsarchitektur, Aspekte der Anreizsetzung sowie Strukturen für die Zertifi-
katsausstellung. Herausforderungen für die Marktteilnehmer betreffen die 
Anreizstruktur für die Teilnahme an Minderungsaktivitäten, Investitionssicherheit, die 
Praktikabilität der sektoralen Ansätze sowie Kapazitätsengpässe bei den Marktteil-
nehmern. 
Ergebnisse 
Sobald die Landschaft zukünftiger Mechanismen der Klimapolitik auf internationaler 
Ebene deutlicher erkennbar wird, wird sich eine relevantere Rolle nationaler Politik-
maßnahmen in einem zukünftigen Klimaregime abzeichnen. Aus heutiger Sicht scheint 
sich das Spektrum sektoraler Ansätze, welche zuvor diskutiert wurden, eher für eine 
Anwendung unter NAMAs zu qualifizieren. Auch erscheint die Entwicklung von Ansät-
zen unter einem ergebnisorientierten Finanzierungsansatz (Results-Based Finance, 
RBF) möglich (was eine Deklarierung als NAMA nicht ausschließt).  
In der Entstehung befindliche sektorale Ansätze werden differenzierter ausgestaltet 
sein als der heutige CDM. Beispielweise kann hier neben einem multilateralen Markt-
mechanismus auch eine Anzahl verschiedenster sektor-spezifischer Mechanismen einge-
führt werden. In diesem Kontext, und um der Vielfalt an sektoralen Ansätzen und den 
jüngsten Entwicklungen Rechnung zu tragen, schlagen wir eine überarbeitete Termino-
logie für sektorale Ansätze vor: 
• Sektor-orientierte Ansätze: Diese Ansätze beziehen sich auf gesamte Sekto-
ren oder Subsektoren, indem beispielsweise die Anwendung einer standardi-
sierten Baseline verpflichtend gemacht wird. Diese Ansätze basieren weiter-
hin auf einem Crediting-Prinzip und können Projekte, Programme aber auch 
Politikmaßnahmen umfassen. Aufgrund ihres unverbindlichen Charakters 
decken sie jedoch nicht notwendigerweise alle Emittenten eines Landes oder 
Sektors ab. 
• Sektorweite Ansätze: Diese Ansätze weiten Klimaschutzaktivitäten aus, in-
dem gesamte Sektoren oder Subsektoren abgedeckt werden. Durch die ver-
pflichtende Teilnahme ist hier die Abdeckung des entsprechenden subnatio-
nalen, nationalen oder regionalen Bezugsrahmens gewährleistet. Ein mögli-
ches frühes Beispiel für einen solchen Ansatz könnte ein NMM sein, welcher 
die Erfassung  etwa emissionsintensiver  Industrien unter dem NMM ab-
deckt.  
• Sektorspezifische Ansätze: Diese dritte Kategorie bezieht sich auf Mechanis-
men, die für auf die Erschließung der Emissionen in einem bestimmten (Sub-) 
Sektor oder einer Technologie (auch länderübergreifend) entwickelt wurden. 
Beispiele hierfür sind REDD+, oder ein Mechanismus, der die Reduktion von 
HFC-Emissionen zum Ziel hat. Diese Mechanismen können in ihrem Gel-
tungsbereich beträchtlich variieren, gemeinsam ist ihnen jedoch ein hohes 
Potential für die Erzielung von Netto-Emissionsreduktionen unter der Vo-
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raussetzung, dass der Offsetting-Ansatz überwunden wird, also die ausge-
stellten Zertifikate den Käufer berechtigen, zusätzliche Treibhausgase zu 
emittieren.  
Diese überarbeite Terminologie soll die Einordnung bestehender sowie neuer Mecha-
nismen und Konzepte erleichtern. Der verfeinerte Blick auf die Gemeinsamkeiten und 
spezifischen Unterschiede könnte zudem die Diskussionen über neue Marktmechanis-
men und über die Frage der Gestaltung des Übergangs vom CDM zu selbigen voran-
bringen.  
Für den CDM zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass sich einige sektorale Elemente wie PoAs und 
standardisierte Baselines von der theoretischen Diskussion loslösen konnten und in die 
Umsetzung gelangt sind. Für eine weitergehende sektorale Ausdehnung des CDM ist 
die Reform zahlreicher CDM-Elemente voranzutreiben, darunter insbesondere die 
Standardisierung von Baselines, Verfahren zum Nachweis der Zusätzlichkeit sowie 
MRV. Werden diese mit dem programmatischen Ansatz kombiniert, könnte der CDM 
weiter in Richtung eines sektoralen Mechanismus’ ausgebaut werden. 
Dabei hängt die Entwicklung von vielen Faktoren ab, unter anderem die Entwicklung 
der UNFCCC Verhandlungen oder der weiteren Ausgestaltung der Architektur für Kli-
mafinanzierung in Verknüpfung mit dem Kohlenstoffmarkt (z.B. durch RBF). Solche 
Ansätze gibt es bereits etwa im Rahmen von REDD+ oder unter dem Green Climate 
Fund. Unter dem CDM können CERs mittlerweile freiwillig gelöscht werden, was etwa 
im Rahmen eines Interviews als ideale Basis für einen sektoralen Ansatz mit Nettomin-
derungseffekt vorgeschlagen wird.  
Diese Diskussionen werden in Zukunft an Relevanz gewinnen, da Akteure in Entwick-
lungsländern, sowohl im privaten als auch im öffentlichen Sektor (also auf Regierungs-
ebene) Minderungsaktivitäten in entsprechender Größenordnung nicht ohne internatio-
nale finanzielle und technische Unterstützung stemmen werden können.  
Die Studie wertet die aktuellen Entwicklungen bezüglich sektoraler Ansätze aus, kann 
aber gleichzeitig bestimmte Aspekte wie den Mehrwert eines NMM gegenüber einem 
CDM+ Ansatz nicht abschließend beurteilen. Dazu gehört auch, Lösungsansätze für die 
Lösung der festgefahrenen Klimaverhandlungen zum NMM auf UNFCCC Ebene zu er-
arbeiten. Hier muss eher eine entsprechende Anreizstruktur untersucht werden, welche 
Entscheidungsträger und Marktakteure zu transformativem Verhalten in entsprechen-
den Sektoren anhält. Die Studie schließt daher mit einer Reihe von Empfehlungen hin-
sichtlich weiteren Forschungsbedarfs und potenziellen Vorschlägen für die UNFCCC 
Debatte.  
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Summary 
Background 
This study analyses how sectoral approaches are evolving in existing and future mitiga-
tion mechanisms, and how they can help shaping the transition period to a new climate 
regime most effectively. For years, there has been a discussion on how the CDM can 
evolve from a project-based approach towards a more comprehensive or sectoral scope. 
Important existing developments in this direction are CDM Programme of Activities 
(PoA) and standardized baselines (SB). Regarding emerging market mechanisms, the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 17, in 2011, established the New Market Mechanism 
(NMM) and the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA), which may serve as potential 
vehicles for sectoral approaches in the future. In addition, Nationally Appropriate Miti-
gation Actions (NAMAs) may absorb some concepts which had originally been discussed 
in the CDM context, but have been adapted to developments such as the rising impor-
tance of climate finance in the UNFCCC process.  
Methodology 
The analysis is based on an evaluation of recent UNFCCC submissions, a desk review of 
the relevant literature and databases, as well as a set of semi-structured expert inter-
views. It starts with an assessment of the debate on sectoral approaches in existing me-
chanisms, with an initial focus on the CDM, including a review of the historical debate 
on a sectoral CDM and the recent evolution of PoAs and SBs. Here, despite changing 
terminology and definitions, the historical debate on a sectoral CDM offers some impor-
tant early insights into some of the most relevant political, institutional and technical 
aspects of various sectoral approaches, such as the distinction between project-based 
and policy-based approaches. This distinction has become more and more explicit, by 
gradually introducing programmatic activities and standardization of baselines and oth-
er methodological elements into the CDM, while other concepts have moved to emerging 
mechanisms, or are applied on the national level as domestic policy measures. Further-
more, the most recent developments regarding sectoral approaches under the UNFCCC 
negotiations are reflected. The desk review is complemented by an analysis of a set of 
indicators regarding the potential of the identified sectoral elements standardized base-
lines, programme of activities, sectoral crediting and trading, as well as domestic policy 
instruments for NMM/FVA and NAMAs, by differentiating and structuring the analysis 
according to various institutional, technical and political aspects. A reflection of relevant 
barriers for adoption of sectoral approaches, as well as opportunities to overcome them 
is provided together with a set of recommendations for political decision makers.  
Potential sectoral approaches 
Summarizing the results, PoAs have established themselves firmly within the CDM 
framework, and are set to achieve significant improvements in line with the political 
objectives of the CDM regarding sectoral and geographical distribution – as long as po-
litical ambition allows for a sufficiently conducive market environment. Some PoAs can 
be considered to come close to sector-wide upscaling of mitigation actions, provided they 
will be fully implemented. Overall the concept enjoys a high degree of acceptance, and 
its value is recognized beyond the CDM. 
PoAs are also highly applicable to both NMM and NAMAs. A critical difference to stan-
dardization is that PoAs do not require as much engagement by host countries as SB 
development, but direct most efforts to project proponents, and to some extent to the 
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UNFCCC. This can be expected to shift considerably for both NMMs and NAMAs which 
raises fundamental questions about capacity as well as the viability and integrity of 
some institutional and technical aspects. More positively, the analysis finds evidence for 
the CDM Policy Dialogue’s proposition that the combination of standardized approaches 
and PoAs can be powerful combination in terms of simplifying applicability for future 
mechanisms, including sectoral approaches, or possibly a reformed “CDM+”. More fun-
damental adjustments are necessary to adjust the PoA concept – particularly the CME – 
CPA relationship for STM and SCM type of NMM approaches, which is likely to require 
a shift of responsibilities from CMEs to host country government authority, raising a 
range of challenges from capacity and governance architecture to incentive structure 
design. 
CDM standardization introduces further sector-orientation into the CDM, as SBs need 
to consider data from the entire sector, and will be – possibly mandatorily – applicable 
to all CDM activities of the same type in the respective country or region. Still, it has 
also become clear that the standardization process is still in an early stage, and it is to 
be aware of a potential trade-off between the transaction costs of a market mechanism 
and its environmental integrity. SBs are also highly applicable for both NMM and NA-
MA mechanisms. On a most fundamental level, this is because SBs are established 
based on performance of (sub)sectors, not projects. Sometimes differences between SB 
applicability for NMM or NAMAs emerge, e.g. with regard to the degree of centraliza-
tion of regulatory requirements. In other instances, e.g. with regard to the capacity and 
transaction cost indicators, it is important to differentiate between stakeholder groups, 
as simplification for market participants may mean higher transaction costs and more 
complex capacity requirements for host countries and/or UNFCCC bodies. Importantly, 
the CDM standardization process is still recent, but now fully operational, and can in 
theory be extended to additional CDM sectors, or transferred to other mechanisms that 
build more directly on sectoral approaches like the CDM, including those that emerge 
from outside of the UNFCCC. 
Beyond existing mechanisms the report analyzes sectoral approaches under future me-
chanisms, with a special focus on sectoral elements that have been proposed in the 
UNFCCC negotiations for the NMM, FVA or NAMAs. Here, more policy-based sectoral 
approaches that have not been taken up in the CDM are reflected, of which the most 
relevant approaches are sectoral crediting and trading under the NMM. Crediting and 
trading approaches are mainly thought for applications with broad scopes/segments of 
an economy, and thus are designed for a sectoral mechanism. The EU proposals for SCM 
and STM underscore this fact. The requirements for regulatory and administrative ac-
tors are significant on the international supervisory level, as well as at the government 
level. Installations are most likely not influenced, apart from experiencing domestic pol-
icies and instruments that were incentivized by the crediting approach – unless gov-
ernments would directly transfer credit incentives. Sectoral crediting - and trading even 
more - demand high quality data for projections. As the current reporting provisions 
under ICA and within the BURs still need to demonstrate their robustness, it appears 
more likely that crediting and trading would be better suited under a central mechan-
ism with clear rules such as the NMM.  
Under future mechanisms and NAMAs, national governments play a more important 
role than in the CDM as they need to design and provide oversight for domestic policies 
and measures with GHG reduction benefits. Compared to NAMAs, stricter international 
provisions from a centralized mechanism such as the NMM are likely to increase the 
environmental integrity (including net emission reductions). However, the NMM (and 
even more the FVA) do not exist yet. Today, any domestic policy measure can be labelled 
as NAMA, as long as it complies with the UNFCCC (MRV) provisions, although the lack 
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of incentives for private sector investment (e.g. through crediting approaches and the 
insufficient levels of (public) international climate finance) have so far prevented a 
stronger uptake of NAMAs.  
Barriers for implementation  
Based on the results of the analytical steps key challenges for implementing and further 
developing sectoral approaches are identified, as well as potential ways to overcome 
these obstacles. For each of the different mechanisms we focus on the stakeholder 
groups “UNFCCC”, “national governments”, and “market actors”. Due to the vagueness 
of sectoral approaches to date, the opportunities to overcoming barriers are very encom-
passing and are intended to serve as a basis for discussion rather than drawing up ela-
borate or fine-grained solutions. Challenges identified for the UNFCCC level comprise 
aspects regarding common rules and standards, issuance of certificates, lack of mitiga-
tion mechanism “infrastructure”, lack of demand and market oversight, and “institu-
tional vacuum” for containing certificate price volatility. Challenges identified for na-
tional governments encompass the governance of national implementation, aspects of 
incentive setting, as well as structures for certificate issuance. Challenges identified for 
market actors address the incentive structure for participation in activities, the need for 
investment certainty, the practicability of sectoral approaches as well as capacity con-
straints at market actors level.  
Findings 
Overall, the range of sectoral approaches sketched above in the first place seems to qual-
ify for NAMAs, but could also be developed as an RBF scheme (which does not prevent 
labelling it a NAMA, though). Once the picture on future mechanisms on the interna-
tional level becomes more diversified, the role of domestic policy measures under the 
future climate policy regime will become clearer, and should be studied and analysed 
further. In sum, emerging sectoral mechanisms are likely to be more diverse than the 
CDM. They could, for instance, cover not only one multilateral market mechanism 
which would cover theoretically all sectors, but could also include a variety of different 
“sector-specific mechanisms”, which are designed specifically for (sub)sectors with highly 
idiosyncratic features.  
In order to consolidate the findings, we attempt to contribute to adjusting the terminol-
ogy that is used for various sectoral approaches in order to capture these important re-
cent developments and the differences between them. At least three ideal types of sec-
toral approaches have been emerging:  
 Sector-oriented approaches: take into account entire (sub)sectors, for instance by 
developing mandatory SBs. These approaches still operate on a crediting basis, 
which may include projects, programmes, and even policies such as renewable 
energy feed-in tariffs (REFIT). Yet, due to their voluntary nature, they may not 
necessarily cover all emitters in a country or sector. 
 Sector-wide approaches: refer to approaches that scale up mitigation action by 
covering entire (sub)sectors, e.g. by relying on PoA approaches. Yet, compulsory 
participation ensures complete coverage within the respective subnational, na-
tional or regional contexts. Likely early examples could include an STM or SCM 
approach that is targeting e.g. emissions-intensive industries. 
 Sector-specific approaches: refer to mechanisms that are designed specifically for 
(sub)sector or even a single technology with highly idiosyncratic features, e.g. 
REDD, HFCs, aviation, shipping), and may operate across multiple countries. 
“Sector-specific” can imply broader definitions of sectors (energy, forestry), or also 
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narrower subsectors (HFCs as subsector of industrial gases, coal power as sub-
sector of industrial EE). A potentially high degree of net mitigation could be 
achieved if these mechanisms – in particular those with very low costs per tCO2e 
reduced – can be transitioned away from offsetting.  
Looking ahead, a key question is how these sectoral approaches will continue to evolve. 
SBs and PoAs are likely to continue to be improved and consolidated within the CDM 
framework, but also to diffuse into NMM, FVA and NAMAs. Which specific aspects of 
which sectoral approach may evolve in which direction, and how, depends on many fac-
tors. These include the paths that the political UNFCCC negotiations may take: the de-
bate on new mechanisms is progressing only very slowly, and concern over the lack of 
ambition on finance and mitigation, as well as the resulting CER market depression 
overshadows technical discussions. Other inputs originate from contexts that have tra-
ditionally not been at the centre of the debate on sectoral approaches. For instance, the 
rise of importance of the climate finance issue, in tandem with the market crisis, has led 
to a stronger focus on the interactions between carbon markets and climate finance, e.g. 
through RBF. Such approaches are already quite prominent e.g. within REDD and the 
GCF, but are a rather recent trend in the CDM context. For instance, the UNFCCC’s Ad 
Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) negotiation 
stream calls for “unlocking opportunities for raising pre-2020 ambition”, and mentions 
the option of voluntary CER cancellations for this purpose. A dedicated cancellation ac-
count for this purpose has now been set up in the CDM registry. It can be expected that 
such discussions will rise in importance, as it is clear that sectoral approaches, which 
are supposed to operate at larger scales than the CDM, need to establish more effective 
price volatility control mechanisms. It is inconceivable that any government or private 
sector actor would agree to deep and potentially costly mitigation actions without a suf-
ficient level of certainty on anticipated support with finance, technology and capacity 
building.  
While the paper evaluates recent developments regarding sectoral approaches within 
the climate regime, it does not fully elaborate on certain aspects, such as in general the 
added value of new mechanisms compared to a reformed CDM+ with changed modalities 
and procedures. It also is beyond the scope of this study to provide solutions for solving 
the deadlock in the climate negotiations on the NMM or showing opportunities for 
avoiding a strong fragmentation trend away from the NMM towards the FVA. Here, it 
needs to be further assessed which incentive structures could convince countries and 
market participants to engage in potentially transformative interventions in key sectors 
of their economies.  
In order to establish the link between the previous analytical exercise above – which 
sometimes consciously does not factor in political feasibility in order to explore a broader 
range of possible concepts – and the UNFCCC negotiations the study proposes a set of 
recommendations for further research and potential input to the UNFCCC debate and 
negotiations on sectoral approaches.  
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1 Introduction  
Background 
In September 2012, the "High-level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue" published its 
final report which recommends that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) should 
be used to support the development of new climate finance instruments that go beyond 
the existing approach - such as a sectoral CDM (S-CDM), "New Market Mechanism" 
(NMM), the "Framework for Various Approaches" (FVA), or Nationally Appropriate Mi-
tigation Actions (NAMAs). For years there has been a discussion on how the CDM can 
evolve from a project-based approach towards a more comprehensive or sectoral scope. 
Important existing developments in this direction are the CDM Programme of Activities 
(PoA) and standardized baselines (SB). Regarding emerging market mechanisms, the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 17 in 2011 established the NMM and FVA, which may 
serve as potential vehicles for sectoral approaches in the future. In addition, NAMAs 
may absorb some concepts which had originally been discussed in the CDM context, but 
have been adapted to developments such as rise of importance of climate finance in the 
UNFCCC process. In this context, the question arises how the transition period to a new 
climate regime can be shaped most effectively. This includes further development of 
market mechanisms to become more effective climate policy instruments, and the role of 
sectoral approaches in this process.  
Objectives 
Hence, the goal of this research project is to analyze and assess the debates and ongoing 
developments regarding sectoral approaches in existing and emerging UNFCCC me-
chanisms. This analysis shall serve to better understand to which extent existing me-
chanisms such as the CDM have already evolved towards a stronger sectoral perspec-
tive. Moreover, this research intends to contribute to expand the knowledge base on the 
foundations on which future mechanisms such as the NMM, FVA, NAMAs, and poten-
tially others can build in their respective future trajectories.   
Methodological approach and outline 
For this purpose, we reflect on the ongoing United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations and expert debates. We conduct a document 
analysis of recent UNFCCC submissions, and a desk review of the relevant literature 
and a range of databases such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Risoe Center CDM, PoA, and NAMA Pipelines. In order to add depth to the analysis, we 
have also conducted a set of semi-structured expert interviews with interviewees from 
three stakeholder groups: UNFCCC negotiators, academic/think tank experts, and mar-
ket participants. In addition, the authors draw on participant observation from negotia-
tions on existing and emerging mechanisms for many years. 
The resulting research report proceeds as follows: In a first step, we elaborate a short 
"inventory" of items and concepts regarding sectoral approaches. We therefore assess 
the debate on sectoral approaches in existing mechanisms, with an initial focus on the 
CDM (Chapter 2). Initially the academic debate on sectoral CDM is summarized (2.1), 
followed by a description of the most important developments referring to sectoral ex-
pansion under the CDM. First, we take stock of how the PoA concept has contributed to 
the methodological toolkit, and whether PoA pipeline allows drawing conclusion wheth-
er this approach already shows indications of sector-wide upscaling (2.2). Then, we re-
flect on progress regarding CDM standardization – again, both with regards to concep-
                                                                                                                                                                          21 
 
Developing Sectoral Mechanisms in the Transition Period towards a New Climate Treaty 
tual and regulatory developments first, and then by taking stock of the early implemen-
tation experience (2.3). In chapter 3, we extend our focus beyond existing mechanisms, 
and assess sectoral approaches under future mechanisms, with a special focus on sec-
toral elements that have been proposed in the UNFCCC negotiations for the NMM (3.1), 
the FVA (3.2) and for NAMAs (3.3). Chapter 4 then consolidates the findings as a prepa-
ration for the subsequent assessment. Chapter 5 offers an analysis on how the sectoral 
approaches from existing CDM elements and the early stages of negotiations on emerg-
ing mechanisms may be utilized for the further evolution of sectoral approaches within a 
reformed CDM and their potential for integration into NMM/FVA and NAMAs. We as-
sess which approaches are more likely to become integrated into any specific or all of the 
above-mentioned instruments. First, a set of indicators is defined (5.1) which allows dif-
ferentiating and structuring the analysis according to various institutional, technical 
and political aspects. Second, we discuss the potential of the identified sectoral elements 
for NMM/FVA and NAMAs (5.2). Approaches identified for further assessment are:  
▸ Standardized Baselines  
▸ Programme of Activities  
▸ Sectoral crediting and trading 
▸ Domestic policy instruments 
Finally, the report sums up the debate in reader-friendly tables which allow for a quick 
overview of the key results and messages (5.3).  
Chapter 6 builds on the results of these analytical steps and identify key challenges for 
implementing and further developing sectoral approaches (6.1.). Second, we propose po-
tential ways to overcome these obstacles (6.2). Both sections will discuss sectoral trading 
and sectoral crediting as key options for the NMM and, where appropriate, FVA, and 
also consider approaches that may become relevant for NAMAs. For each of these differ-
ent mechanisms, we focus on three stakeholder groups: the UNFCCC, national host 
country governments, and market participants / investors. Chapter 7 briefly summariz-
es key insights from this study, concludes from the previous analysis that at least three 
ideal types of sectoral approaches have been emerging – sector-oriented approaches, 
sector-wide approaches and sector-specific approaches –, and offers a set of recommen-
dations.  
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2 Sectoral elements under the Clean Development Mechanism 
The objective of this analysis is to reflect on how the debate around a sectoral CDM has 
attempted to propose solutions for some of the key criticisms of the CDM at various 
stages of its evolution. These include, for instance, the objective to trigger transforma-
tive shifts via incentivizing policies that can scale up mitigation actions beyond the 
project level. Other objectives are to enhance sustainable development, strengthen envi-
ronmental integrity, simplify regulatory processes and standards, as well as the reduc-
tion of transaction costs. Over time, some aspects of these proposals have become opera-
tional in the CDM, perhaps most effectively through PoAs and SBs. Other issues remain 
unaddressed and continue to be debated, e.g. geographical distribution, or have shifted 
along the lines of the broader UNFCCC process, such as the more recent demand for 
market mechanisms to contribute to net mitigation impacts. The discussion of sectoral 
mechanisms based on the CDM is structured along three main analytical dimensions, 
which consider the institutional, technical and political dimensions of these approaches, 
respectively. 
2.1 The historical debate on a Sectoral CDM 
In expert circles, the debate over a broadened scope of the CDM started with the rise of 
the CDM from around the year 2000. The following overview of these discussions on a 
CDM with a sectoral scope (Sectoral CDM, SCM) starts with a discussion of the various 
definitions of such a mechanism, and the respective advantages, and challenges with 
respect to institutional, technical and political aspects which had been discussed. 
The definitions of what constitutes a sectoral CDM differ substantially, and have 
evolved over time, though they were hardly ever presented explicitly. Conceptually, the 
term sectoral CDM has been applied to both project-based mechanisms and policy-based 
mechanisms. The former could refer to aggregating multiple projects or allowing up-
scaling of project-based activities by facilitating the CDM process through sectoral base-
lines or positive lists for judging project additionality (Barata & Helme 2008). Policy-
based approaches constitute a fundamentally different concept. In order to counter any 
confusion regarding the terms policy and project in case of a policy-based S-CDM, Fi-
gueres (2006) clarified that the policies themselves are understood as the “project” (to-
day the term “mitigation action” may be more appropriate), whereas the actual emission 
reduction activities implemented by emitters in response to the policies do not constitute 
“projects” in the sense of credited projects under the CDM. Such a policy based CDM is 
largely related to the concept of the sectoral crediting mechanism that is promoted by 
the EU today.  
A policy-based sectoral CDM could either be financed by international crediting (e.g. 
Samaniego and Figures 2002; Ward et al. 2008), or solely by the host country (Dutschke 
2005). In the former case, host countries could receive Certified Emission Reductions 
(CER) for implementing policies based on previously defined benchmarks (Schmidt 
2005). This stream of revenues could then be allocated via a clearinghouse mechanism 
by the host country government (Figueres 2002). A mechanism without international 
financing could aim towards international harmonization of policies and measures 
(Schmidt 2005). Under "graduation and deepening" countries could choose between an 
ex ante intensity target with emissions trading, or implement a countrywide, “policies 
and measures CDM” as a no lose target (Bodansky 2004). Ward et al. (2008) on the other 
hand proposes “Sustainable Development Policies and Measures” (not credited) and for 
some suitable sectors sectoral no-loose targets (credited). A distinction can also be made 
between a standards-based versus an incentives-based mechanism (Barata & Helme 
2008). This debate has many of the elements of the current discussion on unilateral and 
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supported NAMAs, as well as the sectoral approaches promoted by the European Union 
(EU).   
2.1.1 Political Dimension 
The main aspects of political nature relate to the broader context of the evolving archi-
tecture of the climate regime and UNFCCC negotiations, into which the CDM and its 
reform processes are embedded. Key issues include emissions reductions burden sharing 
between Annex I and Non-Annex-I (NAI) countries, and – closely related – Parties' ac-
ceptance of the mechanism. Other aspects include the mechanism's potential in trigger-
ing transformative change, as well as benefits for sustainable development, and their 
equitable distribution. The potential to reduce transaction costs, the mechanisms' scope, 
as well as, more recently, the relevance of enhancing certainty on robust market prices. 
A S-CDM that designates industrialized countries as leaders of the mitigation effort can 
be politically advantageous as it increases the appeal of market mechanisms for develop-
ing countries, which could also be highly cost-effective (Figueres, 2002). Compatibility 
with the Kyoto Protocol, a potential for capacity building and contributing to the adapta-
tion fund could further enhance its attractiveness (Figueres 2002). The mechanism 
could, however, also be perceived to weaken industrialized countries’ responsibility in 
case of a mechanism without international financing or if cost-neutral policies and 
measures are considered to be part of Non-Annex I Parties’ obligation (Dutschke 2005). 
An overly complex mechanism, which exceeds the capacity of developing country gov-
ernments, will likely also have less developing country support. High upfront costs in 
establishing country-wide baselines could reduce attractiveness unless they are funded 
by industrialized countries. The distribution of burden and benefits likely remains con-
tentious until the COP establishes detailed guidance (Sterk 2008). Issues due to an im-
balance of supply and demand of CERs were mentioned by Dutschke (2008); expecting 
higher reduction commitments by Annex-I countries, a mechanism based on financing 
by CERs was long seen as advantageous, today this would seem disadvantageous due to 
plummeting CER prices. 
Openness of a mechanism with regards to territorial coverage and the policies that can 
be used to enable emissions reductions is seen as attractive to potential host countries. 
The sectoral scope could also be open and either entails an entire sector, a sub-sector, 
activities across sectors, regional or city-wide actions as well as a combination of all of 
these (Figueres 2002). A geographically defined S-CDM – e.g. a city-wide policy – could 
further be limited to specific sub-sectors. Only few discuss a possible limitation in terms 
of host country eligibility – most seem to presume any Non-Annex I eligible. Bodansky 
(2004) limits the range of potential host countries for a sectoral mechanism to develop-
ing countries that do not have absolute national targets and substantial emissions e.g. 
in excess of 50 million tons of Carbon Dioxide (CO2). 
The initial discussion on benefits besides mitigation focused on transformative changes 
and environmental and social benefits (Figueres, 2002). Sustainable development was 
later addressed more explicitly noting that a sectoral approach might overcome the lack 
of rules regarding the role of Sustainable Development (SD) criteria in the Designated 
National Authority (DNA) choice of projects, since the policies implemented would per 
definition follow the host country's strategic planning, while incentivizing emissions 
reductions (Figueres 2006). The question of how a mechanism could aim to enable step-
changing technologies (Barata & Helme 2008) did not gain much traction in later dis-
cussions.  
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2.1.2 Institutional Dimension 
Generally the structure of decisions pertaining to a sectoral mechanism may be compa-
rable to the hierarchy of decision making on the CDM where international treaties such 
as the Kyoto Protocol are at the highest level, therefore, agreements by the Conference 
of the Parties (COP), serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), 
set political and strategic direction, and provide authoritative guidance for regulatory 
bodies like the CDM Executive Board, which define operational rules, standards, and 
procedures. Advisory bodies to the Executive Board (EB) such as the CDM Methodology 
Panel shape the establishment of rules even though they do not formally decide on 
them. Rules decided on different levels have different characteristics and lifetimes (Mi-
chaelowa et al. 2007). Annex I countries are responsible for creating demand for credits 
by mitigation commitments. Prospective host-country governments play a role both as 
regulators as well as implementers of a sectoral mechanism. As regulators they are to 
ensure comparability among standards used across market-based mechanisms, ensure 
proper reporting, monitoring, and verification of emissions reductions and sustainable 
development caused by implementation of a S-CDM. As implementers host countries are 
to design appropriate policies including proper allocation of funding. While Figueres 
(2002) notes that potential difficulties could result in the implementation of policies due 
to the need for collaboration between ministries, between public and private sector 
stakeholders and the need to engage with civil society, this may be a country and sector-
specific issue.   
2.1.3 Technical Dimension 
A general difficulty concerns the definition of what a sector is: while products and ser-
vices serve as a common criterion, others such as the inputs (energy use, fossil fuel use, 
fertilizer use), the types of GHGs emitted, or industry size could be used and a cut off 
level within the product-chain between up- and downstream is required for the sector 
definition. The sector definition needs to take place on the backdrop of substantial polit-
ical interests and implications on baseline definition. It has been shown that the com-
plexity of establishing the baseline vastly depends on sector definition and also results 
in varying levels of risk regarding leakage (Figueres 2002; Dutschke 2005; Barata & 
Helme 2008).  
Reducing uncertainty and avoiding the need to establish baselines for each individual 
project has been noted early on. Michaelowa proposed a combination of national and 
project-specific baselines (1998), while Sokona et al. (1998) and Begg et al. (2001) have 
proposed an early version of standardized baselines, which would have been developed 
by the CDM Executive Board. If chosen well, Dutschke (2005) notes that sectoral base-
lines and large-scale monitoring and verification of an S-CDM could reduce transaction 
costs substantially. Refinements, such as dynamic baselines, accounting for unforeseen 
changes due to e.g. more rapid technology penetration (WBSCD 2008), would however 
increase efforts. Barata and Helme (2008), however, note that though differentiated 
benchmarks based on best practices allow tailored solutions, they can be costly and diffi-
cult, since they require accurate historic installation emissions data and the capacity to 
accurately forecast emissions. Monitoring would require coordination across companies 
within the sector, which may be opposed by the private sector. If the country used penal-
ty funds to buy replacement emissions reductions, it could still reward those who 
achieve their targets even when others fail. Such an internal "clearinghouse”, which 
would ideally allow indicating the average reduction cost over the whole project had al-
ready been discussed early on (Samaniego and Figueres 2002). 
Some sectors may be better suited for a S-CDM (e.g. those with only a few large point 
source emissions and good data availability) and some have even seen initiatives from 
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emitters themselves in proposing sectoral approaches. A sectoral benchmark proposed 
for the cement industry (WBCSD 2008) included a benchmark to demonstrate additio-
nality before and during project implementation and one for baseline calculation. The 
latter proposes a dynamic benchmark that would account for changes of Business As 
Usual scenario (BAU) trends. Also the iron and steel sector (Duan 2009) as well as the 
aluminum sector (Siikavirta 2006) have been discussed as a sector suitable for a sectoral 
mechanism. And additional options may be opened up such as energy efficiency meas-
ures – noted as underrepresented under the CDM at that time (Figueres and Philips 
2007). 
The concept of additionality is vastly different between a policy-based or project-based 
mechanism: additionality of a policy-based mechanism would not be assessed on the 
level of individual actions, but rather concern the overall policy design. With a larger 
scope strong guidance on getting additionality right becomes more important. A new 
challenge in defining additionality arises in case of measures and policies that are not 
funded by industrialized countries, since funding must already be available in the host 
country (Dutschke 2005). Figueres (2006) notes that the issue that the additionality re-
quirement can act as a perverse incentive on policymaking could be eliminated by prop-
er design of baselines. In order to encourage step-changing technologies, the issued 
CERs could be divided (by the EB or the host-country) to specifically fund such technol-
ogies that have a great abatement potential but are not quite yet competitive. Address-
ing double counting, Barata & Helme (2008) proposes to simply ban countries adopting 
an S-CDM from conventional CDM activities. 
More recent developments include research that has informed the CDM Policy Dialogue, 
as well as the formal UNFCCC review of the CDM’s Modalities and Procedures (M&P), 
which both consider certain aspects of transforming the CDM, or some of its elements, to 
a sectoral mechanism. The CDM Policy Dialogue final report observes that the under-
standing of sectoral mechanisms has “evolved into a slightly more ﬂexible concept that 
includes not only approaches across a sector but also approaches across a sub-sector, a 
segment of the economy, or even a group of emitters. In this sense the important charac-
teristic is that mitigation is considered at a broad level of aggregation” (CDM Policy Di-
alogue 2012, p.27). Furthermore, the report concludes that “there  are  no  inherent  bar-
riers  to  reforming  the  CDM  to pursue  sectoral  approaches.  Indeed, the combination 
of standardized baselines and programmatic CDM […] suggests that the apparatus for 
pursuing such approaches is already operative, if unused. Perhaps the largest barrier 
faced by such approaches is one of demand,” (p.27). Therefore, the final report remains 
vague, but draws attention to the significant evolution of the CDM’s regulatory frame-
work that has already been achieved. It is worth noting that the panel rightly notes spe-
cifically the potential of combining standardization and programmatic approaches, as 
well as the severe impact of the absence of demand, which affects not only the CDM, but 
potentially any future mechanism (Michaelowa 2012). By reflecting on the question 
whether Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) should be 
included in the CDM, O’Sullivan et al. (2012) summarize a longer-standing debate, 
which centres around the issue whether the CDM in its future guise should remain an 
overarching umbrella mechanism for all sectors, or whether it is more sensible that crit-
ical sectors with highly idiosyncratic features should be managed under separate sector-
al mechanisms (other examples include HFCs, aviation and shipping).  
The CDM 2013/14 review had called for submissions from parties on proposed changes 
to the CDM’s modalities and procedures (UNFCCC 2013a). The CDM Executive Board 
has also compiled relevant suggestions (CDM Executive Board 2013a), and has prepared 
resulting recommendations to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (CDM Executive 
Board 2013b). There is no specific reference sectoral mechanism. These are more tech-
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nical and incremental in nature, and do not contain explicit references to transforming 
the CDM into a sectoral mechanism. However, the submissions of some parties explore 
some key issues in more detail, including a possible contribution of standardized base-
lines to net mitigation activities. These proposals will be referenced in the respective 
sections below. As a preliminary result, the following illustration provides an overview 
of the development of the concepts and terminology of sectoral approaches. 
Figure 1: Evolution of terms used in the context of sectoral approaches 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
*Concepts in quotation marks have not (yet) materialized under the terms used. 
2.2 CDM Programme of Activities  
As introduced above, the concept for CDM Programme of Activities has been evolving 
from the idea to lower transaction costs by aggregating many small mitigation activities 
(Figueres 2002; Figueres et al 2005). Initially, the concept of “bundling” was created for 
this purpose (CDM EB 2005), but was soon side-lined by the emergence of PoAs.1 Al-
ready the first CMP guidance relating to the CDM in 2005, shortly after the CDM be-
came formally operational, allowed for the aggregation of an unlimited number of indi-
vidual activities under a PoA (UNFCCC 2006). Therefore, the operationalization of PoAs 
can be seen as a significant move beyond the individual project level in CDM’s regulato-
ry framework. Operationalizing these reforms, however, has required several years of 
ongoing, sometimes cumbersome, regulatory evolution. 
Initially, the uptake of the PoA concept had been very slow. At the end of 2008, there 
were only four PoAs in validation, and the first PoA was not registered until July 2009. 
This was partly due to the generally higher complexity to develop a PoA compared to a 
single CDM project, but also because of the need to develop the operational details of the 
regulatory framework in a learning-by-doing process. A broad range of incremental ad-
justments to the CDM’s regulatory framework has slowly evolved to make the concept of 
PoAs operational. The pace of PoA inflow and registration success had increased nota-
bly, driven by the requirement that CDM activities from non-LDC host countries needed 
to be registered before the end of 2012 for being eligible under the EU Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (ETS), but have dropped sharply after that. As of October 2013, there are 
1 The “General principles for bundling” define the approach as “bringing together of several small-scale 
CDM project activities, to form a single CDM project activity or portfolio without the loss of distinctive 
characteristics of each project activity. Project activities within a bundle can be arranged in one or more 
sub-bundles, with each project activities retaining it distinctive characteristics” (CDM Executive Board 
2005:1). 
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now registered 222 PoAs, although only four of these have actually received issued 
CERs (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Status and evolution of PoA Pipeline 
 
Source: UNEP Risoe Center 2013 
As a first result, it is evident that PoAs have clearly moved from a conceptual to an operational 
phase, which allows drawing on an increasing pool of practical experience and related 
data. Yet, the EU ETS deadline, as well as the lack of CER demand from the EU ETS 
and other potential destinations, has dramatically stopped the inflow of new PoAs.  
PoAs remain a rather new instrument, and their effectiveness can only be tentatively 
assessed at this stage. The following sections will provide a review of the first expe-
riences with PoAs in order to assess whether PoAs already represent a move towards 
sectoral approaches, or may provide conceptual elements which could be further elabo-
rated in this direction. The first subsection will first elaborate one some distinct concep-
tual differences between PoAs and the project-based CDM, and discuss their applicabili-
ty and relevance for sectoral approaches. Then, we turn to the portfolio of PoAs that are 
in the CDM pipeline, and assess whether certain technologies and/or methodologies can 
already be interpreted to have achieved a (sub)sector-wide impact? Finally, we summar-
ize some key outstanding barriers for making the PoA concept work on sectoral level. 
The PoA concept is closely built on the project-based CDM, and operates within the ex-
isting modalities, procedures, and governance structures and the main actors largely 
fulfil very similar roles. Still, some noteworthy differences with relevance for sectoral 
approaches exist, which will be structured along the analytical perspectives that have 
been introduced above.2  
2.2.1 Political Dimension 
The objectives of introducing PoAs can be seen as an early major response to address 
key criticisms of the CDM relating to scale up emission reduction activities by reducing 
transaction costs, while promoting a more equitable geographical distribution of the 
benefits of the CDM. The PoA concept has originated from the interaction of an expert 
2 There are currently five sets of modalities and procedures for the CDM (large-scale, small-scale (SSC), 
afforestation/reforestation (A/R), SSC A/R, carbon capture and storage (CCS)), although a review process of 
these is currently ongoing as part of the broader 2013/2014 review of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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debate – which has been sketched above – and the political guidance which had been 
provided by the multilateral governance arrangements of the CDM.  
As Figure 3 reveals, the sectoral and regional distribution of PoAs versus ‘conventional’ 
CDM activities shows some clear differences which seem to be aligned with some of the 
political objectives of the UNFCCC. 
Figure 3: Regional and sectoral distribution of CDM PoAs and project activities 
 
Source: UNEP Risø Centre 2013b 
With regard to regional distribution, some of the so-called “under-represented” coun-
tries, notably African countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), appear to have 
much more success with attracting PoAs than with the conventional CDM project activi-
ties. In addition, it can be considered a highly significant development that operational 
procedures are in place which allows for PoA implementation across countries, and even 
continents. In that sense, the approach is even further than most notions of sectoral ap-
proaches, which are generally focused on designing mechanisms within a single country.  
With regard to scope, energy efficiency, waste management and solar energy activities – 
(sub)sectors and technologies with associated high sustainable development benefits - 
are being taken up much more strongly than under the current CDM. It is a vital aspect 
of the legitimacy of the PoA concept that the PoA portfolio has already produced discern-
ible differences to the single project CDM, which clearly indicates that regulatory re-
forms and capacity building can have an actual impact on implementation. Still, PoAs 
have so far not managed to penetrate a number of sectors such as forestry, agriculture 
and transportation, which have traditionally been underrepresented in the CDM. These 
sectors continue to be held back by methodological problems regarding e.g. the perma-
nence of resulting emission reductions, baselines and leakage. These aspects, however, 
require more far-reaching political decisions rather than incremental adjustments to the 
existing regulatory framework. Should these be achieved, the PoA concept could easily 
be transferred, as is demonstrated by a few pilot reforestation PoAs, and a larger num-
ber in the voluntary carbon market. Possibly Reducing Emissions from Avoided Defore-
station and Forest Degradation (REDD) may emerge as a separate sectoral mechanism, 
and may potentially integrate some of the afforestation and reforestation (A/R) project 
types that are currently featured under the CDM (CDM Policy Dialogue 2012). 
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Regarding potential net mitigation impacts of PoAs, just like for single CDM project ac-
tivities, all resulting CERs can potentially be used as offsets, and could also be used as 
“receipts” in a results-based payments framework that would retire the CERs (Raab 
2012). There is a voluntary cancellation account in the CDM registry which would allow 
for tracking such initiatives. In addition, crediting periods that are shorter than tech-
nology lifetimes or highly conservative baselines may also contribute to ‘hidden’ net mi-
tigation. 
Regarding potential double-counting of emission reduction resulting from PoAs, all 
CERs are tracked in the UNFCCC-operated CDM registry. Although there is broad 
agreement that double-counting should be avoided, there is not yet a finalized set of 
multilateral rules on how to separate the accounting for mitigation actions by develop-
ing countries from those that can be potentially used as offset credits. A future sectoral 
mechanism should integrate its Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) provi-
sions into the emerging global reporting framework, as the demands on developing 
countries to contribute to mitigation efforts can be expected to increase in the post-Kyoto 
architecture of the climate regime. This is partially covered under the biennial update 
reporting (BURs) that Non-Annex 1 countries need to submit from 2014 onwards, but 
will certainly need to be specified further for any future mechanism.  
The political uncertainty around how this pre- and post-2020 climate architecture will 
look like is closely related to the current lack of clarity on the level of mitigation ambi-
tion, which also translates to demand for CERs, and potentially of credits from future 
sectoral mechanisms. However, the other side of the coin of this lack of demand is an 
oversupply of carbon credits even from the existing flexible mechanisms. The dramati-
cally decreasing inflow of PoAs is a direct consequence of this highly depressed carbon 
market situation (see figure 2). Even before, upfront financing for PoAs has been even 
more difficult to secure than under the conventional CDM, as PoA design is more com-
plex, and, depending on type and location, the associated risks are therefore greater. 
There are a number of public sector initiatives which target explicitly PoAs in order to 
help the concept get off the ground, e.g. the KfW PoA Support Programme and the 
World Bank Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-DEV). These initiatives may contri-
bute to lending a lifeline to PoAs in priority sectors which may otherwise become unvia-
ble in the current market conditions. Yet, it is clear that no market mechanism will be 
able to function properly in the absence of sufficient levels of demand. In addition, the 
price volatility for CERs is a strong deterrent for potential host countries: if a country 
considers participating in a new sectoral mechanism which would demand more far-
reaching mitigation actions, and related large-scale investment, it would be necessary to 
enhance certainty on the value of the resulting carbon credits or other forms of financial 
support. The higher the related efforts and investments, the higher is the need for a 
minimum level certainty of return on these investments. 
2.2.2 Institutional Dimension 
On the global level, the CMP fulfils exactly the same role as for the conventional CDM, 
by providing political direction and authoritative guidance for the CDM, including for 
PoA related aspects. Yet, there are no specific CDM modalities and procedures for PoAs. 
Regulatory oversight, including technical standards, procedures and guidance are pro-
vided by the EB and its support structure (working groups and secretariat). Therefore, 
PoAs operate fully within the Kyoto Protocol framework. As NMM and/or FVA are ex-
pected to operate under the Convention rather than the Kyoto Protocol, a political deci-
sion would need to establish whether PoAs and the related regulatory framework could 
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function under another mechanism. However, this decision is relevant beyond PoAs, and 
is likely to be taken for the entire CDM rather than for PoAs only. 
On a national (host country) level, DNAs issue letters of approval for planned PoAs, but 
are not required to get involved any further than with single CDM projects. Therefore, it 
is not necessary for the host country to build a higher level of capacity to make PoAs 
function in practice. However, PoAs can cover multiple countries, and each Component 
Project of Activities (CPA) in an additional country requires a Letter of Approval (LoA) 
by the respective DNA.  
By contrast, project participants have to be able to cope with the higher complexity of 
managing a PoA compared to a single project activity. The structure of a PoA is com-
prised of a responsible Coordinating/Managing Entity (CME), and one or multiple CPAs, 
which can be located in the same or in multiple countries. Depending on PoA type, scale 
and location, this can lead to significant management and administration efforts, in par-
ticular if CPAs are implemented by different organizations. In this case, CPAs need to 
agree on contractual arrangements with the CME, e.g. through emission reductions pur-
chase agreements (ERPA), as CERs are always issued by the EB directly to CMEs. 
Third-party auditing is required from UNFCCC-accredited Designated Operational Ent-
ities (DOEs). By validating and verifying PoAs their role is very similar to the conven-
tional CDM. However, there are some important technical differences. If a DOE is found 
to be responsible for erroneous inclusion of a CPA into a PoA, the DOE is liable for re-
placing the CERs of this CPA, which represents a significant economic risk. This has 
caused a high degree of scrutiny and risk mitigation on the side of DOEs, with trade-offs 
bringing down transaction costs (see below). 
2.2.3 Technical Dimension 
PoAs rely on the established CDM project cycle although the operational details of mak-
ing PoAs work have required some adjustments to regulatory standards and procedures. 
These have been evolving in a learning-by-doing approach which has sometimes led to 
high levels of complexity and left room for interpretation, which increases uncertainty.  
With regard to methodologies, most approved CDM methodologies can be applied to both 
PoAs and single project activities, although some restrictions apply. The CDM metho-
dology panel has initiated a process to assess the most relevant methodologies (CDM 
Methodology Panel 2012). Some of the most frequently used large-scale methodologies 
are applicable under PoAs (e.g. ACM0002 for grid-connected renewable electricity gen-
eration), while others are not (e.g. AM0031 for Bus Rapid Transit Projects). The regula-
tory assessment, of which methodologies are suitable or eligible to be used for scaling up 
mitigation activities, can be seen as a first step towards a more “sectoral” evolution of 
PoAs.  
Methodologies can also be combined, as specified by the relevant guidance. The EB at its 
65th meeting has merged a set of PoA related standards into single standard for addi-
tionality demonstration, eligibility criteria, and application of multiple methodologies 
(CDM Executive Board 2012). The CME has to develop a PoA Design Document (PoA-
DD), which clarifies whether the different CPAs are of the same type or not with regard 
to demonstration of additionality, emission reduction calculations and monitoring. The 
provisions are quite narrow, for instance, in the case of ACM0002, CPAs are considered 
of different types if they rely on different renewable power generation technologies (e.g. 
solar, hydro, wind, geothermal). As documentation needs to be replicated for different 
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CPA types, this can lead to very lengthy documentation requirements, which undermine 
the objective to reduce transaction costs. 
Specific approaches on how to establish baselines are unaffected by whether an activity 
is set up as a PoA or as a single CDM project. Although some problems with establishing 
baselines persist, e.g. related to lack of (access to) historical data for some technologies 
or geographic locations, these are the same as for the project-based CDM. The standar-
dization reform process discussed below is much more relevant for streamlining baseline 
development than PoAs, which have other merits.  
Yet, the methodological tools for MRV and additionality demonstration are significantly 
different compared to single CDM activities. With regard to additionality, the same tools 
apply than for CDM project activities, and the key question is which criteria need to be 
met for CPA inclusion.  
Making PoAs work has produced important improvements in MRV procedures, e.g. with 
regard to sampling data. In addition, CPAs for registered PoAs can bypass validation 
requirements, and lower transaction costs. However, a remaining barrier is that verifi-
cation can only take place for the entire PoA, including all CPAs, at the same time (syn-
chronized verification). A practical example can help to illustrate the impact of this see-
mingly simple issue: For compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) PoAs developed according to 
AMS-II.J (demand-side activities for efficient lighting technologies), emission reductions 
are monitored based on independent monitoring surveys that have to be conducted with-
in a specified period after the start of distributing CFLs within each CPA activity. The 
survey defines the emission reduction volume for a set number of years (monitoring pe-
riod). The surveys would only make sense once the CFLs are distributed. However, a 
CPA may be included already without all CFLs distributed. In practice it is therefore 
very difficult to carry out such monitoring surveys at exactly the same point in time for 
an annual PoA verification (including all CPAs) (Blodgett 2013). 
2.2.4 Analysis of CDM PoA Pipeline for move towards sectoral focus 
After having analysed the distinct conceptual aspects of PoAs, this section aims to 
screen the existing PoA portfolio in order to assess whether the application of PoAs in 
practice allows for additional conclusions on shifts towards sectoral approaches as de-
fined above. On the most fundamental level, the idea that is underlying the PoA concept 
is to aggregate many activities in order to move beyond the project level. Therefore, one 
way of answering this question is to look at whether there are actually PoAs in the pipe-
line that have managed to register more than one of individual CPAs. Another rather 
obvious aspect to consider is the mere (anticipated) scale of the emission reductions of 
PoAs. Table 1 illustrates that 29 PoAs in 18 different countries have managed to regis-
ter at least two CPAs. Nine PoAs have even managed to register more than ten CPAs, 
and each of these PoAs expects several million CERs, three of them even more than ten 
million CERs by 2020. The Chinese Sichuan Rural Poor-Household Biogas Development 
Programme (53 CPAs) is the first PoA that formally relies on a positive list for additio-
nality demonstration - another innovative methodological element in the CDM - that is 
discussed in the context of sectoral mechanisms (see chapter 3 below). Host countries 
range from LDCs to BRIC (Brasilia, Russia, India, China) countries. Interestingly, all 
but one PoAs rely on small-scale methodologies, still, almost all of them expect to reduce 
at least several hundred thousand tonnes of CO2 or more until 2020. As mentioned 
above, the current PoA portfolio is dominated by energy efficiency, waste and electricity 
generation activities. This means that there is a slight shift in the sectors that have 
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dominated the portfolio of the project- based CDM, including a notable absence of the 
most intensely criticized project types (industrial gas, coal power generation, some large 
scale wind and hydro). Of course it depends on a broad range of factors, including many 
non-CDM related factors such as local investment climate and governance conditions 
whether these targets will actually be reached.  Another noteworthy observation is that 
there are a number of public sector organizations listed as coordinating entities. Exam-
ples from Table 1 include PoAs such as the Uganda Municipal Waste Compost Pro-
gramme (National Environment Management Authority), the Egypt Vehicle Scraping 
and Recycling Programme (Ministry of Finance), or the Solar Water Heater Programme 
in Tunisia (Agence and Nationale pour la Maitrise de l’Energie). 
Table 1: PoAs with more than one CPA 
ID Title Host 
country 
(other) 
Coordin
ating 
Entity 
Sta-
tus 
PoA-
Type 
/ 
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or 
Met
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logy 
PoA 
lifeti
me 
start  
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2 
ktCO
2 
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ktCO2 
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of 
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PoA
000
2 
Methane cap-
ture and 
combustion 
from Animal 
Waste Man-
agement Sys-
tem (AWMS) 
of the 3S 
Program 
farms of the 
Sadia Insti-
tute 
Brazil Sadia Re-
giste
red 
Meth
ane 
avoi
dan-
ce 
AMS
-
III.D. 
29-
Okt-
09 
2.36
5,11
6  
10.61
6,011  
105
0 
PoA
005
9 
Sichuan Rural 
Poor-
Household 
Biogas De-
velopment 
Programme 
China Cheng-
du Oa-
sis 
Science 
and 
Tech-
nology 
Co 
Re-
giste
red 
Meth
ane 
avoi
dan-
ce 
AMS
-
III.R.
+AM
S-
I.C. 
10-
Dez-
10 
1,00
0  
5.197,
230  
53 
PoA
001
2 
CFL lighting 
scheme – 
“Bachat 
Lamp Yojana” 
India Bureau 
of 
Energy 
Effi-
ciency 
Re-
giste
red 
EE 
hous
ehol
ds 
AMS
-II.J. 
30-
Mai-
10 
1.94
6,37
0  
7.131,
390  
50 
PoA
018
4 
PoA for the 
Reduction of 
emission 
Madaga
scar (25 
others) 
Green 
Deve-
lopmen
Re-
giste
red 
EE 
hous
ehol
AMS
-I.E. 
01-
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41 
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from non-
renewable 
fuel from 
cooking at 
household 
level 
t AS ds 
PoA
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3 
Promotion of 
Biomass 
Based Heat 
Generation 
Systems in 
India 
India Therma
x 
Sustain
able 
Energy 
Soluti-
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Re-
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Biom
ass 
ener
gy 
AMS
-I.C. 
01-
Dez-
10 
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544  
4.629,
400  
31 
PoA
000
4 
CUIDEMOS 
Mexico 
(Campana De 
Uso Intele-
gente De 
Energia Mex-
ico) – Smart 
Use of Energy 
Mexico 
Mexico Cool 
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Carbon 
Invest-
ments 
Re-
giste
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EE 
hous
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ds 
AMS
-II.C. 
01-
Jun-
09 
74,8
72  
6.070,
750  
25 
PoA
000
1 
Installation of 
Solar Home 
Systems in 
Bangladesh 
Bang-
ladesh 
Infrast-
ructure 
Deve-
lopmen
t Com-
pany 
Limited 
Re-
giste
red 
So-
lar 
AMS
-I.A. 
22-
Jun-
07 
12,1
42  
4.149,
184  
13 
PoA
005
5 
Than Thien 
Small Hydro-
power Pro-
gramme of 
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Managed by 
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Viet-
nam 
Invest-
ment 
and 
Trade 
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Com-
pany 
(INTRA-
CO) 
Re-
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Hyd-
ro 
AMS
-I.D. 
01-
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12 
1,69
3  
1.304,
750  
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PoA
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Green Power 
for South 
Africa 
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Africa 
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dard 
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Re-
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2 
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10 
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Africa 
PoA
000
5 
Uganda Mu-
nicipal Waste 
Compost Pro-
gramme 
Uganda Nation-
al Envi-
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mental 
Manage
ment 
Authori-
ty (NE-
MA) 
Re-
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Land
fill 
gas 
AMS
-III.F. 
12-
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847  
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10  
9 
PoA
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Solar Water 
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nale 
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l'Ener-
gie 
(ANME) 
Re-
giste
red 
So-
lar 
AMS
-I.C. 
23-
Jan-
07 
15,7
19  
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30  
8 
PoA
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5 
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lar Water 
Heater Pro-
gramme 
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my of 
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Re-
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First Solar 
PoA in India 
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Consul-
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Re-
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So-
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AMS
-I.D. 
04-
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11 
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00  
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06  
6 
PoA
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4 
National So-
lar Power 
Development 
Programme, 
India 
India Emerge
nt Ven-
tures 
Re-
giste
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So-
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AMS
-I.D. 
21-
Okt-
10 
3,11
3  
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6 
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4 
Malaysia Bi-
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er 
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Re-
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ce 
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-
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6 
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PoA
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4 
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Re-
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11 
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gramme to 
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6,370  6 
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Re-
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ds 
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-II.G. 
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11 
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Grid 
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ration 
of Chi-
na 
Re-
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gy 
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11 
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99  
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80  
4 
PoA
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asca 
Re-
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ro 
AMS
-I.D. 
01-
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11 
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5  
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01  
4 
PoA
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9 
Punjab State 
Electricity 
Board: High 
Voltage Dis-
tribution Sys-
tem for Agri-
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sumers in the 
Rural Areas of 
the Punjab 
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State 
Electric-
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Re-
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red 
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gy 
dis-
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tion 
AMS
-II.A. 
25-
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07 
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3  
1.245,
990  
4 
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PoA
001
6 
Egypt Vehicle 
Scrapping 
and Recycling 
Program 
Egypt Ministr
y of 
Finance 
Re-
giste
red 
Tran
spor
t 
AMS
-
III.C. 
11-
Mai-
11 
0,03
0  
212,4
60  
3 
PoA
025
6 
South Africa 
Renewable 
Energy Pro-
gramme (SA-
REP) 
South 
Africa 
Stan-
dard 
Bank 
Re-
giste
red 
Hyb-
rid 
rene
wabl
es 
AMS
-I.D. 
27-
Feb-
12 
0,00
0  
448,1
33  
3 
PoA
007
0 
Efficient Cook 
Stove Pro-
gramme: 
Kenya 
Kenya co2bala
nce UK 
Re-
giste
red 
EE 
hous
ehol
ds 
AMS
-II.G. 
21-
Mrz-
12 
42,1
32  
824,1
30  
2 
PoA
002
8 
Methane re-
covery and 
combustion 
with renewa-
ble energy 
generation 
from anae-
robic animal 
manure man-
agement sys-
tems under 
Land Bank of 
the Philip-
pines Carbon 
Finance Sup-
port Facility 
Philipp-
ines 
Land 
Bank of 
the 
Philip-
pines 
(LBP) 
Re-
giste
red 
Meth
ane 
avoi
dan-
ce 
AMS
-
III.D. 
01-
Jun-
12 
40,3
70  
707,3
43  
2 
Source: own illustration based on UNEP Risoe 2013b 
This is relevant, as sectoral approaches are expected to require a much more compre-
hensive role of national governments. However, the CDM is indifferent whether the 
coordinating entity is from the private or public sector. Some PoAs also demonstrate 
how private sector companies can be incentivized to engage in very comprehensive ap-
proaches. Beyond the financial input of private sector investment, the diversity of possi-
ble mitigation actions makes it attractive that non-state actors can initiate and imple-
ment large-scale mitigation activities. Although the public sector retains regulatory 
oversight through LoAs and sector-specific regulation, the CDM requires less adminis-
trative and technical capacity in a broad range of sectors. However, this capacity may 
need to be developed when setting up sectoral mechanism which requires stronger host 
country engagement. This is likely to be feasible only for the most advanced developing 
countries with sufficient capacity and resources.  
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2.3 CDM Standardized Baselines 
CDM standardization seeks to streamline and simplify some key elements of CDM me-
thodologies most prominently baselines, additionality demonstration and MRV. As the 
discussion of the historical debate around a sectoral CDM has shown, the standardiza-
tion of CDM methodologies had been discussed from the outset, although this idea has 
gained traction only in recent years. Therefore, an assessment of its first results cannot 
be exhaustive, but provide first indications for its relevance for sectoral mechanisms. 
The calculation of BAU scenarios for the emissions intensity and reductions for a broad 
range of technologies in very different contexts has always raised concerns about com-
plexity and uncertainty, and standardizing and streamlining CDM methodologies had 
been discussed as possible solutions from the beginning of the CDM (Jackson et al. 2001; 
Sokona et al. 1998; Michaelowa 1998). Yet, for a variety of reasons, including a general 
lack of experience with operationalizing baseline- and crediting mechanisms, the con-
cept has only begun to gain more political relevance in the last few years, and is just 
beginning to be implemented. There are now three approved CDM standardized base-
lines, as well as a broad range of methodologies which apply standardized approaches to 
various degrees. 
Standardized approaches do not primarily aim at scaling up CDM activities, but rather 
at simplifying and streamlining them. Easier applicability, however, can of course be 
seen as a precondition for achieving scale. Key objectives can be summed up as equity, 
efficiency, effectiveness: Equity by broadening access to the CDM for under-represented 
countries, for instance by developing easily applicable methodologies “top-down” (see 
below), and allowing countries to propose e.g. baselines and additionality provisions that 
are nationally applicable, and do no need to calculated on a project-by project level. Effi-
ciency because these steps potentially achieve significant transaction cost reductions for 
project developers. Initially, however, the host country DNA and/or the UNFCCC will 
need to make up-front efforts to enable these efficiency gains. Effectiveness, because 
high-quality standardized baselines may not only enable scaled up mitigation through 
easier applicability, but also strengthen the conservativeness of baselines and the inte-
grity of additionality tests. However, putting these ideas in practice needs to be done 
carefully in order to avoid e.g. easily applicable “unambitious” baselines with weak envi-
ronmental integrity. The following sections will look at these aspects in more depth; 
however, it is clear that standardization contributes to shifting CDM practices further 
away from the project-by-project approach. 
2.3.1 Political Dimensions 
The CMP provided the Executive Board with a strong mandate to roll out comprehen-
sive standardization of methodological elements of the CDM. CMP6 defines a standar-
dized baseline “as a baseline established for a Party or a group of Parties to facilitate the 
calculation of emission reduction and removals and/or the determination of additionality 
for clean development mechanism project activities, while providing assistance for as-
suring environmental integrity” (UNFCCC 2010), and defined a number of key aspects, 
which include the number of priority sectors (energy in isolated areas, transport and 
agriculture). CMP7 largely reaffirmed this mandate, although some rifts over the man-
datory applicability of standardized baselines emerged during CMP8 in Warsaw 2013. 
The key question is whether the use of SBs should be mandatory or voluntary once ap-
proved, which may create winners and losers (Spalding-Fecher and Michaelowa 2013). 
Some developing countries took issue with a perceived intrusion into their national so-
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vereignty by such a move. However, as standardized baselines always have to be in-
itiated and submitted by host country institutions (DNAs);  
this conflict seems resolvable once a better familiarity with SBs will evolve over time. 
Another important aspect is that a standardized baseline is available to all potential 
projects developed in a CDM host country and is therefore a public good. This creates a 
problem in the incentive structure to develop SBs, as private sector actors may not want 
to allow competitors to benefit from their work in developing an SB. This suggests a 
strong role of the public sector in ensuring that a broad range of SBs across sectors and 
regions will be available in the future.  
Standardization features have played a prominent role in the submissions on 
NMM/FVA, as well as inputs to revisions of CDM Modalities and Procedures. While SB 
development currently to a large extent focuses on LDCs and underrepresented coun-
tries in the CDM context, the NMM discussion tends to focus on larger and more emis-
sions-intense middle-income and emerging economies. The procedures are fully applica-
ble to other contexts even though they may be insufficient for NMMs as they still oper-
ate within the framework of the CDM’s modalities and procedures. In this context one 
can observe a certain disconnect between the debates on the role of standardization in 
CDM and future mechanisms. Yet, in particular in light of the lack of progress on 
NMMs in recent negotiations and the slow, but continuous reform of the CDM, e.g. with 
regard to standardization and the possible revisions of the CDM’s modalities and proce-
dures, it is important to ensure transferring the lessons from existing mechanisms such 
as the CDM to emerging future instruments. 
2.3.2 Institutional Dimensions  
CDM standardization still operates within the Kyoto Protocol governance architectures, 
and is directly mandated by the CMP, the highest multilateral decision-making body on 
a global level. This reform process can therefore be seen as another regulatory response, 
similarly to the introduction of PoAs, to some of the most persistent criticisms of the 
CDM regarding methodological complexity, lack of data availability, and unequal geo-
graphical distribution of CDM benefits. It can be seen as a merit of the multilateral ar-
chitecture of the CDM that standardization aims at addressing concerns that challenge 
the legitimacy of the CDM.  
A critical difference to both the project-based CDM and PoAs is the different role of host 
country. At least for the development of country- and sector-specific SBs, DNAs are for 
the first time required to transcend their supervisory role, and assume responsible for 
the practical development of SBs in their country. This is a highly significant develop-
ment, which offers opportunities, but also raises challenges. Although the first steps 
towards implementation have only just begun in a few developing countries, mainly in 
Africa, this move can be expected to generate valuable lessons for new sectoral mechan-
isms, which are also anticipated to demand a greater role from host country govern-
ments. 
In addition, the Executive Board as well as the UNFCCC Secretariat also assumes im-
portant functions in the direct development of standardized methodologies as mandated 
by the CMP. However, this is not an entirely new role, as small-scale methodologies had 
previously been developed or commissioned by these actors. It is worth noting that the 
CDM EB, in contrast to most international regulatory bodies, has access to a compara-
tively large pool or resources that are independent from donor governments, which is an 
important factor in the agency. These funds have already been used, among others, to 
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initiate a loan scheme to cover the costs of CDM documentation in under-represented 
countries, and to establish regional CDM collaboration centres (RCC) in Africa and Lat-
in America. A key role of these RCCs, among others, will be to provide support for devel-
oping standardized baselines. In addition, the World Bank and bilateral donors are be-
ginning to dedicate resources for developing standardized baselines and methodologies 
for priority project or PoA types.  
2.3.3 Technical Dimensions 
The CDM EB work programme for CDM standardization focuses on sector-specific stan-
dardized baselines, but also includes other methodological elements such as additionali-
ty testing, MRV (e.g. sampling), and full-fledged top-down development of new CDM 
methodologies for prioritized project types with high sustainable development impacts 
and relevance for under-represented countries.  
A standardized baseline allows to reduce transaction costs for project developers signifi-
cantly, as a key part of the required work for project documentation – calculating the 
baseline - is readily available once it is approved by the CDM EB, and does not need to 
be conducted again and again for each individual projects. In addition, the common use 
of default factors may alleviate the problem of data availability for project types that 
operate in informal sectors and/or rural contexts in low-income countries, e.g. for effi-
cient charcoal production. 
Due to these simplifications, it is important to safeguard the environmental integrity of 
CDM baseline as all resulting CERs can be used to offset emissions elsewhere. Envi-
ronmental integrity can be positive in case of “ambitious baselines”, which may even 
result in potential net mitigation impacts. A key problem for accounting for such net 
mitigation is that there are no accounting procedures to make the net impacts of highly 
ambitious baselines visible. This does not allow the host country to claim such mitiga-
tion effects. The CDM does currently not formally require net mitigation through ambi-
tious baselines; however, baselines always have to be developed according to the prin-
ciple of conservativeness, as well as according to a set of quality criteria such as accura-
cy, completeness, recentness, among others, which are specified in the relevant proce-
dures. This means that baselines should be developed based on the most accurate and 
recent data (CDM EB 75, Annex 33). However, if a baseline inflates actual emissions 
due to faulty or incomplete data this results in over-allocation of CERs for mitigation 
activities. 
As mentioned before, DNAs are responsible for overseeing the integrity of SBs. For this 
purpose, DNAs need to develop and implement systems for quality assurance and quali-
ty control (QA/QC). Data ownership and management as required by the QA/QC-System 
are the most demanding aspects of the new roles of a DNA in the SB procedures. There 
is very little experience with these systems yet, although different scenarios are possi-
ble. DNAs may own the data itself and maintain it in a specific archive or registry. By 
contrast, there could be a model in which the DNA merely coordinates the relevant sec-
toral agencies which take over some responsibility for managing the data quality of the 
SB. These responsibilities are very significant, as they represent a shift in the estab-
lished role in the DNA, which is related to what can be expected under sectoral mechan-
isms. These systems are just beginning to be tested in practice and the capacity of DNAs 
especially in lower-income countries represents a potential challenge in ensuring the 
integrity of SBs. The procedure also allows for developing multi-country standardized 
baselines. In such cases, one DNA shall act as the lead and other DNAs from participat-
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ing countries shall endorse the submission of the application for adoption of a standar-
dized baseline.  
SBs are valid only for a period of normally up to three years, and need to be updated 
after that, again based on the respective CDM EB procedure. Importantly, however, SBs 
can be revised top-down if the EB feels that technological innovation of faulty applica-
tions have resulted in SBs with low integrity. Third-party auditors (DOEs) are also in-
volved in ensuring the integrity of a SB by compiling an assessment report (AR) on the 
quality of the DNA’s QA/QC system, which can be compared to a validation. For the first 
three SBs in “under-represented countries, the AR can be omitted, however, the 
UNFCCC itself will then perform checks similarly to the AR by the DOE”.  
SBs need to be based on approved methodologies or tools, and in line with respective 
procedures. If a new methodological approach is employed, the SB needs to follow the 
established procedures for developing new methodologies or tools. Therefore, the exist-
ing institutional checks and balances in the CDM also apply to SBs. These are comple-
mented by an expanding set of procedures and guidance, which have been more complex 
than originally expected, and the way forward for SBs has been critically assessed by 
senior international experts (Schneider et al. 2012), and even the CDM Methodology 
Panel (UNFCCC 2012c). Still, the regulatory framework needs to be considered as being 
at an early stage of maturation with first steps towards consolidation only beginning. As 
with the operationalization of previous reforms, some “teething“ problems can be ex-
pected which can be addressed in the CDM’s tested learning-by-doing approach. 
Additionality can also be standardized through the SB procedures, for instance by defin-
ing positive lists for certain technologies, or other eligibility criteria. Some technologies 
are now automatically additional on a global level, but these must be considered as ex-
ceptions with comparably high costs (solar, off-shore wind, marine renewable energy), or 
only at micro- or pico-scale. This concept is at an early stage, although it has already 
been employed in some PoAs (see Table 2), and is discussed prominently both in the 
CDM reform debate, and in the discussions on new mechanisms, including on bilateral 
mechanisms such as the Japanese Joint Crediting Mechanism. 
2.3.4 Portfolio analysis of standardized approaches under the CDM 
As explained in the section on technical dimensions, standardized baselines are most 
frequently mentioned although the standardization agenda is more encompassing. An 
important distinction is between a standardized baseline, and a standardized methodol-
ogy, in which a broader set of technical elements is standardized. In addition, the most 
recent procedure formally distinguishes between top-down and bottom-up standardiza-
tion (UNFCCC 2013a). First, examples for standardized methodologies and their relev-
ance for sectoral approaches will be introduced, followed by an assessment of currently 
available portfolio of bottom-up sector-specific SBs. 
Top-down standardization 
This aspect of standardization concerns mainly streamlining of existing methodologies, 
as well as development of new methodologies for desired sectors and contexts. As per the 
mandate of the CDM these efforts have mainly focused on small-scale interventions that 
are applicable to LDCs. A key advantage is that they are globally applicable, which is 
more efficient in terms of transaction costs. However, a challenge is that sometimes de-
fault values are overly conservative (although there are also examples of loose provi-
                                                                                                                                                                          41 
 
Developing Sectoral Mechanisms in the Transition Period towards a New Climate Treaty 
sions that result in weak integrity). Table 2 uses rural electrification as an example of a 
sector in which most methodological progress has been made. 
Table 2: Selected standardized CDM methodologies for rural electrification 
CDM 
Methodology 
Degree of standardisa-
tion 
Eligibility  conditions 
Country-specific 
standardisation 
potential 
Number of 
Projects / 
PoAs 
AMS-I.L. 
Electrifica-
tion of rural 
communities 
using renew-
able energy 
Default baseline emis-
sion factors of 6,8 – 
1,3 – 1,0 tCO2e/MWh 
for different catego-
ries of end-users (e.g. 
households) for off 
grid or mini-grid   
75% of end-users 
shall be households 
End-users are not 
electrified, supplied 
with efficient light-
ing,  
Equipment meets 
quality standards 
Default factors 
considering 
suppressed de-
mand  
Country-specific 
end-user 
weighting 
0/1 
AMS-III.BB 
Electrifica-
tion of com-
munities 
through grid 
extension or 
construction 
of new mini-
grids 
Baseline emissions 
are the sum of emis-
sions associated with 
new and existing con-
sumers. 
Same default values 
as in AMS-I.L. 
Limited to communi-
ties with no access 
to a national or re-
gional grid 
At least 75% of the 
end-users (by num-
ber) shall be house-
holds. 
Default factors 
considering 
suppressed de-
mand 
Project emis-
sions and lea-
kage 
0/1 
AMS-III.AR 
Substituting 
fossil fuel 
based light-
ing with 
LED/CFL 
lighting sys-
tems 
Default values for 
baselines emissions 
(lamp emission factor, 
fuel use rate, utiliza-
tion rate, annual utili-
zation, fuel emissions 
factor), resulting in 
emission reductions 
per lamp of 
0,092tCO2/lamp). 
Crediting period 
dependent on perfor-
mance standards 
Lamp life must be 
certified by manufac-
turer 
(5,000/10,000h), 
which affects credit-
ing period (2 or 7 
years) 
Max. 5 lamps per 
household 
Higher level of 
suppressed de-
mand, minimum 
service level, 
fuel emissions 
factor. 
1/13 
AM0103  
Renewable 
energy power 
generation in 
isolated gr-
ids 
Emission factor of the 
isolated grid 
(t CO2/MWh), based 
on the composition of 
the isolated grid, if 
data are available  
Use of one of the 
following sources: 
hydro, wind, geo-
thermal, solar, wave 
or tidal power. 
Specific conditions 
for hydro power 
apply. 
Limited 0/0 
Source: own illustration 
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In part this standardization has happened because there is a lot of experience and data 
in the energy sector, but also because such project types with high sustainable develop-
ment impacts which are applicable especially in LDCs fit well with the political priori-
ties of the standardization reform programme. It can clearly be seen in Table 2 that the 
methodologies that are applicable to rural electrification in a narrower sense have not 
been implemented at scale yet. Still, they are a particularly noteworthy element of the 
CDM toolkit, as there has been a lot of recent progress on a methodological level, e.g. by 
introducing default values that eliminate the critical barrier of lack of data availability. 
In addition, the concept of suppressed demand is gradually being introduced, with quan-
tified estimates of minimum service levels, e.g. for household electricity consumption, 
which are then translated into baseline default values. Concepts such as suppressed 
demand are often absent from the discussion on sectoral mechanisms, which tend to 
focus on more advanced developing countries. Yet, even in China and India, there are 
still vast regions and populations to whom these concepts are relevant. The review of the 
historical debate and the political drivers for introducing both PoAs and SBs indicate 
that such demands will be raised also for new mechanisms. The increasingly compre-
hensive operationalization of these concepts e.g. in SBs is therefore potentially relevant 
both for the CDM as well as for new market mechanisms. Beyond rural electrification, 
top-down development of new methodologies and standardization of existing ones is a 
key aspect of the EB work programme in the coming years. 
Bottom up standardized baselines 
Standardization allows countries to develop sector-specific standardized baselines, 
which aim at taking into account specific country circumstances. Due to the prominent 
political mandate for standardization, a relatively elaborate regulatory framework has 
been emerging over the last two years, to operationalize the bottom-up development of 
country-specific, consistings mainly of the following documents, as well as a number of 
related forms and standards: 
Table 3: Procedures and Guidance for sector-specific standardized baselines 
 
SB-specific 
CDM EB proce-
dures and 
guidance doc-
uments 
▸ Procedure: Development, revision, clarification and update of standar-
dized baselines. Version 03.0 (EB 75, Annex 33)* 
▸ Guidelines for Quality Assurance and Quality Control of Data used in 
the Establishment of Standardized Baselines. Version 01.0. (EB 66, 
Annex 49) 
▸ Guidelines for the Establishment of Sector Specific Standardized Base-
lines. Version 02.0. (EB 65, Annex 23) 
▸ Establishment of standardized baselines for afforestation and refore-
station project activities under the CDM Version 01.0 (EB 70, Annex 10) 
Further rele-
vant CDM EB 
procedures and 
guidance which 
contribute to 
standardization 
▸ Guidelines for determining baselines for measures. Version 1.0 (EB 69, 
Annex 21) 
▸ Guidelines on the demonstration of additionality of small-scale project 
activities. Version 09.0. (EB 68, Annex 27)  
▸ Guidelines on the consideration of suppressed demand in CDM Metho-
dologies. Version 02.0. (EB 68, Annex 2) 
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▸ Development, revision and clarification of baseline and monitoring 
methodologies and methodological tools (EB 70, Annex 36) 
Source: Own illustration, based on CDM website 
However, the applicability of these procedures has only been tested scarcely, as there 
are not too many practical examples so far. Table 4 lists all approved and proposed SBs 
that are available have been approved by or proposed to the CDM EB.  
Table 4: Approved and proposed sector-specific standardized baselines 
Refe-
rence 
Sector Title 
Submitted by 
(applicable count-
ries) 
Submi
tted 
Approval Da-
te/Status 
Approved Standardized Baselines 
ASB-
0001 
Power Sector 
Grid emission factor 
for the Southern 
African Power pool 
Botswana (Demo-
cratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC); 
Lesotho; Mozam-
bique; Namibia; 
South Africa; 
Swaziland; Zam-
bia; Zimbabwe) 
21 
Aug 
2012 
31 May 2013 
ASB-
0002 
Charcoal 
production 
for consump-
tion in 
households 
and SMEs 
Fuel switch, tech-
nology switch and 
methane destruc-
tion in the charcoal 
sector of Uganda  
Uganda 
16 
May 
2012 
31 May 2013  
ASB-
0003 
Power Sector 
Grid emission factor 
for the Republic of 
Uzbekistan  
Uzbekistan 
31 Jan 
2013 
7 Oct 2013 
Proposed Standardized Baselines 
PSB-
0002 
Cement 
Standardized base-
lines for clinker 
production in Ethi-
opia 
Ethiopia 
24 Jul 
2012 
Initial 
assessment  
PSB-
0004 
Rice mill 
sector 
Standardized base-
line of energy use in 
rice mill sector of 
Cambodia 
Cambodia 
27 
Sep 
2012 
Initial 
assessment 
successfully 
concluded 
PSB-
0006 
Power Sector 
Grid emission factor 
of Belize 
Belize 
23 
May 
2013 
Initial 
assessment 
successfully 
concluded 
Source: Own illustration, based on CDM website 
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It is clear that the SB portfolio has mainly focused on sectors which have already been 
taken up quite comprehensively under the CDM, such as energy and cement. Other sec-
tors with less CDM experience have not yet begun to develop SBs. Therefore, at least in 
the initial phase, SBs can be seen as a consolidation of existing experience. Other sec-
tors such as transport, agriculture or forestry have not yet been taken up, although spe-
cific guidelines for such SBs are anticipated or already under development. The first 
sector-specific guidance has been published for SBs for afforestation and reforestation 
(CDM EB 70, Annex 10).  
In terms of geographical scope, it is clear that SBs are mainly developed in so-called un-
der-represented countries such as LDCs, which is in line with the political guidance by 
the CMP. To which extent the concept can be integrated into NMMs, where the discus-
sion focuses on higher-income countries, still needs to be seen in practice, although the 
available guidelines are fully applicable to all sectors in all potential host countries. 
Some of these sectors with relevance for the economies of more advanced developing 
countries have been explored on a conceptual basis (see chapter 2.1).  
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3 Sectoral options in emerging UNFCCC market mechanisms 
As outlined above, the debate on sectoral approaches has been evolving for more than a 
decade, and has produced a broad range of ideas and concepts. The initially rather tech-
nical debate by academic experts was taken up by policy- and decision makers in the 
„golden days’’ of the carbon market back in 2007 and 2008. Back then, the CDM reform 
process took up concepts of PoAs and later laid the foundations for standardization of 
baselines and other methodological tools. In UNFCCC negotiations on the post-2012 
treaty following the Kyoto Protocol, Parties started debating concepts of sectoral ap-
proaches in line with the mandate coming from the Bali Action Plan in 2007. The two 
main concepts discussed as sectoral approaches for a post-2012 climate policy world, are 
“sectoral trading” and “sectoral crediting”, which were promoted by the EU from 2008 
onwards in the negotiation stream on “Long term Cooperative Action” (LCA). Some of 
the market friendly Parties supported the EU´s sectoral approach, others opposed it – 
but only few other Parties introduced their own concepts. Koakutsu & Usui (2013) offer 
a good overview of country submissions on the NMM and FVA until mid-2013. In the 
following we assess the distinct negotiation streams with relevance for sectoral ap-
proaches under an emerging and future climate policy regime, namely the New Market 
Mechanism (NMM), the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) as well as NAMAs. 
For the latter we also regard the debate on non-market based approaches (NMAs).  
A very important aspect in the discussion of future market mechanisms is the distinc-
tion between project level mitigation and government level mitigation results. Navigat-
ing through the landscape of existing and future mechanisms is complex, given that in-
dividual mechanisms address different actors and levels, operating in very different 
country- and sector-specific circumstances. Under the CDM, incentives for action were 
initially addressing directly the emitters' level, while the NMM envisages incentivizing 
governments to take action on a scale beyond the project level.3 In case of the NMM, but 
also under NAMAs governments can choose whatever policy instruments they deem 
adequate on the domestic level to incentivize mitigation action. An illustrative list of 
such instruments is provided in figure 4 below, while figure 5 illustrates the layers of 
decision making under the CDM and NMM.  
3 CDM PoAs or standardized baselines allow for focusing on mitigation opportunities beyond individual 
projects.  
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Figure 4: Policy instruments under emerging market mechanisms 
 
Source: Perspectives GmbH 
It is important to note that the different structure of the interaction and the relationship between do-
mestic governments and implementing actors raises new governance challenges: There is an in-
centive structure at play that could lead both NMM host country governments and im-
plementers to inflate baselines, set unambitious caps or harm environmental integrity 
in other ways. It is not quite clear yet, how an independent regulatory body (such as the 
CDM Executive Board) could counteract such incentives and supervise the integrity of 
such mechanisms on an international level. As the debate on emerging mechanisms is 
still recent, and lacks conceptual clarity and experience from practical implementation, 
we direct our focus in the subsequent sections more strongly on the political dimensions, 
and only discuss institutional and technical details to the extent possible.  
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Figure 5: Different levels of decision making for mechanisms and instruments 
 
Source: Perspectives GmbH 
3.1 Elements of sectoral approaches in the negotiations of the NMM 
Following the mandate from the Bali COP in 2007, negotiations came in 2011 to a defi-
nition on the NMM as follows: “new market-based mechanism (NMM), operating under 
the guidance and authority of the COP, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to pro-
mote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and de-
veloping countries [...] which may assist developed countries to meet part of their miti-
gation targets or commitments under the Convention” (UNFCCC 2011). COP 18 in 2012 
further clarified that the NMM should “deliver real, permanent, additional, and verified 
mitigation outcomes, avoid double counting of effort and achieve a net decrease and/or 
avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions” (UNFCCC 2012), and should include both 
project-based as well as sectoral approaches. In this respect, the NMM is expected to 
cover “broad segments of the economy”, though there is still no agreed upon definition 
what this phrase exactly means.  
3.1.1 Political Dimension  
Current options for NMM design comprise variations of crediting and trading approach-
es (including the EU proposal for a sectoral mechanism). However, further details, the 
scope and structure of the NMM are still unclear, and as the 2013 COP in Warsaw did 
not deliver a detailed set of modalities and procedures for the NMM, it is only expected 
to be further defined towards the end of 2014 at COP 20 in Peru – or possibly even later. 
A key lesson from the evolution of the CDM described in previous sections is that the 
operationalization of reform concepts has always taken several years.  
A Joint Workshop of UNFCCC Parties on the New Market Mechanism and FVA held in 
October 2013 in Bonn, Germany gave a good overview on the status of the negotiations 
on new market mechanisms. Its session on New Market Mechanism (NMM) addressed 
the progress in the work programme on the elaboration of modalities and procedures for 
a NMM and the subsequent submission to COP19 for consideration by the Parties. The 
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UNFCCC Secretariat provided a synthesis paper featuring the outcomes from the work-
shops in 2012 as well as the submissions received by Parties in 2012 and 2013, and 
identifying areas of convergence as well as items for further discussion (UNFCCC 
2013a). The paper also highlights open questions that were identified at SBSTA 38 in 
June 2013, serving as the basis for the discussion of the 2013 workshop. With regards to 
sectoral approaches, SBSTA 38 raised notably the following questions regarding “broad 
segments of the economy” to be answered by the parties:  
▸ How should the NMM stimulate mitigation within such broad segments of the econ-
omy? 
▸ What are examples of such segments? 
▸ On what basis should the participating Parties define broad segments of the econo-
my? 
Based on the dialogue in 2012 and 2013, as well as on the submissions of parties the 
UNFCCC Secretariat (2013a) summarized the debate on sectoral approaches (i.e. “broad 
segments of the economy”) as follows. For actually achieving “sectoral coverage” (first 
question) one could either 
▸ limit the scope of the NMM to sectoral and national crediting and trading schemes, 
thus excluding project-based activities; or  
▸ broaden the scope of the NMM to cover a range of approaches, in order to increase 
the scale of mitigation. 
If Parties choose to broaden the scope of the NMM, it could potentially comprise differ-
ent tracks for crediting (second question), such as  
▸ credited NAMAs,  
▸ sector-based approaches,  
▸ policy- or programme-based approaches,  
▸ net avoidance approaches,  
▸ REDD+, or 
▸ project based approaches and micro-scale activities.  
These could be either credited or traded within a centralized, decentralized or hybrid 
system. For this purpose a general framework could be developed to choose which sec-
tors qualify under which track. The definition of “broad segments of the economy” could 
either be a prerogative of the host country or be agreed internationally. In case an in-
ternational definition is envisaged by the Parties, the following three options could be 
considered (third question): 
▸ Option 1: a broad segment of the economy constitutes a significant proportion of a 
country’s emissions (e.g. the energy sector) and/or a significant proportion of a coun-
try’s gross domestic product; 
▸ Option 2: a broad segment of the economy means one or more sectors, categories or 
subcategories listed in annex II of the UNFCCC guidelines on reporting and review, 
as adopted by the Conference of the Parties in decision 15/CP.17; 
▸ Option 3: a broad segment of the economy covers one or more of the sectors identified 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as relevant to mitiga-
tion. 
                                                                                                                                                                          49 
 
Developing Sectoral Mechanisms in the Transition Period towards a New Climate Treaty 
3.1.2 Technical & Institutional Dimension  
Although it is currently only vaguely defined, the NMM terminology already suggests a 
certain degree of conceptual proximity to the CDM as expressed by the terms "real", 
"permanent", "additional", "verified", etc. to describe the nature of envisaged emissions 
reductions. Nevertheless some crucial differences are discernible. Calls for submissions 
through Parties have over the past years received a broad range of responses, but have 
enabled some progress on mutual understanding of the various proposals as a basis for 
agreement on the future role of market mechanisms. Recent submissions and discus-
sions show that most Parties agree on a NMM design that addresses mitigation activi-
ties beyond the project level (see Annex 2 for an overview of submissions with reference 
to sectoral approaches). The most relevant suggestions for sectoral mechanisms as per 
the above list are:  
▸ The EU advocating for a sectoral crediting and sectoral trading mechanism:  
▸ While still dependent on the legal nature of target setting, a Sectoral Trading 
Mechanism (STM) implies that sanctions would apply to a host country in case 
of non-compliance with the underlying commitment. In a top-down regulatory 
situation, an amount of allowances corresponding to the sector’s target would be 
allocated to the country ex-ante. Given the binding nature of such a mechanism, 
the government would pass the reduction responsibility on to the emitters in 
the respective sector, either by setting up an ETS or by imposing mandatory mi-
tigation policies and measures. Any shortfall of allowances would have to be 
filled by acquiring allowances from abroad; consequently any surplus of allow-
ances could be sold. 
▸ By contrast to a mandatory STM, a Sectoral Crediting Mechanism (SCM) would 
be based on a voluntary or “no-lose” target. The target is also set below a busi-
ness-as-usual scenario but has no binding character – the host country govern-
ment thus does not face sanctions if the target is not reached. In the case emis-
sions are reduced below the target, the difference between the emission level 
and the target will be credited ex-post. Credits could be sold on the internation-
al carbon market and hence provide international finance for mitigation. In a 
situation where domestic and international finance can be blended, the host 
country could initially contribute to mitigation through domestic measures be-
low the business-as-usual scenario but above the non-binding target. This could 
allow reaping the so-called “low hanging fruits” with the lowest abatement 
costs, whereas for activities that address reductions beyond the non-binding 
target (so-called “higher hanging fruits”) international finance should be access-
ible. However, the incentive for emitters to meet or even over-achieve the non-
binding target is clearly weaker than under a trading mechanism with manda-
tory reduction obligations. 
▸ Colombia proposed in 2011 a “Mechanism for Carbon-Efficient Economies (MCEE)”, 
which is essentially a discounting approach with a sectoral and sub-sectoral scope. 
Discount factors could range from 2 – 41%, depending on the countries' share of 
global emissions. Further a 2 per cent share of proceeds for the Adaptation Fund was 
proposed. The MCEE would complement domestic mitigation of developed countries, 
and co-exist with the CDM – CERs would have to be subtracted from MCEE reduc-
tions (UNFCCC 2011). 
▸ Brazil is suggesting a sectoral mechanism based on voluntary cancellations of CERs. 
Given that the CDM EB has been accepting voluntary cancellations by credit owners 
since 2012, they may also transfer them to third parties. Third parties could be Par-
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ties, non-state actors, companies or even individuals. Sectors such as air transport or 
maritime transport could benefit from these cancellations of CERs in order to reduce 
carbon footprints without creating new mechanisms. Such cancellations would pro-
vide the CDM with impetus to continue for the years to come, positively impact the 
carbon price, and would even allow for the creation of new market mechanisms. A 
clearer focus on cancellations – an aspect of the CDM, that is readily available for 
everyone – would allow existing projects to move forward and capitalize on the fact 
that the CDM is still generating a lot of credits. Sectors that are interested could 
resort to CDM cancellation to lower their carbon footprint (UNFCCC, 2013b). In 
Brazil this mechanism has already been put to use in making the Rio 20+ conference 
carbon neutral. Similar actions are planned for the World Cup as well as the Olym-
pic Games in 2016. However, Brazil’s proposal did not find approval at COP 194.  
▸ Ecuador has proposed a “Net Avoidance Emission Mechanism” which would essen-
tially allow claiming credits for not exploiting fossil fuel resources. A practical exam-
ple was the Yasuni National Park Initiative, which however was scrapped in late 
2013 by presidential decree. 
One interviewee elaborated on the scope the NMM could cover:  
“I am rather skeptical this [NMM] will move forward, because the contents of climate policy move away from inter-
national offsetting to national climate policy, so maybe a mechanism such as the NMM is not so much more re-
quired, and may die in the negotiations. If it continues, and has added value, it should reach areas that the CDM 
cannot reach, including sectoral and policy crediting, these would be the most interesting areas for NMM” (Inter-
view No.6). 
3.2 Elements of sectoral approaches in the negotiations of the FVA 
In addition to a top-down design for an NMM, many countries are envisaging to indivi-
dually develop market-based mechanisms for mitigating GHG emissions. These activi-
ties include regional ETS (EU ETS, North American schemes), domestic emissions trad-
ing schemes (which are being developed in numerous countries supported by the World 
Bank’s Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR), bilateral offsetting schemes (Japan), 
domestic offsetting schemes (e.g. China, Australia, California, Canadian provinces). In 
the future, subject to political agreement, potentially credited elements of Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) could also be envisaged under the FVA5. In 
addition, some countries are proposing non-market based activities (see also 3.3).  
3.2.1 Political Dimension 
In order to recognize these “fragmented” attempts under the UNFCCC, in 2011, COP 17 
decided to establish the “Framework for Various Approaches” (FVA). COP18 in Doha 
decided to “consider” whether the FVA is to be developed under UNFCCC authority and 
guidance. The underlying idea is to prevent a complete fragmentation of market me-
chanisms by providing authoritative guiding principles and criteria, and oversight at 
least at the highest level. The objective is to establish at least a minimum level of trans-
parency, environmental integrity, and comparability of efforts. Other bilateral arrange-
ments or domestic efforts may become relevant for the FVA in the future: The agree-
ment between California and Latin American countries on the eligibility of Reducing 
4 See 
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_brazil_workstream
_2_cdm_voluntary_cancellation_20130918.pdf 
5 Note that credited NAMAs are still at an extremely early stage in negotiations – mentioned occasionally 
under NMM and FVA discussions, but at the same time do not comprise an official element under 
UNFCCC negotiations.  
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Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) credits is one, which even fore-
sees the use of offsets from international sectoral crediting mechanisms in the future. 
Carbon taxes coupled with domestic offsets – as is the case in the Canadian provinces of 
British Columbia and Alberta are another. The Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
represents a third example – which is, however, set to be dismantled after a change of 
government.  
The negotiations on the FVA are informed by a number of submissions, and Parties did 
debate the FVA at the UNFCCC Joint Workshop in October 2013 (UNFCCC 2013a). The 
discussion addressed progress with regard to the COP 18 mandate to conduct a work 
programme for elaborating a FVA and submitting it to COP 19 for consideration by the 
Parties. For this purpose, the UNFCCC Secretariat produced a synthesis paper on out-
comes from the workshops in 2012 as well as the submissions received by Parties in 
2012 and 2013 (UNFCCC 2013c). While there is no specific focus on “sectoral nature” of 
mechanisms / approaches under the FVA so far, examples for initiatives under the FVA 
comprise (see also figure 6 below):  
▸ The flexible Kyoto mechanisms, namely the CDM, JI and IET;  
▸ The New Market Mechanism;  
▸ Regional and domestic or subnational trading schemes, such as the EU ETS, the 
Australian ETS and emerging Chinese municipal and provincial pilot trading 
schemes;  
▸ Bilateral offset schemes, such as the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) operated by 
Japan;  
▸ NAMAs proposed by developing countries;  
▸ The Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism (JAM) for integral and sustainable 
management of forests developed by the Plurinational State of Bolivia;  
▸ A mechanism for avoidance of emissions, such as the Yasuni initiative developed by 
Ecuador.  
Figure 6: Illustrative scope of approaches under the FVA 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2013c) 
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The submissions on the FVA contain only very limited information on technical details 
regarding sectoral scope of the framework, and mainly state that the framework should 
be open to sectoral approaches. See Annex 2 for an overview.  
3.2.2 Institutional & Technical Dimension  
There is still little understanding regarding the governance of the FVA, and how the 
UNFCCC can ensure that mechanisms of different designs can be integrated into the 
global climate governance architecture. Key questions include whether such mechan-
isms will be governed under the direct “authority” of the COP, or merely under a looser 
interpretation of “guidance”, e.g. through principles that may be agreed upon within the 
UNFCCC, while implementation, including regulatory powers, remains outside of the 
UNFCCC.  
“Parties will claim freedom to develop their own trading and crediting regime – and here the FVA comes in. This 
means a variety of different trading and crediting schemes growing in parallel will face the problem of different 
standards for compliance in an international regime, and mutual acceptability. Here the FVA was coming in, but 
now after Warsaw we have a situation where many negotiators lost faith in the purpose of having a coherent 
framework prior to 2020, and thus I doubt that we will have a coherent system prior 2020. The intention of the 
FVA was to address those initiatives such as the JCM and make sure that they comply with a set of defined crite-
ria, and hopefully create a process to enforce those criteria. Hence, the FVA is a safety valve for ensuring that at 
least some degree of integrity is left. But the negotiations on the FVA have pretty much collapsed in Warsaw, and 
nobody seemed to be very surprised, and that speaks volumes about the expectations on markets in the run up to 
2020.” (Interview No.3) 
Party positions on the FVA differ considerably, with the EU and various developing na-
tions requesting a stronger centralized governance of the UNFCCC, while e.g. Japan, 
the USA and New Zealand favour a minimum set of common standards that allow for 
comparing various evolving bottom up activities. 
“While markets are down any positive proposal and signal that a country is active is a good signal. Here Japan 
plays a very constructive role, also in the light of the changes of the Japanese energy policy and the problems in 
meeting their pledge. I think this whole discussion on the JCM is an asset for the discussions on the FVA level. Try-
ing to simplify and standardize is good as well.” (Interview No.9) 
3.2.3 Elements of sectoral approaches in the negotiations of Non-Market based Ap-
proaches (NMA) and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) 
An agenda item of the negotiations with relevance for sectoral approaches are non-
market based approaches (NMAs). While there was no big interest in discussing NMAs, 
reiterative calls of socialist Latin American parties to include NMAs have led to this 
agenda item. The relevance of non-market based approaches depends on whether a 
broad range of domestic mitigation action measures with no direct market-character (i.e. 
no tradable units) will be attributed towards the NMM, the FVA or NAMAs – or shall be 
accommodated under a distinct vehicle (which e.g. Bolivia desires). Such domestic 
measures could comprise a vast list of measures, such as standards (performance, fleet, 
buildings), labelling schemes, grants and subsidies, taxes, feed in tariffs (FiTs) or other 
regulations (Phillips 2013). In its submission to SBSTA 39 on NMAs the Environmental 
Integrity Group (EIG 2013) showcases 5 measures that appear suitable for NMAs, 
namely  
▸ Progressive phasing out of subsidies for fossil fuels, 
▸ Phasing down of the production and the consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFC),  
▸ Promoting renewable energies, 
▸ Ecolabels, 
▸ REDD and forest bonds. 
The EIG concludes that no distinct discussion on NMAs under SBSTA is required, as 
NMAs are already covered by many negotiation streams inside and outside the 
UNFCCC. On similar lines the EU recognizes the relevance of NMAs for mitigation, but 
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sees no need for further establishing a separate mechanism for NMAs (European Union 
2013). Overall, the discussion on NMAs is juvenile (and will probably remain), and 
seems not to lead to the establishment of a non-market based mechanism. It is neverthe-
less helpful to at least regard the debate on NMAs in the light of sectoral approaches, as 
many NMAs have a transformative or sectoral character. However, the NMA debate 
must also be read in the light of the current intermediate and very dynamic character of 
the negotiations that still leave a lack of clarity regarding which approaches and meas-
ures can be attributed to which mechanism– e.g. under NAMAs or under the UNFCCC 
finance debate, or more general as results based finance (RBF).  
A Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) addresses voluntary activities of 
GHG emissions mitigation in developing countries that are not subject to UNFCCC mi-
tigation commitments and can be supported by developed countries through financing, 
technology transfer or capacity building. Actions taken are to result in measurable re-
portable and verifiable emissions reductions below emissions under business as usual 
i.e. in the absence of those actions. Potential measures can range from strategic policies 
supported by legislation (e.g. a renewable energy target with a feed-in tariff), sector-
wide mitigation policies over programmes of mitigation activities to specific individual 
projects (so NAMAs are not a mechanism amongst parties at governmental level, but 
address individual domestic emitters, see introduction to chapter 3 above). Due to this 
flexibility, many believe that NAMAs are suited to also address dispersed and non-
stationary GHG emission sources, such as agriculture and transport. In any case, NA-
MAs are thought to comprise mitigation actions way beyond the standalone-project level 
and thus they may be able to leverage the kind of transformational changes hoped for in 
the discussion of sectoral approaches (Lütken et al., 2013). The NAMAs put forward so 
far cover a wide spectrum of emission sources, often within a boundary colloquially re-
ferred to as a sector, which is also reflected in the NAMA database (2013). The UNFCCC 
NAMA registry6 might in the future provide similar insights, but has not been filled 
with substantial content yet, due to its very recent operationalization. 
6 See http://www4.unfccc.int/sites/nama 
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Figure 7: Sectoral distribution of NAMA concepts globally 
 
Source: NAMA Database (2013) 
While the political framework for NAMAs is still under development it becomes increa-
singly clear that NAMAs will become a core element of the future international climate 
policy regime. While the development of NAMA concepts frequently depends on support 
by international entities, the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010) differentiate two 
types: NAMAs designed for implementation solely through domestic funding (“unilateral 
NAMAs”) and those designed for additional international support for implementation 
(“supported NAMAs”). Domestically funded and internationally funded elements are in 
practice often combined within a single framework. Many NAMA proposals include dis-
tinct elements that can be financed and implemented relatively independently to ac-
count for the preferences of prospective donors. Most NAMA concepts identify support 
needs that are not necessarily limited to financial support, but encompass also technolo-
gy transfer or capacity building measures. Such support can often be obtained more rea-
dily through bilateral or multilateral donors or facilities officially approved by the Con-
ference of the Parties, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) or the Global Environ-
mental Facility (GEF).  
A far-reaching concept that has so far not operationalized could play a more relevant 
role at a later stage by NAMA finance approaches with elements of carbon market ve-
hicles: A "credited NAMA" mechanism could be envisaged under which supported NA-
MAs could choose to seek co-financing for certain elements via the generation and sale of 
emission credits for emission reductions achieved (Okubo et al. 2011). A more immediate 
version of credited NAMAs could also refer to a “framework approach” in which a CDM 
PoA is blended with additional upfront finance and other forms of technical support, e.g. 
with regard to setting technical appliance standards. 
An additional source of finance could be provided by the private sector, as is often hig-
hlighted by Annex-I countries. Experience on how to leverage private sector finance for 
NAMA implementation is insufficient to date, however and a lot more foundational work 
needs to be done (Michaelowa 2012). The most promising avenues seem to be RBF ap-
proaches, which essentially retire CERs, and thus effectively pilot a transition of the 
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CDM from an offset to a performance-based payments scheme. Further varieties with 
upfront finance components are conceptually possible. Main reasons for the limited trac-
tion of NAMA crediting until today include uncertainty on methodological issues, and 
the attributability of emission impacts to some policy instruments. In order to ensure 
environmental credibility, the additionality of policies needs to be assessed meaning 
that mitigation costs of the policies need to be positive. NAMAs should therefore be dif-
ferentiated according to their marginal abatement cost, such that those actions with 
negative marginal abatement costs should not be creditable (Michaelowa 2013). NAMA 
crediting has also been criticized on baseline issues – policy crediting is “unlikely to be 
feasible due to the difficulties of setting boundaries and baselines” (Röser and de Vit 
2012, p.5). However, the use of approved baseline and monitoring methodologies allow 
generating additional emission reductions with a reasonable degree of MRV-ability, and 
should thus be expected to enjoy a high degree of legitimacy among Parties. In particu-
lar if structured as an RBF scheme that retires credits and thus uses them as “receipts” 
rather than offsets (Raab 2012), such an approach could gain broader acceptance as a 
credited NAMA in the future. 
Given their still widely open scope, NAMAs have so far drawn heavily on building blocks 
from established mechanisms in order to design actions that credibly cause measurable, 
reportable and verifiable emissions reductions. NAMAs have drawn on approved CDM 
methodologies for baseline and emission reductions estimates as well as MRV design. 
Given the currently low CER prices, it may also become attractive to transform existing 
CDM or PoA activities into a supported NAMA based on RBF as described above. Tech-
nology goals or standards are another element of the discussion on a sectoral CDM that 
has been applied in NAMAs. Klein et al. (2009) discuss technology-based sectoral NA-
MAs for energy-intensive sectors such as cement, iron and steel. Such NAMAs would be 
based on technology choices which would allow for simple MRV systems. They note the 
appeal of conditional NAMAs for developing countries – NAMAs, which would only be 
implemented in case that international financing materializes. While NAMAs have tak-
en up many aspects of the various sectoral approaches discussed in the academic litera-
ture, a sectoral crediting mechanism might still have advantages over supported NA-
MAs if it would result in a common carbon price for all types of emissions reductions 
within a sector (Helme et al 2010). In order to avoid conflicts between several credited 
NAMAs that overlap in a particular sector one could in such cases switch to sectoral 
crediting and not allow for other credits within that same sector. 
At COP 19 Parties decided that the teams reviewing Biennial Update Reports (BUR) of 
developing countries, should comprise of a majority of experts coming from non-Annex I 
Parties. MRV of unilateral NAMAs will not be subject to any international scrutiny. 
CDC Climat (2013) expects that in the long run, MRV of supported NAMAs could look 
like the MRV of REDD+ agreed in Warsaw, however, the language is currently very soft, 
and does not seem to guarantee a sufficient level of transparency, comparability and 
rigour yet. Importantly, the BUR process for non-Annex I parties requires parties to 
report from the end of 2014 onwards, and start building up national emission invento-
ries. The requirement is that the second BUR (due end 2016) shall cover data back until 
2012, which means that data availability can be estimated to improve over the next 
years. However, it remains to be seen what quality of data is reported in practice. The 
scope of biennial update reports is to provide an update to the most recently submitted 
formal national communication to the UNFCCC in the following areas (although this is 
rather a qualitative than a quantitative request so far): 
▸ Information on national circumstances and institutional arrangements relevant to 
the preparation of the national communications on a continuous basis; 
                                                                                                                                                                          56 
 
Developing Sectoral Mechanisms in the Transition Period towards a New Climate Treaty 
▸ The national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removal by sinks 
of all greenhouse gases (GHGs) not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including a 
national inventory report; 
▸ Information on mitigation actions and their effects, including associated methodolo-
gies and assumptions; 
▸ Constraints and gaps, and related financial, technical and capacity needs, including 
a description of support needed and received; 
▸ Information on the level of support received to enable the preparation and submis-
sion of biennial update reports; 
▸ Information on domestic measurement reporting and verification.  
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4 Summary of progress on sectoral approaches in the CDM and 
emerging UNFCCC mechanisms 
Despite changing terminology and definitions, the historical debate on a sectoral CDM 
offers some important early insights into some of the most relevant political, institu-
tional and technical aspects of various sectoral approaches. The distinction between a 
project-based versus policy-based sectoral mechanism was initially not very clear with 
overlapping notions between a sectoral aggregated project-based mechanism and an ap-
proach that operates with setting standards or different sets of incentives. This distinc-
tion has become more and more explicit, by gradually introducing programmatic activi-
ties and standardization of baselines and other methodological elements into the CDM, 
while other concepts have moved to emerging mechanisms.   
PoAs have established themselves firmly within the CDM framework, and are set to 
achieve significant improvements in line with the political objectives of the CDM regard-
ing sectoral and geographical distribution. Some PoAs can be considered to come close to 
sector-wide upscaling of mitigation actions, provided they will be fully implemented (see 
table 2). However, market and political uncertainty are currently inhibiting implemen-
tation of many CDM activities after a rapid build-up of the PoA portfolio in 2012. Yet, 
the rather cumbersome consolidation of the regulatory framework for PoAs illustrates 
typical teething problems when developing the nuts and bolts of procedures and stan-
dards, which can be expected for any new approach or mechanism. However, the PoA 
concept enjoys a high degree of acceptance, and its value is recognized beyond the CDM. 
There is a broad range of voices and conceptual studies that explore how the PoA ap-
proach can be integrated into emerging mechanisms including NAMAs and the NMM 
(Lütken et al. 2013, Füssler 2012, Cocco et al 2011).  
The stock-taking exercise above has also shown that CDM standardization introduces 
further sector-orientation into the CDM, as SBs need to consider data from the entire 
sector, and will be – possibly mandatorily – applicable to all CDM activities of the same 
type in the respective country or region. Still, it has also become clear that the standar-
dization process is still in an early stage, and needs to evolve further. For instance, it is 
not yet defined how to prepare a PoA-DD with a standardized baseline that is in the 
process of being developed but not yet approved. More importantly, the effects of stan-
dardization on the environmental integrity of the CDM cannot be assessed yet. A key 
question for the future evolution of the standardization reform programme is to be 
aware of a potential “trade-off between the transaction costs of a market mechanism 
and its environmental integrity. Therefore, researchers and practition-
ers need to assess carefully, ideally on the basis of empirical evidence  which  project 
types lend  themselves  to  standardization  under  which circumstances” (Michaelowa 
2012, p.43). If done right, standardization may lower transaction costs and access bar-
riers significantly, although upfront efforts by public actors are necessary to harness 
such benefits. This aspect relates to the balance between top-down and bottom-up stan-
dardization, driven either by the UNFCCC or by host countries and their partners 
themselves. The higher the degree of standardization in existing CDM methodologies, 
the more efficient and effective further country-specific standardization is, as it lowers 
complexity and workload for DNAs and reduces the need for country-specific data. Simi-
larly to PoAs, the current political and market uncertainty is a key barrier for harness-
ing the potential of these initiated reforms and its first results for both further evolution 
in a reformed CDM and emerging UNFCCC mechanisms.  
Both of these sectoral approaches are now fully operational even though they remain in 
early stages of implementation. As the CDM policy dialogue has noted, in particular 
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their increasing combination (using SBs and standardized methodologies in a PoA) has 
the potential to achieve a significant move towards the sectoral level within the existing 
CDM (CDM Policy Dialogue 2012 p.27), or a reformed “CDM+”7. This demonstrates the 
responsiveness of the CDM’s regulatory framework and governance architecture, even 
though the criticism and politics have already moved on to other issues such as net mi-
tigation. Other more policy-based sectoral approaches have not been taken up in the 
CDM, but have largely diffused into the debate on emerging concepts for NAMAs and 
new market mechanisms. The most relevant approaches here are sectoral crediting and 
trading under the NMM. A rather conceptual approach is NAMA crediting. These are 
not operational yet, and – regarding the latter - the idea of a credited policy mechanism 
has not yet gained acceptance within the UNFCCC process. Still, there is a conceptual 
discussion taking place on an expert level, as well as also first moves towards implemen-
tation outside of the UNFCCC e.g. in the context of the Partnership for Market Readi-
ness or concepts that blend carbon markets with climate finance.  
Looking at emerging UNFCCC mechanisms, NAMAs today provide the most mature set 
of the juvenile activities under preparation or implementation, while the NMM and even 
more the FVA remain vague options in the political discussion. Still, converging views 
indicate that the most likely concepts for NMM, FVA and NAMAs are envisaging miti-
gation action with a stronger sectoral scope that may include policy-based approaches. 
In addition, sector-specific approaches are beginning to emerge as complementary for 
sectors that have either not been taken up in the CDM (REDD, aviation, shipping), or 
could even be phase out of the CDM for political reasons. Here the “artificial” debate on 
NMAs comes in, which are not expected to evolve into a separate non-market mechan-
ism, but be accommodated under NAMAs or FVA, or UNFCCC finance fora.  
These emerging sectoral mechanisms are likely to be more diverse than the CDM. They 
could, for instance, cover not only one multilateral market mechanism which would cov-
er theoretically all sectors, but could also include a variety of different “sector-specific 
mechanisms”, which are designed specifically for (sub)sectors with highly idiosyncratic 
features. Some tendencies in the most important high-impact sectors are already dis-
cernible (HFCs, aviation, shipping). These are likely to be assembled under FVA, al-
though the governance architecture remains an open question. Standardisation and 
streamlining of PoAs could help achieving several of the EU’s policy objectives for sec-
toral crediting through the use of conservative SBs on the one hand and streamlined 
approval and inclusion procedures on the other. This would help ensure that fewer cre-
dits are issued than actual emissions reductions achieved and enable the more rapid 
scaling up of the carbon markets. One could also integrate PoAs into credited NAMAs, 
or into other mechanisms. Figure 8 illustrates possible pathways for scaling up market 
mechanisms into sectoral approaches.  
7 We use the term “CDM+” to refer to a future (improved) CDM after the scheduled review of its modalities 
and procedures, and further standardization of methodologies, maturation of the institutional design and 
administrative processes. 
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Figure 8: Scaling up Market Mechanisms 
 
Source: Perspectives GmbH 
Figure 9 illustrates how both existing and emerging mechanisms have evolved over 
time, in order to draw attention to duration, linkages and maturity of the various me-
chanisms. 
Figure 9:  Evolution of UNFCCC Mechanisms 
 
Source: Perspectives GmbH 
Looking ahead, a key question is how these sectoral approaches will continue to evolve. 
SBs and PoAs are likely to continue to be improved and consolidated within the CDM 
framework, but also to diffuse into NMM, FVA and NAMAs. Which specific aspects of 
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which sectoral approach may evolve in which direction, and how, depends on many fac-
tors. These include the paths that the political UNFCCC negotiations may take: the de-
bate on new mechanisms is progressing only very slowly, and concern over the lack of 
ambition on finance and mitigation, as well as the resulting CER market depression 
overshadows technical discussions. Other inputs originate from contexts that have tra-
ditionally not been at the centre of the debate on sectoral approaches. For instance, the 
rise of importance of the climate finance issue, in tandem with the market crisis, has led 
to a stronger focus on the interactions between carbon markets and climate finance, e.g. 
through results-based financing. Such approaches are already quite prominent e.g. with-
in REDD and the GCF, but are a rather recent trend in the CDM context. For instance, 
the UNFCCC’s Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP) negotiation stream calls for “unlocking opportunities for raising pre-2020 ambi-
tion”, and mentions the option of voluntary CER cancellations for this purpose. A dedi-
cated cancellation account for this purpose has now been set up in the CDM registry. It 
can be expected that such discussions will rise in importance, as it is clear that sectoral 
approaches, which are supposed to operate at larger scales than the CDM need to estab-
lish more effective price volatility control mechanisms. It is inconceivable that any gov-
ernment or private sector actor would agree to deep and potentially costly mitigation 
actions without a sufficient level of certainty on anticipated support with finance, tech-
nology and capacity building. A more thorough evaluation of such possible developments 
of the identified sectoral mechanisms, and their potential to inform the development of 
the NMM and NAMAs will be the subject of chapters 5 and 6. 
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5 Evaluating the potential of sectoral approaches for NMM and 
NAMAs 
Based on the assessment in chapter two to four, we define indicators for evaluating the 
feasibility and practicality of utilizing the identified conceptual elements for NMM, FVA 
and NAMA approaches. Consistent with the previous analytical steps, we distinguish 
between indicators in institutional, technical and political categories. Applying these 
indicators to selected sectoral approaches will allow for a structured evaluation of possi-
ble challenges and solutions. 
▸ Which approaches are suitable for further evolution under the NMM, and potentially 
the FVA? 
▸ Which approaches are more likely to be integrated into NAMA frameworks? 
In a first step (5.1), we outline a catalogue of indicators for a structured analysis of the 
various sectoral approaches that have been identified above:  
▸ Standardized Baselines, SB 
▸ Programme of Activities, PoA 
▸ Sectoral crediting and trading,  
▸ domestic policy instruments.  
Second, we discuss the potential of these elements for further evolution within the CDM, 
but primarily within NMM/FVA and NAMAs (5.2). In particular when assessing the 
potential for future evolution, we may draw on developments and evidence that go 
beyond narrowly understood debates on sectoral approaches, e.g. regarding internation-
al climate finance, or bottom-up initiatives from outside of the UNFCCC process. Final-
ly, we sum up these rather complex debates in reader-friendly tables which allow for a 
quick overview of the key results and messages (5.3). 
5.1 Indicators for evaluating sectoral approaches  
Based on the assessment in chapter two to four, we define indicators for evaluating the 
feasibility and practicality of utilizing the identified conceptual elements for NMM, FVA 
and NAMA approaches. Consistent with the previous analytical steps, we distinguish 
between indicators in institutional, technical and political categories. Applying these 
indicators to the various sectoral approaches will allow for a structured evaluation of 
possible challenges and solutions. 
Table 5: List of indicators for evaluating sectoral approaches 
 Nr Indicator Explanation 
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
1 
Administrative 
requirements  
What is the role of the UNFCCC (COP/CMP), project cycle bodies 
and host country bodies? 
 
 
2 
Regulatory 
requirements  
Which authority will be located at UNFCCC (COP/CMP), and 
which at host country level? (centralized- decentralized app-
roach) 
 3 Role of third-party Competences and required tasks of international and/or do-
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auditors   mestic auditors 
 
4 
Capacity 
requirements 
Which competences are required by various actors groups 
(UNFCCC, national governments, market participants), and 
which capacity gaps exist?  
Te
ch
-
ni
ca
l 
5 Data requirements  
Considers data availability, quality and processing require-
ments and principles 
 
6 
MRV infrastructure 
and processes 
Which data and which level of aggregation and complexity is 
necessary; requirement for international and/or domestic audi-
tors (desk review, on-site visits); registries 
 
7 
Prevention of 
double counting  
Role of registries, other (sector-specific) regulatory measures 
8 Eligibility  
Which criteria and approaches are used to define eligibility 
(additionality), and who has the authority to decide over them 
9 Transaction costs  
Considers level of transaction costs (high-mid-low), but also 
who hast to bear these cost (donors, host country govern-
ments, market participants?) 
10 Incentive structure  
Are financial incentives given ex-ante / ex-post? And is an ap-
proach exposed to, or reduces or enhances “resilience to mar-
ket volatility“? 
11 
Net avoidance ef-
fects 
Considers “ambitious” baselines, discounting, crediting pe-
riods  
Po
lit
ic
al
 
12 
Scope of 
mechanism/measu
re  
Relates to the sectoral and geographical scope, and describes 
boundaries for mechanisms (e.g. sectors), and how existing 
CDM activities would be integrated into the new mechanism or 
not. Distinction between "established CDM sectors" or "un-
tapped sectors" (with less experience), could potentially in-
clude UNFCCC-external sectors: REDD, aviation and shipping, 
HFCs) 
13 
Timeline to 
implementation  
Whether a sectoral approach is likely to become operation-
al/implemented pre- or post-2020 
14 Political feasibility  
Considers the impact of host country position towards market 
mechanisms, domestic lobby groups in specific sectors, and 
membership of host country in UNFCCC negotiation blocs with 
relevance for market mechanisms 
Source: authors 
                                                                                                                                                                          63 
 
Developing Sectoral Mechanisms in the Transition Period towards a New Climate Treaty 
5.2 Opportunities for developing sectoral approaches under NMM and 
NAMAs  
The set of indicators developed in 5.1. will be applied to the selection of conceptual ap-
proaches that have been identified in chapters 2, 3, 4: 
▸ Standardized Baselines  
▸ Programme of Activities  
▸ Sectoral crediting and trading 
▸ Domestic policy instruments with regulatory / non-market character  
Each of the indicators introduced above will be applied to these sectoral approaches. 
This step allows for evaluating whether these could evolve further within a CDM with 
reformed modalities and procedures (to which we refer to with the preliminary term 
“CDM+”), and whether they are more likely to be applicable to NMM/FVA, NAMAs, or 
both. As the previous chapters have shown, each of the sectoral approaches comprises a 
broad range of – sometimes complex – aspects that can be more or less applicable in dif-
ferent mechanisms. The indicator set will therefore allow developing a refined under-
standing as a basis for evaluating the potential of a certain aspect of a sectoral approach 
(e.g. net mitigation through SBs) for a specific mechanism (e.g. NAMAs). Regarding data 
and information sources, this chapter draws on the stock-taking in chapters 2-4, as well 
as responses from a set of semi-structured expert interviews that have been conducted 
specifically for this research report. In order to align the subsequent steps in our analy-
sis, where appropriate, we distinguish between the three stakeholder groups, which are 
the centre of chapter 6 (UNFCCC, host countries, market participants).  
5.2.1  Developing sectoral approaches based on CDM standardized baselines 
Institutional dimensions  
(1) Administrative requirements: SBs have only recently generated EB guidance and 
procedures for how to process and assess data for entire sectors rather than individual 
projects. These define slightly new roles for the CDM support structure (Secretariat and 
working groups). These procedures can be seen as an evolution of conventional metho-
dology approval, and are still rather new and are likely see further elaboration and con-
solidation within the CDM. These new tasks show that the established organizational 
structures of a mechanism can adjust to new responsibilities, which will result from in-
troducing new sectoral approaches. For host countries, SBs require maintain and update 
data on entire (sub-) sectors, which inform SB establishment. As one interview ex-
plained, the “Host country level is more important under NMM than under CDM. DNA 
is a good starting point. It has to be build early, of course there will be new tasks in 
terms of MRV, methodologies because further tasks will be required” (Interview No.2). 
This is the key reason why the SBs are widely seen as highly transferable to a broad 
range of project-based, programmatic, and to some extent policy-based approaches. 
Therefore, SBs can serve as baselines or thresholds for both NMM and NAMAs. 
(2) Regulatory requirements:  As with all CDM-related aspects, the CMP retains politi-
cal oversight, and the EB remains the key actor that has the authority to approve or 
revoke SBs, and thus safeguard the integrity of the approach with a relatively high de-
gree of neutrality. This is critical as SBs can have strong or weak environmental integri-
ty, depending on the quality of data. Looser regulatory arrangements increase this risk. 
A CDM-like centralized institutional design could be either replicated or extended to the 
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NMM, which depends on the elaboration of the NMM’s M&P. By contrast, such func-
tions seem less likely for FVA and NAMAs, which are likely to operate more decentra-
lized and country-driven. However, CDM SBs may become benchmarks with regard to 
conservativeness for other mechanisms that establish their own baseline standards. SBs 
can also be used as elements of a non-CDM methodological framework, e.g. for MRV of a 
supported NAMA feed-in tariff (Michaelowa and Hoch 2013). Host country DNAs are the 
only actors that can perform QA/QC checks and submit SBs, or, in case of multi-country 
SBs, submit LoAs, and update, represent new role for DNA which comes close to soft 
sector oversight. This multi-country dimension should certainly be transferred to both 
NMM and NAMAs.  
(3) Role of third party auditors: The key DOE role is to prepare an AR of the SB which is 
similar to validation. Therefore, sectoral upscaling could theoretically be fostered by 
easing validation requirements for PoA-DDs and PDDs which use approved SBs. Within 
the NMM, it is likely that auditors will require UNFCCC accreditation similarly to 
DOEs, although NAMAs and FVA approaches my allow entities that demonstrate their 
competence otherwise, e.g. through International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) certification.  One needs to consider, however, that the key challenge here is “not 
about whether an auditor has competences, but also specifically about the tasks that 
need to be performed – we have to be sure that they (auditors) perform the right tasks 
and that needs to be defined” (Interview Nr. 5). ARs offer experiences which can contri-
bute to defining such requirements for all other sectoral mechanisms. 
(4) Capacity requirements: Regarding UNFCCC actors, the CDM support structure has 
built up a considerable level of expertise which is currently underused due to lower in-
flow of projects. SB-related tasks are roughly comparable to methodology development. 
However, for host countries, SBs represent a step-change, and require building substan-
tial capacity for QA/QC procedures and comply with continuous data requirements. Only 
a few countries have submitted SBs, therefore, it is not clear how effectively this will be 
implemented. For market participants involved in developing SBs, a level of capacity 
similar to methodology development is required and considerably lower than previously 
if a SB is readily available, as a key part of the requirements are already fulfilled. It is 
clear that these efforts are currently made possible primarily through donor support 
rather than the market. The related political uncertainty raises challenges related to 
whether a government or company should invest in building such capacity:  
I sometimes don’t understand why there is capacity building - for so many governments, really smart people are 
tied up in these mechanisms, and now the market is dead. It does not matter what the name of the mechanisms is, 
but that is a really unfortunate situation, that should be avoided (Interview Nr. 10). 
Technical dimensions  
(5) Data requirements: Data requirements are defined by CDM methodologies, specific 
SB establishments, or QA/QC guidelines (see section 2.3). As explained in (1) these typi-
cally cover an entire sector and need to be updated and revised by the DNAs. Previously, 
such tasks needed to be conducted by the PPs, who then had their baseline validated by 
a DOE. 
(6) MRV infrastructure and processes: MRV requirements are defined by CDM metho-
dologies. SBs are merely on methodological tools, and therefore operate fully within the 
CDM infrastructure. Innovations include the AR, the possibility of top-down SBs and 
revisions, as well as the relatively short validity period of only three years.  
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(7) Prevention of double counting: SBs do not directly contribute to double-counting, but 
enhance comparability across countries.  Using SBs in mechanisms with a less mature 
infrastructure than the CDM, which at this stage applies to both NAMAs and the NMM 
may contribute indirectly to prevent double claiming. 
(8) Eligibility: The use of SB is likely to become mandatory in order to prevent ‘cherry-
picking’ or ‘methodology-shopping’. SBs can optionally define automatic additionality 
e.g. through positive lists. These are currently only available for small-scale technolo-
gies, but could theoretically be expanded to other scales in any sector as long as envi-
ronmental integrity is preserved. This represents a direct link to the degree of net miti-
gation, i.e. the more the offsetting component of emission reductions is decreasing, at 
least from a climate perspective (not one of economic efficiency). The application of this 
SB aspect is transferable to NMM and NAMAs.  
“SBs have good potential for reducing transaction costs, and are currently gaining first experiences. Though, on a 
sectoral level still one would have individual activities that have to be designed, monitored and verified. This would 
not significantly reduce transaction costs. Though, one particular aspect why the CDM worked is that individual 
action was credited. So that’s a bit of a dilemma – moving away from individual action, and still aiming to use in-
struments that were designed for individual projects. Not sure whether this is the best solution. In any case 
PoA/SBs would need to be altered to fit a sectoral approach.” (Interview No. 3)  
(9) Transaction costs: SBs may significantly lower TA for market participants, as default 
values are provided. The costs for their establishment, however, have effectively been 
shifted from the Project Participants (PP) to public actors, both UNFCCC (in case of top-
down SBs), and host country DNAs (for bottom-up SB). This results in comparatively 
high transaction costs for these two, which may result in limitations of the concept.  
(10) Incentive structure: remains ex-post, but SBs increase certainty on the volume of 
expected CER yields, as the baseline is pre-determined for all activities in the entire 
(sub)sector, sometimes even across countries. This also means however, that a PP has 
little incentive to invest in a SB, as all competitors would be able use it freely. This may 
further require public work. In addition, CER prices continue to depend on market fluc-
tuations. RBF is a concept that seems to enjoy an increasing popularity within the 
UNFCCC space, and SBs can be excellently integrated such designs as several donor 
initiatives are now beginning to demonstrate. For NMMs, price volatility mitigation me-
chanisms are highly recommendable; in particular as deeper emission cuts for broad 
segments imply high risks.  
(11) Net avoidance effects: Conservativeness as a key CDM design principle already en-
sures some limited net mitigation effects (Interview Nr. 10). However, these remain in-
transparent as they are typically not quantified (Lazarus et al. 2013). More “ambitious 
baselines” may amplify this effect, but require further regulatory evolution. As one poss-
ible avenue, the JCM has established the concept of BAU emissions (similar to base-
lines), reference emissions (other threshold) and project emissions. The difference be-
tween reference and project emissions can be credited, whereas the difference between 
BAU and reference emissions is described as net mitigation effects (Government of Ja-
pan 2014). This provides a useful framework, although the conservativeness of the re-
spective values is critical for the integrity of such attempts to account for net mitigation. 
However, it is important to recognize that the CDM has not been designed to achieve net 
mitigation, although offsetting is only one option of using CERs. As one interviewee put 
it: 
Net mitigation is important because there is a lack of ambition. If the whole world would be covered by targets, you 
wouldn’t need net mitigation anymore. It is also important what you assume about the ambition level of a country 
or mechanism for net mitigation.” (Interview No.5) 
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Political dimensions 
(12) Scope of mechanism/measure: SBs are open to all CDM eligible sectors, although 
the CMP has mandated the EB to develop specific guidance for priority sectors8. Subse-
quent political decisions could broaden these work programs to further desirable sectors 
(e.g. those with high SD impact). In practice, SBs have so far focused on typical CDM 
sectors like power generation, two of the three priority sectors (transport, agriculture) 
have seen very limited CDM uptake. Regarding geographical scope, SBs could theoreti-
cally easily be transferred to advanced emerging economies. In some countries, “the 
CDM has not been taken up in the most important sectors, such as fisheries and mining. 
“ (Interview Nr. 12) 
(13) Timeline to implementation: SBs are fully operational. As mentioned in (2), the 
CDM’s regulatory framework continues to contribute to a toolbox of methodological ele-
ments which can also be utilized for other mechanisms. This is particularly relevant for 
pre-2020 implement, as all other mechanisms have no (NMM) or only embryonic infra-
structure of their own (NAMA). A political decision is required to integrate the concept, 
procedures and governance architecture into the NMM, whereas the vagueness MRV 
procedures for NAMAs already allows for the use of SBs for supported and credited 
NAMAs. 
(14) Political feasibility: SBs are one of the few items on which the CMP has issued 
guidance, there is a work programme for further evolution until 2015 in place, and the 
concept enjoys a relatively high degree of acceptance. Due to market situation, the SB 
development has been practically restricted to LDCs. In lieu of a recovery of the CDM 
market, extension of SB to development to middle and high income developing countries 
for those countries and sectors that do not develop full-fledged ETS. For adoption into 
non-market approaches, this may require some initiative and openness on the side of 
donor countries and multilateral development banks (MDB) or climate funds, which de-
termine the M&E frameworks for climate finance approaches that could potentially use 
the CDM framework to measure performance. 
Brief summary and assessment 
Regarding the majority of indicators, this analysis revealed that SBs are highly applica-
ble for both NMM and NAMA mechanisms. On a most fundamental level, this is because 
SBs are established based on performance of (sub)sectors, not projects. Sometimes dif-
ferences between SB applicability for NMM or NAMAs emerge, e.g. with regard to the 
degree of centralization of regulatory requirements. In other instances, e.g. with regard 
to the capacity and transaction cost indicators, it is important to differentiate between 
stakeholder groups, as simplification for market participants may mean higher transac-
tion costs and more complex capacity requirements for host countries and/or UNFCCC 
bodies. One interviewee remarked that “the idea of applying SBs across a sector is a 
very important idea that needs to be implemented in the new market mechanisms. It 
offers very strong argument for new mechanisms - simplify, transaction costs. Of course 
it costs more upfront, but then simplifies implementation.” Importantly, the CDM stan-
dardization process is still recent, but now fully operational, and can in theory be ex-
8 Energy in isolated areas, transport, agriculture. SB guidance for afforestation and reforestation already 
exists. 
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tended to additional CDM sectors, or transferred to other mechanisms that more direct-
ly on sectoral approaches like the CDM, including those that emerge from outside of the 
UNFCCC. 
5.2.2 Developing sectoral approaches based on Programme of Activities  
Institutional dimensions  
(1) Administrative requirements: Regarding the UNFCCC, PoAs operate largely within 
CDM methodologies, project cycle, and support structure. A key difference is to process 
CPA inclusion into existing PoAs, which also results in different MRV provisions. For 
host countries, PoAs do not require new responsibilities beyond a LoA, as the all the 
methodological work remains delegated to the PPs. For market participants, a consider-
ably higher administrative effort results in managing a CME, although it is possible 
that an organization can join an existing PoA with significantly less administrative hur-
dles. In case of multi-country PoAs, the CME can be located outside the country, which 
may exacerbate the problem of stakeholder consultations and other steps. Taking these 
concepts further to both NMMs and NAMAs through quasi sector-wide PoAs may re-
quire a public sector CME, which already exist in some sectors that are typically in pub-
lic sector dominated (waste, transport). 
(2) Regulatory requirements: Similarly to SBs, PoAs operate fully within the CDM 
framework, and are subject to project cycle and methodologies. It is important to recall 
that, similarly to standardization, the PoA concept has been formally introduced to the 
existing CDM by a COP decision (UNFCCC 2006), which is an indication of the respon-
siveness of the CDM’s regulatory framework to legitimate criticism. PoAs have generat-
ed an even more comprehensive set of procedures and guidance compared to SBs, as the 
concept has been introduced much earlier. For host country DNAs there not many 
changes, the main requirements remain LoAs. Yet, it is important not to under-estimate 
the important of effective sector-specific regulation (not CDM specific), for which the 
DNA is not responsible, but could make the effort to promote harmonization with CDM 
or other UNFCCC mechanism requirements.  
(3) Role of third party auditors: Although both validation and verification remain neces-
sary of PoAs, CPA inclusion does not necessarily require validation. The issue of DOE 
liability shows that the details of an innovative sectoral approach can take several years 
to be resolved. This is likely to become more relevant for upscaled approaches.  
(4) Capacity requirements: For the UNFCCC, the key challenge was arguably to develop 
the regulatory framework for PoA development, which can now be considered to be 
largely in place and somewhat consolidated. For national governments, there are no 
fundamentally new requirements for host countries. For market participants, however, 
the complexity of aggregating activities within the PoA umbrella can be very high, in 
particular when using methodologies with a low degree of standardization and involving 
multiple CPA implements (potentially in multiple countries and jurisdictions. However, 
in particular for smaller organizations without CDM experience, the option to join an 
existing PoA umbrella can mean significantly lower capacity requirements. Both NAMA 
and NMM approaches can be expected to increase capacity requirements for host coun-
tries, although there is little clarity on the specifics from the UNFCCC level. Therefore, 
there is a complete absence of market participant capacity on NMM. NAMAs have 
gained a bit more attention, but remain primarily government driven at this stage. 
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Technical dimensions  
(5) Data requirements: UNFCCC and host countries, not differences compared to 
project-based CDM. However, it is important to be aware that PoAs have opened the 
CDM to very small scale mitigation activities even on a household level. For market par-
ticipants, this means that many new developments in (sometimes informal) sectors with 
very poor data availability and/or reliability were required, resulting in the need to con-
duct extensive surveys on the ground. Increasing standardization, based on consolidat-
ing empirical research removes many of these needs, increasing applicability and there-
fore potentially scale. One interviewee stated that  
it is very good that it started to aggregate various installations, including large installations, and can thus be al-
ready very close to a sectoral approach – if it evolves to compulsory participation then we are in a sectoral approach 
– we have moved from one dimension to another one – if we have moved from PoA with small activities to large one, 
if we achieve comprehensive participation to avoid leakage (Interview Nr.2) 
(6) MRV infrastructure and processes: The potentially large number of CPAs that can be 
grouped within one PoA umbrella, have led to some innovative MRV approaches, e.g. 
with regard to sampling (even across CPAs) and validation (see 2.3). One interviewee 
remarked that  
the CDM is a very important experience and is an excellent basis to further new market mechanisms, most rele-
vant are PoA and SBs. CDM elements will not be used 100% the same. But for instance, let’s take the MRV aspect 
– it is a huge experience that can be further used. The methodologies will probably not be used one by one – even 
more for sectorals, but it is still very important 
Remaining issues synchronized verification should be abandoned. Increasing CDM 
standardization will remove the need to conduct surveys for PoAs, as has recently been 
achieved e.g. in methodologies for improved cook stoves and sustainable charcoal pro-
duction. 
(7) Prevention of double counting: PoAs do not directly contribute to prevention of 
double counting, although resulting CERs and the centralized UNFCCC CDM registry, 
operated under the authority of the EB, form a basis to prevent double counting. The 
NMM will certainly require similar accounting systems and registry infrastructure, al-
though the scope is so open at this time, that it is not clear which units are relevant, and 
what the balance between global and national levels will be. Yet, it is also likely to draw 
on UNFCCC infrastructure, although for sector-wide approaches or tradition with in-
ternational scope, common accounting frameworks and the role national registries and 
their linkages with UNFCCC system becomes more important. 
(8) Eligibility: The key issues are additionality, but also – more innovatively – CPA eli-
gibility. To ensure compatibility, PoAs drawn upon CDM methodologies, specific addi-
tionality tools and SBs, as well as any related guidance. These lessons concerning the 
compatibility of the underlying approaches – allowing for eligibility of the resulting 
emissions reductions – could be transferred to both NAMAs and the NMM. As an inno-
vative variation, a sector-wide approach such as an STM with compulsory participation 
could transfer the CME concept to the public sector (regulator), and assign a quasi-CPA 
role to individual participating entities. This is relatively far from the CDM’s baseline-
crediting approach, but some lessons could be learned for NMM.  
(9) Transaction costs:  On the UNFCCC level, elaborating PoA rules can be considered to 
have been the key effort, which has consolidated after. For host countries, transaction 
costs are similarly low than for conventional CDM projects. For market participants, 
transactions costs have initially been very high, but may be simplified through increas-
ing standardization (see 3.4). Potentially low transaction costs for standardized CPA 
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entry. Section 2.2 has demonstrated that even small-scale methodologies can now lead 
to some very large emission reductions. 
(10) Incentive structure: financial incentives typically accrue ex-post, and their value is 
dependent on market fluctuations. It needs to further elaboration until a sectoral ap-
proach can be seen in nascent initiatives such as Ci-Dev, which already pilot RBF ap-
proaches based on PoAs. Even more innovative concepts could limit crediting periods in 
exchange for provision of upfront finance, which would some of the incentives to ex ante. 
Climate Investment Funds have piloted this implicitly by some funding windows, al-
though the approach was very much project-based similar to conventional multilateral 
lending with grant elements. De facto, however, this could be seen as a pilot phase for 
one possible variety of credited NAMAs, although the mitigation impacts of the NAMA 
and CDM components of such activities need to be made more explicit.  
(11) Net avoidance effects: Conservativeness as a key CDM design principle establishes 
a likely net mitigation aspect (Lazarus et al 2013, Interview 12). For the UNFCCC, the 
cancellation account is potentially a key net mitigation instrument. In addition, innova-
tive RBF mechanisms based on CDM methodologies could harness the performance-
based character of CDM PoAs, but circumvent the currently depressed market by paying 
above-market prices. To some extent, credits generated under Ci-Dev will be retired, 
leading to direct net avoidance effects, which demonstrate that offsetting is only one 
option under the CDM. For market participants such RBF mechanisms are attractive as 
they enhance certainty. However, such approaches require willing financiers, although 
there may be a stronger institutionalization of such linkages between carbon markets 
and climate finance in the future. 
Political dimensions 
(12) Scope of mechanism/measure: PoAs have enabled access to the new sector with high 
relevance for under-represented countries, thereby enhancing not only sectoral but also 
geographical balance in the CDM portfolio (a key objective of the multilateral CDM). 
Later, large-scale methodologies have been allowed to operate as PoAs. The effort of the 
Secretariat to screen all relevant CDM methodologies for “PoA compatibility” is current-
ly ongoing. Some restrictions still apply (exclusion of cement sector). Yet, the transfer 
potential is high, including for innovative approaches such as sector-specific RBF me-
chanisms, which could function as a NAMA. For some sectors such as agriculture (soil 
carbon), the PoA concept has initially been taken up primarily in voluntary carbon stan-
dards, although these could be integrated into compliance mechanisms NAMAs. PoAs 
also have high relevance for NMM, as most NMM proposals focus on programmatic or 
policy-based approaches. For policy-based approaches, PoAs require further adjustment, 
in particular with regard to baseline identification and attributability of emission reduc-
tions. 
“The role of PoAs and SBs depends on the sector. PoAs could work for dispersed applications such as CFLs or cook 
stoves, while they are not so much suitable for large scale applications (as PoAs still need to monitor all activities, 
and you would require a large amount of activities for making use of sampling procedures). So for large point 
sources PoAs are essentially a bundle.” (Interview No. 3)  
(13) Timeline to implementation: PoAs are fully operational, and the concept has estab-
lished itself firmly within the CDM’s regulatory framework. Extension to further sectors 
and scales is possible both within and beyond the CDM virtually immediately. The PoA 
approach could evolve further within the CDM by extending is, as well as both within 
NMM and NAMAs. However, lack of clarity procedures makes it unlikely that larger 
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scale-rollout happens before 2020 within the NMM. Yet, RBF-based NAMAs could be 
rolled out virtually immediately, as the CDM registry and the cancellation account are 
already in place.  
(14) Political Feasibility:  The initial results of early PoA implementation are fully in 
line with CDM reform expectations (scale, geographical and sectoral balance), and have 
contributed to the high degree of acceptance of the PoA concept. This directly translates 
into potential applicability for both NMM and NAMAs. However, the rapid decrease in 
PoA inflow after 2012 demonstrates the vulnerability to policy uncertainty, CER ‘under 
demand’, and market volatility, similar to conventional CDM projects. For host coun-
tries, buyer countries have also shown a particular interest in supporting specifically 
PoAs through initiatives by a range of European governments. A critical precondition for 
further evolution towards sectoral levels is the continued attention to methodological 
evolution in particular in priority sectors with high sustainable development impacts 
but barriers such as data availability, as well as innovative combinations of CDM and 
climate finance vehicles, which could then be structured as either a NMM or NAMA. 
Brief summary and assessment 
Similarly – as is the case for SBs – PoAs are also highly applicable to both NMM and 
NAMAs. A critical difference to standardization is that PoAs have not engaged host 
countries as much, but directed most efforts primarily to PPs, and to some extent to the 
UNFCCC. This can be expected to shift considerably for both NMMs and NAMAs, rais-
ing fundamental questions about capacity and the viability and integrity of some insti-
tutional and technical aspects. More positively, this analysis has also found evidence for 
the proposition by the CDM Policy Dialogue that the combination of standardized ap-
proaches and PoAs can be powerful combination in terms of simplifying applicability, 
e.g. with regard to MRV (see 8), which may become relevant for all possible future me-
chanisms. This is a key precondition for facilitate upscaling towards sector-wide ap-
proaches (by lowering the barriers for uptake). Other critical further possible develop-
ments for NAMAs include RBF approaches based on PoAs, which could be seen – from a 
strictly conceptual perspective as a variety credited NAMAs, although they are usually 
not framed this way. More fundamental adjustments are necessary to adjust the PoA 
concept – particularly the CME – CPA relationship for STM and SCM type of NMM ap-
proaches, which is likely to require a shift of responsibilities from CMEs to host country 
government authority, raising a range of challenges from capacity and governance ar-
chitecture to incentive structure design.  
5.2.3  Developing sectoral approaches based on crediting & trading mechanisms 
In this section crediting and trading approaches as per the EU´s proposals for sectoral 
crediting mechanism or sectoral trading mechanism are discussed, and we evaluate 
their feasibility for accommodation under the NMM or NAMAs. The discussion for feasi-
bility under the FVA is set aside due to its more than speculative nature at this point – 
the discussion on the NMM is already speculative enough given the lack of agreed defi-
nitions and approaches from negotiations. As the future shape of the FVA is even vagu-
er, any discussion going into such detail would result in redundancies with the NMM 
discussion or be pure speculation. It is quite clear that the EU´s approach for crediting 
and trading is designed for the NMM. The result of the subsequent assessment is that 
the NMM is essentially better suited for crediting and trading. We nevertheless also 
consider NAMAs as a possibility for developing sectoral crediting or trading approaches 
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– for the simple reason that NAMAs are operational today, in contrast to the NMM. 
While NAMAs could in fact accommodate a crediting approach, this is still a contentious 
element in expert discussions and not officially debated under the UNFCCC so far. 
Institutional dimensions 
(1) Administrative and regulatory requirements: Sectoral crediting and trading ap-
proaches are intended to work under – and as we have seen require – a centralized me-
chanism, with a clear set of rules determining the process. Given that this likely hap-
pens on the national governments' level, international oversight is required for ensuring 
comparability and minimum quality standards. Here the UNFCCC (COP/MOP) can take 
a supervising role (e.g. by approving modalities and procedures). For the crediting ap-
proach CDM bodies would not be involved in the first place, but some parts of the CDM 
infrastructure could be copied (e.g. a supervisory board related to CDM EB, Meth Panel, 
working groups, etc.). For trading, the CDM body would not be required, apart from 
maybe accreditation aspects for third party auditors.  
“[The] Host country level is more important under NMM than under CDM. [The] DNA is a good starting point. 
[Such an institution] has to be build early, [and] of course there will be new tasks in terms of MRV [and] methodol-
ogies because further tasks will be required” (Interview No.2).  
As these approaches move away from the level of individual emitters and more towards 
the government level, the capability and political will of national governments for credi-
ble and consistent action becomes way more important under both crediting and trading 
approaches for defining and enforcing the domestic action. One interviewee observed, 
that “an important, if not core aspect is the enforcement of action. Here the responsibility of governments is very rele-
vant.” (Interview No. 7).  
Under a trading route the responsibility of the government is even higher, given that 
binding targets (cap) are to be met and thus careful preparation of a trading scheme is 
essential. Also given that the stakes are much higher in such a case of a binding cap, 
incentives may be greater to allow for a relaxed and ineffective target setting or design 
of the rules of the trading mechanism. Sectoral bodies or associations could also play a 
role, but would probably not have enforcement power (e.g. national building council) to 
incentivize behavioural changes, but could rather provide complementary guidance. 
From what we know today about the structural setting of the NMM, crediting and trad-
ing would clearly correspond with the administrative requirements expected under the 
NMM. Some NAMAs already today involve the national government (e.g. ministry of the 
environment) for administering the program; hence NAMAs with strong governmental 
involvement could also be suitable to accommodate crediting or trading approaches – 
from an administrative point of view.  
(2) Role of third-party auditors: As credits shall certify emission reductions, third party 
auditing would most likely be required. However, on the governmental level, scrutiny 
should rather address sector inventories than individual actions. For project level audit-
ing, CDM DOE´s would be best suited and could cover the tasks. They would however 
need to be accredited in some form for the new sectoral scope through the UNFCCC to 
ensure they are able to deal with the broader nature of the mechanism. For the former – 
the governmental level – the international consultation and analysis (ICA) process with 
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its review experts could become relevant.9 In case of a trading approach, auditing would 
be required particularly for reporting/verification of reductions on the sector level. Here 
(domestic) experts with expertise in the particular sector could come into play, e.g. un-
der an international roster of experts.  
The decision at COP 19 regarding the review of Biennial Update Reports (BUR) of de-
veloping countries was that the teams executing this task should comprise of a majority 
of experts coming from non-Annex I Parties. MRV of unilateral NAMAs will not be sub-
ject to any international scrutiny due to the limited stake of the international communi-
ty in such mitigation actions. CDC Climat (2013) expects that in the long run, MRV of 
supported NAMAs could look like the MRV of REDD+ agreed in Warsaw10, however, 
the language on MRV of supported NAMAs is currently very soft, and does not seem to 
allow for the necessary level of transparency and comparability. While NAMA develop-
ers currently often aim to orient themselves towards the standards set by CDM metho-
dologies and include elements of verification, this is a voluntary choice based on the ex-
pectation that in the future more stringent rules might apply. Furthermore the MRV 
depend to a large degree on the specific requirements that donors may have in a sup-
ported NAMA case and given the limited financing mobilized for the implementation of 
supported NAMAs these requirements are quite uncertain and likely to show strong 
differences between sectors and the types of donors engaging. The text on the NMM 
states clearly that the modalities and procedures need to regulate third party auditing, 
and that its implementation would most likely require auditing. Generally, the idea of 
third party reviews as well as an international review process is widely supported in the 
negotiations on the NMM. Given the market based nature of crediting and trading it is 
more likely that sufficient auditing could be achieved under the NMM rather than in the 
case of NAMAs. 
(3) Capacity requirements: Internationally capacity for a supervising body would be re-
quired, both in terms of technical expertise and financial support. While the UNFCCC 
Secretariat could certainly provide for some parts of this infrastructure, the history of 
the CDM EB has demonstrated that it takes time and resources to build up and main-
tain a body that is sufficiently equipped for working smoothly. On the government level 
full capacities for setting up a crediting approach are required, including administrator 
at government level (e.g. unit in ministry), registry and processing units (such as 
Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle, DEHSt), expertise for defining baselines and targets. 
For a trading approach a broader range of institutions need to be set up and technical 
preparations (such as registry, baseline and cap definition) to be considered. Here, ETS 
experience would be helpful and should be gained. In terms of the technical capabilities 
and capacities of human resources, the NMM is probably more demanding for host coun-
tries, whereas NAMAs allow for more freedom once their structure is defined, operatio-
nalized and actually implemented. An interesting aspect regarding JI was mentioned 
during the interviews:  
9 UNFCCC (2011): COP 17 adopted modalities and guidelines for international consultation and analysis 
(decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 54-62 and annex IV of decision 2/CP.17), see 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/3594.php?rec=j&priref=600006772#beg 
10 National entities are to be determined who administer the REDD+ activities and a national MRV sys-
tem. A technical annex of the BURs of countries engaging in REDD+ will provide detailed information on 
REDD+ activities. Proposed baselines (“reference levels”) will be assessed by a technical team of two LU-
LUCF experts, one each from a developing and an industrialized country. Baselines can be modified on the 
basis of the assessment. 
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“I also think we need to look at Joint Implementation (JI); JI is not relevant as a market mechanism anymore but 
as a design […]. NMM and FVA are kind of like JI track 1 and 2, NMM is track 1 and FVA track 2, which has al-
lowed you, depending on national capacity; you can do things outside of UNFCCC rules. Of course it should be ar-
ranged differently, because JI reform towards one track shows that it is not supportable. This is a huge responsibil-
ity for governments, so we also need to build mechanisms to [support] their capacity. JI shows that if you don’t 
trust the capacity of a country, you don’t trust the mechanism, and you cannot use the respective mechanisms in a 
useful way. It is about national capacity both in NMM and FVA.” (Interview No.5) 
Technical dimensions 
(4) Data requirements: Both sectoral crediting and trading require robust data. The dif-
ficulty here is projecting economic growth or the impact of policies on emission levels. 
For baseline and BAU definition solid historic data is needed, also depending on wheth-
er a target type referring to a base year, a BAU deviation or an emissions intensity tar-
get are chosen. This question was highlighted by many interviewees as relevant:  
“Data availability is a major challenge. And here it does not so much depend on the country – really solid and ro-
bust data is difficult to obtain everywhere, if it was just not monitored thoroughly enough in the past” (Interview 7).  
Then it is also difficult to determine what an ambitious reduction is, i.e. what emissions 
reductions are beyond an ambitious baseline and can therefore be credited. This relates 
again to proper MRV design, where one interviewee brought it to the point:  
 “[…] MRV needs to start from the baseline setting exercise itself. Measuring the emissions reductions later, that is 
easy, since you have measurement equipment etc. and it is something that you can observe and measure. But veri-
fying a baseline where you just have projections and no actual data, is much more difficult. So you need very clear 
guidelines and you need guidelines that tell you how to make a sensitivity analysis, and how to demonstrate what 
would happen under different possible future scenarios. Thus you should not build just one BAU scenario, but sev-
eral ones, considering for instance what happens if there is another financial crisis. Besides, the methodology 
should be unified and transparent and as standardized as possible” (Interview No.1).  
This aspect of required guidance is a key point underscoring again that crediting and 
trading would be best accommodated under the NMM.  
Standardization is an important aspect here, so allowing for standardized sampling ap-
proaches (also from other countries) could be an opportunity to overcome data problems. 
Under a trading approach robust data is particularly relevant for defining the baseline 
scenario and the cap. In case historic data is not available, which represents a major 
barrier to the implementation of a trading approach, the integrity of the approach is at 
risk. 
(5) MRV infrastructure and processes: Both crediting and trading demand robust and 
central MRV provisions, which would ideally be rule based with common accounting 
standards. Thus, the required infrastructure and rule set for MRV of crediting and trad-
ing mechanisms will most likely be defined internationally. However it still needs to be 
implemented and enforced by national governments, which requires a robust domestic 
approach as well involving the infrastructure and processes to maintain registries, in-
ventories, and undertake regular monitoring. The NMM will certainly define in its mod-
alities and procedures how MRV processes are to function on the international level, as 
well as the broad strokes regarding the roles of national governments. The International 
Consultation and Analysis (ICA) process already sketches MRV relevant aspects, which 
already today apply to NAMAs. The level of MRV requirements for proper crediting and 
trading mechanisms also point towards NMM as the appropriate venue for negotiating 
and implementing such mechanisms.  
(6) Prevention of double counting: For preventing double counting any domestic mitiga-
tion action needs to be registered and traced. The credibility of an international emis-
sions trading market amongst governments strongly depends on the credibility of the 
commodity, i.e. credits or allowances. Hence, an international registry needs to reflect 
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for such issues (such as the International Transaction Log under the Kyoto Protocol). 
Also a domestic registry should be in place registering all domestic action and contain 
information on existing policies pertinent to the areas of domestic actions for the proper 
demonstration of additionality. Reporting on the content of such a registry on domestic 
action would ideally be included in the context of the national GHG inventory, the na-
tional communications to the UNFCCC and the biannual update reports. Auditors 
should check the registry and ensure that no domestic measures or policies are counted 
twice. For a trading approach similar accounting and registry standards in all partici-
pating countries are required. In case robust modalities and procedures are put forward 
for crediting and trading, those are most likely to address such requirements.  
“Double counting is very important and very complicated – there are many definitions of double counting, with the 
probably most important one being double claiming as per the OECD definition. Here both buyer and seller country 
claim the emissions towards their targets. You would need to address all these double counting issues, and once 
other market mechanisms emerge such as the JCM does, it gets even more complicated to ensure that there is no 
double counting.” (Interview No.8) 
(7) Eligibility (additionality): The eligibility of measures depends on the rule set of the 
mechanism. So far NAMAs do not foresee covering market based approaches, while the 
NMM is a market approach per se. Thus, crediting and trading would inherently fit un-
der the NMM. The additionality – and with this also the environmental integrity of any 
approach – strongly relates to the robustness of baseline setting, and scope of the ap-
proach. For crediting additionality can be defined as activities beyond the ambitious 
baseline that covers existing and future domestic action. Here also “standardized as-
pects and positive lists can play a stronger role” (Interview No. 7). An important aspect 
for trading approach is the supplementarity rule to ensure that sector target is not ex-
clusively the result of domestic or international offsetting only.  
(8) Transaction costs: Regarding the transaction costs for both crediting and trading the 
equation reads “the more stringent the MRV, the higher the transaction costs”. Both 
approaches require technical and personal capacities within the host country and on the 
international level, but as trading has a mandatory component, the government would 
even more engage technical MRV processes in ensuring compliance, and thus drive up 
the costs. The integration of CDM elements can help reducing transaction costs, in par-
ticular the application of standardized processes. Here one faces a trade-off between 
standardization and integrity.  
“On a sectoral level still one would have individual activities that have to be designed, monitored and verified. This 
would not significantly reduce transaction costs” (Interview 7).  
An opportunity for further reducing transaction costs would be to do the MRV based on 
sector inventories (here one would face an even larger trade-off). We assume that the 
NMM modalities and procedures will require many technical and institutional aspects 
that we discuss here for crediting and trading - thus accommodating crediting and trad-
ing under the NMM allows for utilizing synergy effects. For NAMAs a crediting ap-
proach could build upon CDM elements (such as standardization).  
(9) Incentive structure: Under crediting the financial incentives for governments are 
provided ex-ante. When translating action towards the domestic level it depends on the 
government whether it utilizes credits as carrots for incentivizing action or applies other 
sticks for enforcement of action. Under trading allowances are allocated ex post, and 
could potentially be traded on an international carbon market. While the government 
needs to enforce action on the domestic level, it could closely monitor the success of the 
domestic measures, and eventually decide whether to buy or sell allowances. Both as-
pects would need to provide incentives and prevent free-riding on the domestic level. 
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Under the NMM (crediting/trading) as well as under NAMAs (crediting) incentives for 
domestic action have to be forwarded by the government to the emitters. 
(10) Net avoidance effects: By setting up an ambitious baseline and crediting only reduc-
tions beyond this baseline the host country provides own contributions under a crediting 
scheme. Under the trading route net emission reduction would occur if the baseline is 
determined conservatively but not inflated, and if the cap is set ambitious. Both aspects 
refer to robust baseline setting, see above. Net avoidance is a key requirement of the 
NMM, while NAMAs without trading component per se generate net reductions (if de-
signed properly). If crediting of NAMAs would need to demonstrate net emission reduc-
tions, baseline setting would need to be robust and transparent. 
Political dimensions 
(11) Scope of mechanism/measure: The scope of the mechanism depends on characteris-
tics of the sector (nature of emission sources) and technical aspects such as MRV ap-
proach, baselines, but also on the existing policies within the country. Here, trading is 
better suited for large point emission sources such as heavy industry or power sector, 
while crediting is can also cover smaller and dispersed measures and is attractive for 
sectors that are not already fully regulated in terms of mitigation policies and measures, 
and that have a certain reduction potential to address "high hanging fruits".  
“Depending on the MRV one may target different sectors. If the MRV is done in a facility by facility approach such 
as under the CDM, and one aggregates projects to a sectoral level, then one probably focuses on sectors that are al-
ready successful under project based CDM, such as industry, cement, power generation. Distributed generation 
would also be a possibility under that regime through PoAs. If instead a sectoral MRV system based on statistical 
data is applied, on could target the transport sector for instance. The key question is how emissions are monitored, 
on an individual basis or on a group basis. Regarding countries the CDM has shown that in countries with low ca-
pacity one should not go for sector wide mechanism with sector wide monitoring etc. Rather individual or project 
based MRV with individual verification, so a CDM or VCS (Verified Carbon Standard) based approach. Countries 
with enhanced capacity such as Colombia, Mexico have the potential to go forward to inventory based MRV for sec-
tors where individual monitoring is prohibitive such as in the transport sector. Though, I am biased against too 
much making use of inventories as a trade-off exists between environmental integrity of reductions and level of 
transaction costs” (Interview No. 3). 
(12) Timeline to implementation: As data requirements are quite significant probably 2-
3 years lead time seem reasonable – this would speak for the NMM (that is not to be 
operational within the next 5 years anyways).  
(13) Political feasibility: An important issue with regards to political feasibility will be 
transparency and accountability, i.e. demonstration of environmental integrity (in par-
ticular if default approaches come into play). The main difference is that under a STM 
governments will push harder for reaching the cap, and thus enforce mitigation action 
on the sectoral level. This could alert lobby groups for working against too stringent 
caps. Thus, the feasibility of crediting and trading to be implemented depends on the 
domestic circumstances and even more on the national governments ability to enforce 
action. Here the incentivizing character carbon trading could support the government, 
which is more likely under the NMM. 
Brief summary and assessment 
Crediting and trading approaches are mainly thought for application with broad 
scopes/segments, and thus are designed for a sectoral mechanism. The EU proposals for 
SCM and STM underscore this fact. The requirements for regulatory and administrative 
actors are significant on the international supervisory level, as well as at the govern-
ment level. Installations are most likely not influenced, apart from experiencing domes-
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tic policies and instruments that were incentivized by the crediting approach – unless 
governments would directly transfer credit incentives. 
In terms of data requirements sectoral crediting, and trading even more, demand high 
quality of data for projections. As the current reporting provisions under ICA and within 
the BURs still need to demonstrate their robustness, it appears more likely that credit-
ing and trading would be better suited under a central mechanism with clear rules such 
as the NMM. Crediting of policies in theory could be accommodated under a credited 
NAMA, if that concept ever materializes, but again here the current MRV provisions for 
NAMAs look too loose for generating credible units.  
“Apart from markets, envisaging sectoral emission reductions makes sense. NAMAs could be a better vehicle for ac-
commodating sectoral initiatives, though credited NAMAs would again start making things complicated.” (Inter-
view No. 3) 
5.2.4 Developing sectoral approaches based on domestic policy instruments  
After having discussed elements of the CDM (i.e. SB and PoA) and the concepts of cre-
diting and trading, we subsequently focus on a broader range of measures that are dri-
ven and implemented domestically and/or have a non-market character. A lot of action 
under future mechanisms and NAMAs is to be implemented by national governments on 
the domestic level, and there is a broad range of possible measures with GHG reduction 
benefits. We categorize them as financial and regulatory measures:  
Table 6: Domestic policy measures with sectoral character 
Category Measure / Instrument 
Financial Carbon fund 
Financial Tax incentives 
Financial Soft loans 
Financial Subsidies 
Financial / 
Regulatory 
Carbon tax 
Regulatory Feed in Tariffs (FiT) 
Regulatory Energy Efficiency / RE certificates 
Regulatory Energy Efficiency & Industry Standards 
Source: authors 
A key distinction between conventional project-based approaches and emerging sectoral 
approaches is the requirement to initiate or achieve transformative effects in the respec-
tive sector. However, these initiatives are not organized under a coherent mechanism or 
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other umbrella. Table 6 provides a brief impression of the diversity of measures, which 
is in practice even much broader, and can in theory be open to any initiative or sector, 
without a concise set of requirements on UNFCCC level. This makes a comprehensive 
analysis of these policy instruments along the set of indicators difficult. Further re-
search could assess individual NAMA or NMA instruments in more depth. Yet, as the 
focus of this study is on market-based approaches, we conduct our subsequent analysis 
in a more generic way along the three dimensions “institutional”, “technical” and “politi-
cal”.  
Political dimension 
The scope of approaches will be defined by the measure / mechanism itself - specific poli-
cies and measures focus on certain areas or sectors, such as FiTs (energy). The time for 
implementing domestic measures depends on the national policy environment and the 
ability of the government to enforce action. However, complex policy instruments re-
quire robust preparation if they shall work effectively, which is likely to take several 
years. Once operational, the current conceptual vagueness allows that a domestic meas-
ure can relatively easy structured as a NAMA, while the NMM is still an embryonic me-
chanism and thus will only be operational in a few years’ time, at the earliest.  Invest-
ment certainty here refers to stability of international revenue streams supporting an 
action. This depends on the bilateral negotiations of donor and host country/emitter, on 
the policy design and the government’s credibility. If international finance under a sup-
ported NAMA is provided, it becomes important how this money is channelled through 
towards recipients, e.g. via green loans or grants. The political feasibility of measures is 
determined by the measure itself, and again the domestic policy landscape. Here, the 
interests of the respective stakeholder groups involved are relevant - national initiatives 
require national support, but are likely to face opposition from various lobbies (e.g. fuel 
industry or coal power lobbies). 
Institutional dimension 
The administrative requirements strongly depend on the nature of the action. One could 
assume that an overarching set of international rules is introduced for governing indi-
vidual action, e.g. under the UNFCCC. The national government has the key responsi-
bilities for domestic measures, and thus is required to enable the respective authorities / 
administrative bodies. Third party auditing could become relevant if required by nation-
al legislation, or of international provisions of the UNFCCC or donors under a supported 
NAMA. Internationally capacity for an oversight body may be required once a global 
rule set is in place (in the way the FVA is desired by some parties), while for the domes-
tic level full capacities for setting up measures are required, including administrator at 
government level (e.g. unit in ministry), registry and processing units (such as DEHSt), 
as well as expertise for defining baselines and targets.   
Technical dimension 
The credibility of any measure with GHG reduction benefits hinges on robust BAU sce-
narios, baselines and MRV - otherwise no sound accountability is possible. Hence, data 
requirements are high, though may vary from measure to measure. For defining GHG 
reductions, one needs robust emissions data (historic and BAU) of the respective nation-
al sector. Depending on the sector and country, an inventory-based approach may help. 
The structure of MRV strongly depends on the measures at stake, but for all national 
policies and measures domestic requirements may be introduced. In case a NAMA ap-
proach is chosen, the UNFCCC MRV requirements (see ICA and BUR) come into play. 
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Regarding the prevention of double counting domestic measures with GHG reduction 
benefits generally need to be registered for a government being able to claim reductions. 
Here, a national registry may need to be put in place and register all domestic action 
(should also hold existing policies to ensure that additionality could be demonstrated). 
Reporting of registry (i.e. part of inventories, national communications or BUR) could be 
made mandatory. Auditors should check the registry to ensure that no domestic meas-
ures/policies are counted double. The eligibility and additionality again is defined by 
national legislation. Domestic action faces eligibility constraints defined by national leg-
islation (if any), but needs to comply with international provisions if they shall be ac-
commodated under an international mechanism (such as the NMM asking for additional 
and measurable reductions). International guidance for defining additionality of policies 
and measures could be helpful, for ensuring comparability of reductions and substan-
tiating integrity. The transaction costs are determined by the individual measure at 
stake - building upon existing schemes such as the CDM can help with reducing initial 
costs (e.g. for developing new methodologies). Incentives from the international level 
could be provided ex-post (in any RBF scheme). Ex-ante provision of finance could work 
in a supported NAMA setting where green loans or conditional loans are provided. Oth-
erwise, domestic approaches for setting incentives need to be set up by the government 
(either introducing compulsory policies, or incentivizing action with “carrots”). In case 
domestic measures are additional, they directly contribute to net emission reductions (if 
no trading is involved). Co-existence of mechanisms / approaches / instruments is possi-
ble as long as no double counting occurs. Ideally mechanisms /approaches are also re-
flected in a registry. 
Brief summary and assessment 
Domestic measures are to be regulated and designed on the national level, by the na-
tional governments, and may work under the NMM or FVA in future, if the respective 
modalities allow for them. Compared to NAMAs, stricter international provisions from a 
centralized mechanism such as the NMM are likely to increase the environmental inte-
grity (including net emission reductions). However, the NMM (and even more the FVA) 
do not exist yet. Today, any domestic policy measure can be labelled as NAMA, as long 
as it complies with the rather loose UNFCCC (MRV) provisions, although the lack of 
incentives for private sector investment (e.g. through crediting approaches and the in-
sufficient levels of (public) international climate finance) have so far prevented a strong-
er uptake of NAMAs. Overall, the range of approaches sketched above in the first place 
seems to qualify for NAMAs, but could also be developed as an RBF scheme (which does 
not prevent labelling it a NAMA, though). Once the picture on future mechanisms on 
the international level becomes more diversified, the role of domestic policy measures 
under the future climate policy regime will become clearer, and should be studied and 
analysed further. Until then they can be best accommodated under NAMAs.  
5.3 Summarizing opportunities for sectoral approaches under NMM and 
NAMA  
The key findings of the analysis in section 5.2 will be briefly summarized in the tables 
below in order to concisely convey the key messages and results in a more reader friend-
ly format. Table 7 draws attention to SB and PoA CDM elements with SB. Table 8 con-
solidates the findings on sectoral crediting and trading. 
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Table 7: Overview of options for further evolution of sectoral approaches based on the CDM 
  Indicators Sectoral Elements and Mechanisms 
    SB PoA 
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
Administrative 
requirements  
UNFCCC:  
- CDM support structure to check QA/QC of proposed SBs, 
recommend approval or rejection to EB, make informa-
tion available 
- Support for DNAs and PPs (helpdesk, RCC) 
- CDM project cycle and methodologies 
- Specific SB guidance and procedures 
 
Host country:  
- DNA to ensure quality and maintenance according to 
QA/QC principles (completeness etc),  
- LoA 
- Submission of SBs 
 
UNFCCC 
- Based on CMP Mandate, EB develops guidance and proce-
dures 
- Support for DNAs and PPs (helpdesk, RCC) 
- CDM project cycle and methodologies 
- Specific PoA guidance and procedures 
 
Host countries:  
- LoA 
 
Market participants:  
- CDM project cycle and methodologies, CME/CPA coordination 
Regulatory 
requirements  
UNFCCC:  
- CMP exercises political oversight, establishes priority 
sectors according to political objectives (geographical 
distribution) and development of relevant guidance 
- EB has authority to approve SBs (drawing on CDM sup-
port structure and project cycle),  
- EB can initiate top-down suspension, modification de-
UNFCCC:  
- CMP has mandated the introduction of PoA, development of 
guidance and procedures 
- EB has authority to approve PoAs, drawing on CDM support 
structure and project cycle 
Host country:  
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velopment  
Host country:  
- new role for DNA: LoA, but also SB QA/QC procedures, 
responsibility for submission, and update  
- LoAs,  
- sector-specific regulation (not CDM specific) 
Role of third-
party auditors   
Similar to conventional DOE role:  
- Assessment Report of proposed SB (similar to valida-
tion), can be waived for LDCs 
- Established validation and verification for CDM activities 
using SBs  
Similar to conventional DOE role according CDM project cycle 
- validation only for PoA-DD, not CPA-DD 
- verification needs to take place simultaneously for all CPAs 
- specific rules for micro-scale methodologies 
- Uncertainty of DOE liability has delayed uptake for several 
years 
Capacity 
requirements 
- UNFCCC: similar requirements than for methodology de-
velopment 
- DNAs: much higher due to responsibility for quality of SB 
development, submission and maintenance 
- Market participants: lower if SB readily available, similar 
to methodology development if PP develop SB together 
with DNA  
- UNFCCC: similar, although more complex requirements than 
for processing projects and methodology development 
- DNAs: similar 
- Market participants:  High, due to complexity of aggregating 
activities, potentially multiple implementing/executing enti-
ties/actors 
- Higher for CME (potentially public sector for sector-wide ap-
proach) 
- Potentially lower for CPAs 
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
l 
Data 
requirements  
- Based on CDM methodologies or specific SB establish-
ment guidelines  
- Data needs cover entire sector not only project 
- Data maintenance for updating SBs may require new 
competences in DNAs 
- Based on CDM methodologies 
- Depending on level of standardization, high data require-
ments in particular for MRV of small-scale interventions (e.g. 
household surveys) 
 
MRV infrastruc-
- Drawing on CDM methodologies  
- Data updates necessary  
- Drawing on CDM methodologies 
- Higher complexity in particular for sectors that aggregate 
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ture and 
processes 
many small activities 
- Has led to innovative MRV approaches, e.g. cross-sampling 
- Some concerns remain (see “third-party auditors”) 
Prevention of 
double 
counting  
- No direct relevance, but SBs enhances comparability 
across countries (contributes to transparency, prevents 
double claiming) 
- UNFCCC CDM registry 
Eligibility  
- SB use is likely to become mandatory  
- SBs can optionally include automatic additionality (posi-
tive list) 
- Additionality tools 
- Positive lists possible  
- CME-CPA structure could be transferred to sector-wide partic-
ipation in NMM 
Transaction 
costs  
- UNFCCC: Potentially higher in case of top-down SB, simi-
lar for bottom-up SB 
- DNAs: Significantly higher due to upfront methodological 
work  
- Market participants: Lower for market participants, as 
default values are provided 
- UNFCCC: Potentially higher in case of top-down SB, similar for 
bottom-up SB 
- DNAs: no difference 
- Market participants: Initially higher transaction cost due to 
higher complexity, but high potentially lower transaction 
costs for additional CPA  
Incentive struc-
ture 
Similar to project-.based CDM: 
- ex-post, but higher certainty on expected CER yields, as 
baseline is pre-determined for all activities in entire sec-
tor, sometimes even across countries 
- price dependent on market fluctuations 
- Compatible with upfront finance such as RBF 
Similar to project-.based CDM: 
- Ex-post  
- CER value dependent on market 
- Some funds target specifically PoAs rather than projects 
- Compatible with upfront finance such as RBF 
Net avoidance 
effects 
- Depends on conservativeness of SBs, can be high, but 
are intransparent as the mitigation effects of “ambitious 
baseline” typically is not quantified and visible (as the 
CDM does not have this mandate) 
- Resulting CERs can be used as 100% offsets, but can al-
so be cancelled and then act as a receipt for net mitiga-
- Depends on conservativeness of methodologies and crediting 
period.  
- Resulting CERs can be used as 100% offsets, but can also be 
cancelled and then act as a receipt for net mitigation action 
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tion action  
Po
lit
ic
al
 
Scope of 
mechanism/ 
measure  
- focuses on priority sectors and  
- approach transferable to non-CDM sectors, although 
mandate of regulators limited 
- Some restrictions currently apply (exclusion of cement sec-
tor), but transfer potential is high  
Timeline to 
implementation 
- already operational, but still recent concept with limited 
uptake primarily in “under-represented” countries 
- Already operational, concept has established itself firmly, 
wide implementation across regions, sectors and scales 
Political 
feasibility  
- high degree of acceptance, cornerstone of CDM reform 
efforts, but practically restricted to LDCs (due to market 
situation), no uptake in middle and high income develop-
ing countries 
- High degree of acceptance, large-scale uses across all rele-
vant CDM countries. Uptake impacted by post-2012 
uncertainty similar to CDM projects 
As
se
ss
m
en
t 
General relev-
ance for sector-
al  approaches 
- Sector-orientation: Established based on performance of 
(sub)sectors, not projects      
- Key approach to improve and extend the CDM’s metho-
dological “toolbox” (baselines, additionality, MRV) 
- Key aspect of UNFCC CDM reform debate due to simplifi-
cation, comparability and transfer potential  
- Key challenges are capacity requirements and upfront 
transaction costs by either UNFCCC and/or host coun-
tries, and donor countries 
- CDM SBs target sectors that have not been penetrated  
by the CDM previously (transport, forestry, agriculture, 
potentially others such as building efficiency) 
- Already operational, but uncertain role beyond Kyoto 
Protocol (KP) CP2 
- Step towards sector-wide approaches due to aggregation of 
mitigation activities (see table 1) 
- Applies to large, small and micro-scale activities 
- Experience on roles of CMEs, CPA, and their interactions 
- Ongoing consolidation of standards and procedures has al-
ready yielded important lessons e.g. for MRV design 
- Has shown role of unexpected difficulties of operationalizing 
more complex approaches at higher scales (DOE liability) 
- Accuracy of accounting very high, potentially less need for 
stringency if there is no international trading or high degree 
of net mitigation  
- Vulnerable to market uncertainty 
 
Specific to 
NMM / FVA 
- SBs typically operate on higher level of aggregation than 
projects: potentially, a higher level of conservativeness 
may achieve higher level of net mitigation, although this 
is not made visible (as this is not the mandate of the 
- Experience with aggregation 
- CME and CPA roles, although this will need to be adjusted 
according to the different role of the host country government 
- Further potential lessons depending on design of the 
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CDM) 
- Can be used for crediting entire sectors 
- Could function as benchmark for FVA approaches 
- Further potential lessons depending on design of the 
NMM/FVA 
NMM/FVA 
NAMA 
- high applicability as a methodological/conceptual ap-
proach for establishing both baselines, eligibility and 
MRV, e.g. for results-based financing or other approach-
es  
- As NAMAs currently do not generate offset credits, net 
mitigation impact is 100% 
- High applicability for aggregated activities (e.g.CME-CPA rela-
tionship, MRV) 
- If CER cancellation becomes more important, this PoAs could 
be transitioned into a variety of credited NAMAs which do not 
generate offsets (as CERs are cancelled  
Table 8: Overview of options for further evolution of sectoral approaches crediting/trading, regulatory and non-market measures 
  Indicators Sectoral Elements and Mechanisms 
    Crediting and trading approach  Domestic Policy Instruments 
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l  
Administrative 
requirements  
- The UNFCCC (COP/MOP) functions most likely as super-
vising Mechanism, approving modalities and proce-
dures;  
- CDM bodies are not involved for crediting in the first 
place, but its structure could be utilized (e.g. EB, Meth 
Panel, working groups, accreditation aspects for third 
party auditors etc.).  
- The national government has way more importance com-
pared to CDM;  
- Also here the national government becomes important 
for defining and enforcing the domestic action.  
- Sectoral bodies could also play a role, but probably have 
no enforcement power (national building council etc).  
- The administrative requirements strongly depend on the na-
ture of action. In general one could assume that an overarch-
ing set of international rules is introduced for governing indi-
vidual action, e.g. under the UNFCCC.  
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- Also sectoral trading is intended to work under a centra-
lized mechanism, with a clear set of rules determining 
the process.  
Regulatory 
requirements  
- The UNFCCC is envisaged to supervise and put forward a 
certain set of rules;  
- Host country governments play key role by defining do-
mestic approach - need to define sectoral policy or 
measure.  
- As above, international rule set may be required, while na-
tional legislation is a prerequisite.  
Role of auditors   
- As credits shall certify emission reductions independent 
third party auditing would most likely be required.  
- Could become relevant in case i) the national legislation re-
quires for it, or ii) if international provisions of donors under 
a supported NAMA request it.  
Capacity 
requirements 
- Internationally capacity for an oversight body is re-
quired, while for domestic level full capacities for setting 
up crediting approach are required. 
- Internationally capacity for an oversight body may be re-
quired in case a global rule set is in place (in the way the FVA 
is desired by some parties), while for the domestic level full 
capacities for setting up measures are required. 
Te
ch
ni
ca
l 
Data 
requirements  
- Key element for baseline and BAU definition - solid his-
toric data is required, for base year target approaches, 
while BAU deviation or intensity targets are picked, less 
historical data required (but modelling).  
- An important question is how to determine what is ambi-
tious reduction, i.e. what is beyond an ambitious base-
line and will be credited?  
- Data requirements are per se high, though may depend on 
the measure applied.  
MRV  
- Monitoring of emissions performance at sector level is 
required, though potentially sampling is feasible. As 
crediting is involved auditing may be required (could be 
national auditors if they are accredited at UNFCCC).  
- MRV is ideally rule based, robust and central, but at the 
discretion of host country.  
- Data and Information on existing PAMs are required.  
- The structure of MRV strongly depends on the measures at 
stake - for all national policies and measures domestic re-
quirements may be introduced. 
- In case a NAMA approach is chosen, the UNFCCC MRV re-
quirements (see ICA and BUR) come into play.  
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Prevention of 
double 
counting  
- National registry must be in place and register all domes-
tic action (should also hold existing policies to ensure 
that additionality could be demonstrated.  
- Reporting of registry (=part of inventory/National Com-
munication/BUR) should be mandatory.  
- Auditors should check registry as well to ensure that no 
domestic measures/policies are counted double. 
- In general, domestic measures with GHG reduction benefits 
need to be registered for a government being able to claim 
reductions.  
- A national registry should be in place and register all domes-
tic action (should also hold existing policies to ensure that 
additionality could be demonstrated).  
Eligibility 
(additionality)  
- In the first place a specific size in terms of installations 
or reduction potential is required (i.e. sectoral characte-
ristics). Then one would need to ensure that no free rid-
ing is possible.  
- Additionality can be defined as activities beyond the am-
bitious baseline (that covers [existing] & future domestic 
action).  
- Eligibility depends on the national legislation, and if applica-
ble, on the international rules. International guidance for de-
fining additionality of policies and measures could be help-
ful, for ensuring comparability of reductions and substantiat-
ing integrity.  
Transaction 
costs  
- Tradeoff between standardization and integrity.  
- Building upon CDM elements can help.  
- The transaction costs strongly depend on the measure - 
building upon existing schemes such as the CDM can help for 
reducing initial costs (e.g. for developing new methodolo-
gies).  
Incentive Struc-
ture 
- Financial incentives for the government are to be pro-
vided ex-ante (trading) or ex-post (crediting).  
- Under crediting it depends on government whether it uti-
lizes credits as carrots for incentivizing action or applies 
other sticks for enforcement of action. 
- Incentives from the international level could be provided ex-
post (in any RBF scheme).  
- Ex-ante provision of finance could work in a supported NAMA 
setting where green loans or conditional loans are provided.  
- Investment certainty refers to stability of international reve-
nue streams supporting an action. This depends on the bila-
teral negotiations of donor and host country/emitter. 
Net Avoidance 
effects 
- By setting up an ambitious baseline and crediting only 
reductions beyond this baseline the host country pro-
vides own contributions.  
- Discounting could turn out to be the more robust option 
for crediting approaches.  
- In case domestic measures are additional, they directly con-
tribute to net emission reductions (if no trading is involved).  
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Po
lit
ic
al
  
Scope of 
mechanism/me
asure  
- Attractive for sectors that are not already fully regulated 
in terms of mitigation policies and measures.  
- Depends on country, but a certain reduction potential 
should be there to address "high hanging fruits". 
- This will be defined by the measure / mechanism itself, as 
specific policies and measures can focus on certain areas or 
sectors.  
Timeline to 
implementation 
- As data requirements are quite significant probably 2-3 
years lead time, hence only possible as pilot for crediting 
under NMM after 2020.  
- The implementation of domestic measures depends on the 
national circumstances. Important policy instruments require 
robust preparation if they shall work effectively, hence a few 
years of preparation and testing are required. 
- Once operational a domestic measure can relatively easy be 
accommodated under a NAMA, while the NMM is still an em-
bryonic subject and thus per se will only be in place in about 
a decade.   
Political Feasi-
bility (host 
country posi-
tion towards 
MMs, lobby 
groups, UNFCCC 
group associa-
tions?)  
- Big issue will be transparency, accountability = environ-
mental integrity (in particular if default approaches come 
into play. 
- The political feasibility of measures depends on the character 
of the measure, and on the interests of the respective stake-
holder groups involved. National initiatives require national 
support - and are likely to see opposition from lobbies.  
As
se
ss
m
en
t 
General 
relevance 
- Crediting and trading are mainly thought for application 
with broad scopes/segments, and thus is designed for a 
sectoral mechanism.  
- Domestic measures are to be regulated and designed on the 
national level, by the national governments, and may work 
under the NMM or FVA in future, if the respective modalities 
allow for them.  
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NMM / FVA 
- Both trading and crediting are envisaged to work under a 
central top down mechanism, hence they suit good with 
the NMM.   
- Compared to NAMAs, stricter international provisions from a 
centralized mechanism such as the NMM are likely to in-
crease the environmental integrity (including net emission 
reductions). Though, the NMM (and even more the FVA) do 
not exist yet.  
NAMA 
- NAMAs could be developed into the direction of "credited 
NAMAs", - here sectoral crediting is essentially policy 
crediting. Trading is too much of a market based ap-
proach as if it would fit under a NAMA.   
- Today, any domestic policy measure can be labelled as NA-
MA, as long as it complies with the rather loose (MRV) provi-
sions for NAMAs.  
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6 Measures for implementation and evolution of sectoral ap-
proaches 
Chapter six builds on the analysis and results of the previous chapters and identifies 
challenges for implementing sectoral approaches (6.1.) as well as potential ways to over-
come them (6.2). As there are many common challenges for the various sectoral ap-
proaches we have analyzed (SBs, PoAs, sectoral crediting and trading, as well as domes-
tic policy measures with sectoral character), we do not consider these individually below, 
but refer to common barriers and solutions. Instead, we focus on three key stakeholder 
groups: the UNFCCC, national host country governments, and market participants / 
investors, which have to adopt new roles in the implementation of evolving sectoral ap-
proaches. However, we highlight if specific barriers or solutions are particularly salient 
in the context of one of the specific sectoral approaches.  
6.1 Identifying challenges for implementing sectoral approaches  
The previous chapters have taken stock and evaluated the progress of various sectoral 
approaches for UNFCCC mechanisms, as well as options for their potential further evo-
lution. This chapter consolidates and scrutinizes these options by asking for the chal-
lenges that could stand in the way of realizing this potential. In order to develop a prac-
tice-oriented and policy-relevant approach, we differentiate between three main stake-
holder groups: First, the UNFCCC negotiations process and governance architecture is 
the institutional and political core of the international climate regime. Therefore, we 
begin by discussing possible challenges at the global level that could be faced by the 
UNFCCC process and relevant UNFCCC bodies and actors. Second, national govern-
ments act as negotiators in the intergovernmental UNFCCC process and therefore have 
influence on shaping the evolution of sectoral approaches on a political level. In addi-
tion, governments are key drivers for promoting the domestic implementation in partic-
ular of existing, but also of possible pilot activities for emerging mechanisms. A number 
of national governments are already participating in the PMR, an even greater number 
has already submitted NAMAs or is currently preparing them. As the previous chapters 
have explained in depth, sectoral approaches also have potentially much greater impacts 
on national development than a project-based approach. Therefore, the roles of host 
country governments will fundamentally change compared to the original CDM re-
quirements. Depending on the type of approach, government roles can be expected to 
range somewhere between conducting QA/QC procedures for SB development and full-
fledged market facilitation and oversight functions similar to hosting an ETS. Market 
participants are in the first place actors that implement mitigation action (such as emit-
ters and/or their service providers), that generate carbon credits or other outputs (such 
as electricity) from implementing mitigation activities, but also investors and buyers of 
carbon permits. The CDM was designed with an explicit bottom-up design, which al-
lowed market participants to develop activities on their own initiative within a global 
framework and project cycle, but only a very limited supervisory role of national gov-
ernments. This applies at least to the DNA functions, as of course any economic activity 
is embedded in sector-specific regulation and (sometimes informal) practices that exist 
independently of the UNFCCC process, and have a key impact on the domestic success 
of a mitigation activity. Furthermore, the CDM pipeline shows very clearly that private 
investment both in CDM projects and PoAs has essentially dried up due to a lack of de-
mand and CER price volatility and depression. This applies to any new market mechan-
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ism (Michaelowa 2012), and it is critical to be conscious of the need for a sufficient level 
of certainty on return as a precondition for private sector investment, in particular in 
countries with difficult investment climates. However, the evolution of sectoral ap-
proaches and the increasing interactions with climate finance instruments offer poten-
tial ways to address these issues, as the experience with an increasing number of ETS 
around the world shows, in which floor prices, market stability reserves, and other price 
volatility control measures are emerging and maturing. 
In practice, these stakeholders are not isolated groups but engage in interactive constel-
lations, in which sometimes the same people have simultaneous mandates, e.g. a formal 
role in the CDM Executive Board, being a negotiator for a national government, as well 
as perhaps even responsibilities for national carbon purchasing programmes (Annex I 
countries), or promotional activities (non-Annex I countries). Still, we attempt to distin-
guish these connections for analytical reasons while taking into account potential over-
laps. In this setting, we apply the lessons of the previous sections to the stakeholder 
groups described above, in order to identify critical challenges for the evolution of sec-
toral approaches within CDM+, NMM/FVA and NAMAs. These challenges are struc-
tured assigned to seven broader issue areas, and assigned subsequent numbers in order 
to facilitate establishing linkages and cross-references between chapters. 
6.1.1 UNFCCC  
Key challenges for UNFCCC actors include: 
1 Common Rules and Standards:  
There is still an absence of even the most fundamental rules on role of the UNFCCC, 
which leads to a high degree of political uncertainty. Still embryonic “early design prin-
ciples” suggest that the NMM is likely to emerge as a more “centralized” mechanism, i.e. 
operating under guidance and authority of COP. Yet, the increasing relevance of climate 
finance (including through NAMAs), and other approaches that could become relevant 
within the FVA, or even outside of the UNFCCC strongly suggest a considerable degree 
of fragmentation, that creates a broad range of challenges.  
1.1 Finding agreement on the degree of centralization 
Regulatory authority: different sectoral approaches will require different arrangements 
for the COP to exercise its authority and guidance. It is not clear, which regulatory bo-
dies will emerge in the future climate policy regime and how they could influence or ad-
ministrate sectoral approaches. For CDM based approaches such as PoA and SB the 
existing architecture (CMP, EB, DNA) is likely to continue to play an important role. 
For the NMM, it seems likely that a multilateral body that is accountable to the COP 
will be established, although this is not yet clear at this time: Will there be a new desig-
nated global regulatory body similar to CDM EB - or the EB itself with an adjusted 
mandate established by a COP decision?  What are its competences and responsibilities? 
This relates to the balance between global and national levels: Which competences can 
remain on the global level, and which need to be transferred to host country govern-
ments? For crediting and trading approaches, as well as domestic policies, the national 
government has the key responsibilities for implementation. Sectoral trading represents 
the strongest deviation from the baseline and credit approach, and the transfer of regu-
latory authority to host countries is most different, as similar provisions than for inter-
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national emission trading would be required (see also section 6.1.2.). PoA elements such 
as the function of a CME can be transferred but will require adjustments and are likely 
to be operated by public sector actors which raises new questions and challenges on the 
host country level. 
1.2. Negotiating net mitigation and “own contribution”  
Politicization of technical concepts: Deriving net mitigation effects is challenging if trad-
able units are involved, while pure domestic measures represent net GHG reductions 
per se – as long as they are additional. Double counting and environmental integrity 
(MRV and additionality) are the most relevant aspects in this regard. Applying ambi-
tious standardized baselines for defining the amount of tradable units, discounting of 
credits or even CER cancellation requires a transparent and robust technical founda-
tion, which is ideally to be defined internationally.  
“Net mitigation is not a scientific approach, you can do “undercrediting”, and therefore do more than a conventional 
approach.” (Interview No.6) 
“An important thing with offsetting is that there is no “own contribution” of mitigation envisaged. So if you want to 
derive net mitigation in an offset based mechanism, you would need to discount credits. Thus, one needs to distinct 
net mitigation and own contributions. You can do that within a project based scheme (e.g. by discounting or ambi-
tious baselines). For example, the latest HFC 23 methodology under the CDM is exactly that. Within that metho-
dology a threshold for crediting is set at a level that no plant in the world has ever reached – so the current version 
of the methodology only issues credits for a small part of the covered emission savings, and thus in fact provides a 
net mitigation benefit.” (Interview No. 3) 
Those approaches are however politicized because of perceived imposition of mitigation 
commitments and loss of revenue. This has prevented progress on technical issues, and 
therefore negatively impacted progress on sectoral approaches, particularly in the nego-
tiations on NMM/FVA. Still, PoA and SBs continue to mature, and work on conservative 
standardization may continue to drive net mitigation. A technically easy solution would 
be to account for “own contribution” through CER cancellation, which has become a 
prominent issue in the ADP. However, this raises the challenge of generating financing 
as well as for administrative and eligibility requirements need to be met in order to 
avoid double-counting. 
1.3. Fragmentation and need to integrate UNFCCC-external developments 
While the FVA remains vague, bilateral mechanisms established by powerful rich coun-
tries establish “facts on the ground” (JCM, WCI) – with a tradeoff between useful pilot 
experiences11 and a fragmented landscape of mitigation mechanisms which raises the 
risk of mechanism shopping. In the context of sectoral approaches this development be-
comes even more relevant, as the emergence of a range of sector-specific mechanisms, 
partly outside of the UNFCCC process. These are unique mechanisms for subsectors or 
even individual technologies with highly idiosyncratic characteristics, operating in mul-
11 “With regard to baselines, NMM rules are not yet developed, we don’t have modalities and procedures, 
what we have is an empty shell, we have a bit of research that was done. In my view, you gain more in-
sights not through academic work, and we need piloting of new approaches to see if they can work.“ (Inter-
view No.6) 
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tiple countries (such as REDD+12, destruction of HFC gases13, or aviation and ship-
ping14). 
1.4. Safeguarding the environmental integrity of certificates  
The environmental integrity of certificates strongly depends on eligible approaches, go-
vernance architecture, and potentially the degree of offsetting that is involved, which 
may differ strongly between NMM and NAMAs. The key challenge here are provisions 
for ensuring additionality, designing robust MRV concepts, as well as the availability of 
emissions data and a transparent regime.  
“I think the main technical challenge is baselines, because in the end baseline setting is playing with numbers and 
it is just so easy to play with numbers. So it is just a question of how to define BAU, like a projection from now on 
until 2020 or 2030. How do you define that convincingly, particularly in developing countries where you really don’t 
know how much they will grow? There is a high uncertainty of growth projections and I am not talking about emis-
sions or how much cement will be produced. It is playing with large-scale growth and growth is the driver for every-
thing. So if you don’t know how much a country will grow, how can you set a BAU scenario?” (Interview No.1) 
Standardization or inventory based approaches could help overcoming those challenges, 
although a tradeoff exists regarding the quality of credits. This issue has been a strong 
concern among all the dominant majority of interviewees:  
“The overall concern I have right now under the KP agreement we have a solid accounting framework, there is 
nothing that points towards having an equally solid accounting framework under the new deal. If we are lucky we 
get something similar, but I´m pretty sure it´s going to be weaker. In this light it will become difficult for new me-
chanisms to demonstrate integrity, as it for instance will be tough to avoid double counting” (Interview No. 8). 
2 Issuance of certificates 
This issue area raises three challenges related to the nature of the certificates, the au-
thority to issue certificates, and what the necessary infrastructure comprises: 
2.1. Defining the nature of certificates 
The evolving range of carbon market standards over the last decade has demonstrates 
that a variety of approaches and requirements regarding the nature of certificates exist 
– depending on the interest of market participants and the purpose of the credits. While 
Renewable Energy Certificates schemes or some voluntary carbon standards sometimes 
do not meet demanding environmental aspects, units eligible in compliance markets 
such as CERs or EUAs often have a higher quality. Thus, any tradable unit requires a 
clear definition for safeguarding the standards quality and for justification of prices. 
This is particularly relevant regarding the underlying output: Although numerous di-
mensions are possible (e.g. electricity generated or saved, or fossil fuel subsidies re-
moved), ideally the certificates would be based on GHG emission reductions. The clear 
12 Already quite mature with implementation in voluntary carbon markets, although drifting towards a 
RBF mechanism without market elements in the UNFCCC arena. Linkages with CDM may potentially 
include A/R SBs.  
13 A new sectoral mechanism could be created relatively simply from a technical perspective, although po-
litical will is necessary and direction is unclear. A RBF mechanism could be based to varying degrees di-
rectly on CDM methodologies  and the project cycle for MRV, a specific window in CER cancellation ac-
count (to be created), or a link to GCF for managing  financial flows. The challenges include the politics 
related to institutional linkages to the Montreal Protocol.  
14 In discussion as Aviation MBM / International Shipping MBM under ICAO/IMO.  
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definition of certificates also ensures inter-standard fungibility with other markets, e.g. 
between SCM credits, the CDM and a domestic ETS.  
2.2. Lack of clarity on who has the authority to issue credits, and on what basis  
Authorities issuing tradable units must be credible and able to decide and act indepen-
dently, otherwise market interests may try to influence issuance decisions and thus un-
dermine market credibility. In any case international oversight (through UNFCCC) is 
strongly preferable, be it in the form of a centralized institution for issuance (as under 
the CDM), or via checks & balances that scrutinize the issuance process through nation-
al government bodies. The CDM has demonstrated that maximum transparency is key 
in this respect.  
2.3. Lack of mitigation mechanism “infrastructure” 
For issuing certificates a clear system of actors (auditors, implementers), rules & proce-
dures (MRV, SD benefits, issuance “cycle”), and infrastructure (such as a registry) is 
essential. Any sectoral approach based on the CDM (SB/PoA) can utilize the CDM infra-
structure in this context, while a SCM / STM approach would require an international 
set of rules, as well as guidance or rules for national implementation. In case additional 
capacities would be required on the international level, the question is how those would 
be financed (e.g. through a share of proceeds administrative fee under the NMM).  
3 Lack of demand and market oversight 
3.1. Lack of mitigation ambition leads to “underdemand” 
Annex I countries do not put forward mitigation targets in line with the 2°C target, 
which would allow for a reliable price finding through supply and demand dynamics. In 
such “policy driven” markets, certificate prices are entirely contingent on political ambi-
tion, therefore currently (and probably over the next decade) leading to depressed car-
bon prices that do not cover costs of implementing mitigation activities. This applies to 
all mitigation market mechanisms – existing and future ones. Recent developments 
show a slight increase in “artificial” demand through procurement programmes of An-
nex 1 party governments. In addition, RBF based schemes such as the CiDev fund of the 
World Bank will absorb some credits from the market. However, in the light of the re-
quired or of magnitude (i.e. stable long term demand for billions of credits) these at-
tempts are an important but insufficient drop in the ocean that can, however, lend a 
lifeline to highly desirable activities.  
“The main concern right now is demand, a market for offsets or market mechanisms and finance for NAMAs. The 
problem of demand is not just for market mechanisms but also for NAMAs and we don’t have credited NAMAs so 
far to create demand for NAMAs. So we really need the market situation to be clear, before we can start to think 
what to do in the practice.” (Interview No. 1) 
Another way to look at this challenge is proposed by one of the interviewees:  
“The language focuses very much on separate mechanisms at sectoral scale, but there the terminology can also ap-
ply to what kind of tools we need to mobilize mitigation action at a higher level. This is why […] why we are a bit 
stuck in the negotiations because we sometimes are not clear about the terminologies and talk about different 
things. That is why I sometimes don’t talk about market mechanisms anymore, because we are in a world, where is 
it more about mechanisms not just markets. I think of flexible mechanisms…flexibility is at least as important as 
the market because it can adjust the mechanism to changing circumstances in the future. Flexibility gives us a way 
of dealing with this uncertainty.” (Interview No.5) 
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3.2. There is an “institutional vacuum” for containing certificate price volatility  
One important question for a functioning market is what level of market oversight is 
necessary and sufficient to contain price fluctuations? Today under the UNFCCC no 
institution has the authority and competences to fulfill such a market stabilization func-
tion (the COP is too far from market action; the EB is a regulator that has the mandate 
to remain “neutral”, the GCF is stil a paper tiger). Proposals for carbon reserve banks 
(submission of Papua New Guinea in 2011) or market stability reserve (such as we see 
in the recent discussion on EU level for the EU 2030 climate package, or under the NA-
MA facility) exist, though there seems to be a low degree of political acceptance for the 
problem, especially among Annex I parties. 
In this context, an interviewee referred to the risk of brain drain from the CDM:  
“Right now there is very serious danger of collapsing of the infrastructure. The moving out of DNV from the market 
sends a very alarming signal that the CDM is in fact on its way out. I think the project based CDM as an instru-
ment will be gone; it is a matter of time. The real shame in this market collapse that we will not have a lot to go on 
in terms of developing new offset type mechanisms, we have CDM, we have VCS and other experiments such as the 
Californian ETS, but the bulk of the experience we gained from CDM.” (Interview No. 3) 
6.1.2 Host countries 
The stronger role of the host countries in evolving sectoral approaches may allow ad-
dressing country circumstances more flexibly, but also raises new challenges related to 
governance architecture, related incentive structures as well as certificate issuance. 
4 Governing National Implementation  
4.1. Balancing global and national responsibilities 
Currently, the role of the DNA is not well-defined in the CDM’s modalities and proce-
dures, which is largely due to the initial limitation of DNA responsibilities to approving 
the contribution of a CDM activity to SD. SBs are already beginning to change this role, 
and the more comprehensive requirements of emerging mechanisms – which may be 
closer to hosting an ETS than a CDM activity - makes it likely that the role of the host 
country government authority needs to be more precisely defined. A key question is 
which responsibilities need to be transferred to the national level, and which can remain 
at the global UNFCCC level, as well as the political feasibility.  
”Host country level is more important under NMM than under CDM. DNA is a good starting point. It has to be 
build early, of course there will be new tasks in terms of MRV, methodologies because further tasks will be re-
quired” (Interview No.2).  
Under PoAs the concept of CMEs has produced mature rules and experience – a sectoral 
approach could be understood as a further evolution of the PoA concept, depending on 
interpretation of voluntary sectoral crediting or compulsory sectoral trading. However, 
this is likely to require public sector agencies to assume the CME role, depending on 
interpretation of sectoral (crediting) mechanism. Finally, under a SCM/STM approach 
the role of the government is core, as it is responsible for enforcing mitigation action on 
the domestic level. Those tasks, responsibilities and required competencies need clear 
definition for being allocated to the respective level.  
4.2. Capacity constraints  
                                                                                                                                                                          94 
 
 Developing Sectoral Mechanisms in the Transition Period towards a New Climate Treaty 
Countries with a good understanding of CDM and related procedures in place may be 
hesitant to be willing to invest (scarce staff time) in a new mechanism, e.g. for founding 
new responsible units in relevant ministries for dealing with SCM implementation. Par-
ties have reiterated on the opportunities of utilizing CDM elements as much as possible 
in this regard (but not to re-invent the wheel).  
“In our view, whenever we discuss markets we refer to the Kyoto Protocol, and in the light of creating ambition we 
need to refer to the tools that are already available and that is the CDM, but not create new markets before 2020. 
The carbon price is very low, and the price will not climb by creating new markets. This will only happen by raising 
ambition.” (Interview No.11) 
“And for more advanced countries, the CDM already has played its role by creating capacities, awareness and emis-
sions data for setting baselines. So these countries could already make the step to broader mechanisms and the 
CDM could be upscaled there, at least in the traditional sectors. There could also be a scenario where - in China, 
India and the advanced countries in Latin America - the CDM is used for specific sectors, like for example house-
holds, transport, etc. where there has not been much development so far and start moving towards other types of 
mechanisms for sectors that are already quite well organized like cement, energy, etc.” (Interview No. 2) 
Past experience has shown that lower-income countries have already been overwhelmed 
by CDM, and the NMM may introduce an even have higher level of complexity for gov-
ernments.  
“There is room for project based approaches for various reasons - one important reason is that the governance re-
quirements for CDM were quite low, and CDM activities were initiated even in countries with very challenging go-
vernance circumstances. Project based CDM will have a smaller role in the future, though. At the same time you 
will have aggregated project based but sectoral crediting on the basis of inventories.” (Interview No. 3) 
4.3. Vulnerability to lobbying  
In sectors with influential companies (such as ESCOM in South Africa, PLN in Indone-
sia), or strong lobbies (power sector, transport sector) there is high level of proximity 
and potentially stickiness. This is a challenge for governments to enforce mitigation ac-
tion, or put forward robust market rules independently. This can have negative effects 
on the stringency of mitigation measures or credibility of the market infrastructure.  
5 Incentive setting  
This challenge addresses the need for incentives for a host country to participate in an 
international mechanism or for the national government to trigger respective incentives 
for emitters to implement a sectoral approach. In this respect it is important to regard 
the distinct levels that mechanisms may address – international and national. 
5.1. Is it attractive for a country to participate in sectoral approaches?  
A country would participate in an international mechanism if sufficient incentives for 
doing so are available. Participation here means either creating an enabling environ-
ment for domestic actors to apply the mechanism (such as under the CDM, where a 
DNA and potentially domestic CDM laws are in place), or actively deciding to engage as 
a party under the mechanism (such as entering international emissions trading with a 
STM). While the former is relevant for SB and PoAs and retains a limited involvement 
of the government, the latter requires strong engagement of the government for enforc-
ing mitigation action. Attractiveness thus refers to whether the government perceives 
the SCM or STM (or NAMA crediting scheme) as credible and economically promising 
enough, i.e. believes in long term market and price stability and investment security. 
External effects such as pressing environmental problems (e.g. air pollution in China) 
can also drive political momentum to embark on a mechanism. The nature of the me-
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chanism determines whether domestic stakeholders will lobby against the measures 
(emission caps under a STM are likely to face much stiffer resistance than SCM ap-
proaches). Important design aspects that influence the attractiveness for governments 
are opportunities to flexibly react to external factors influencing the market, such as the 
rise and fall of emissions due to economic (in-)activity? The government will also need to 
consider whether the price signals (= incentives) from the international level shall be 
transferred to the domestic level, i.e. whether a price shall be put on carbon, and if ex-
ante or ex-post.  
5.2. How to define, measure and implement net mitigation and “own contribution” 
The NMM will require host countries to demonstrate net emission reductions. SCM ap-
proaches would require clear provisions for defining additionality on the national level 
(ideally consistent with international provisions), and transparent registration of miti-
gation achievements. Technical options for ensuring net reductions are discounting or 
cancellation of credits, or setting of ambitious baselines (i.e. significantly below BAU). 
So far SBs do not have the mandate to make net mitigation visible, and while conserva-
tiveness is a precondition, it does not need to be accounted for. A STM approach would 
derive net reductions in case mitigation measures are additional. Also under PoA re-
lated measures a robust demonstration of additionality is required – and credits need to 
be traced in domestic and international registries so that no double counting of reduc-
tions would occur.  
5.3. Lack of access to finance 
In countries with difficult investment climate, CDM activities have been impeded by 
lack of access to upfront finance, in part due to the lack of acceptance of carbon credits 
as a financial asset in the mainstream financial sector. Sectoral approaches at larger 
scales are likely to face the same or bigger problems. The availability of climate finance 
is a general problem in this context, for instance has most of the work on NAMAs only 
covered conceptual/preparation stages but stopped before implementation – due to lack 
of finance. The involvement of private sector money via the carbon market is a potential 
(and often highlighted) solution, though creating a vital global carbon market that is 
short of credits is a major challenge in itself (see also above).  
5.4. Sustainable development  
Future mitigation mechanisms are expected to contribute to sustainable development. 
However, it remains at the discretion of the host country to define what constitutes sus-
tainable development on the national level. The CDM has demonstrated that this aspect 
can remain relatively generic and play a minor role in the process, if not triggered suffi-
ciently by international rules. Today NAMAs shall result in co-benefits besides GHG 
emission reduction, though SD is still not defined coherently. Clear international provi-
sions or recommendations for how and why SD aspects are relevant in the respective 
sectoral approach could help – an idea could be to ask governments to report on SD ef-
fects in a frequent and detailed fashion.  
6 Certificate issuance 
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Certificates can be issued in various ways – allocation according to certain parameters 
(ex-post based on verified reductions or ex-ante through grandfathering or benchmark-
ing) or via auctions.  
6.1. Governance structure for certificate issuance 
National governments serve as economic actors in markets and thus have an intrinsic 
interest to maximize the credit yield, which raises questions about the level of regulato-
ry authority that can be transferred from global to national level. A relevant example is 
Joint Implementation, where under Track 1 host country governments were able to bila-
terally engage in trades of ERUs – this needs to be reflected when designing future me-
chanisms. 
“I also think we need to look at Joint Implementation (JI); JI is not relevant as a market mechanism anymore but 
as a design […]. NMM and FVA are kind of like JI track 1 and 2, […] which has allowed you, depending on national 
capacity; you can do things outside of UNFCCC rules. Of course it should be arranged differently, because JI reform 
towards one track shows that it is not supportable. This is a huge responsibility for governments, so we also need to 
build mechanisms to their capacity. JI shows that if you don’t trust the capacity of a country, you don’t trust the 
mechanism, and you can use mechanisms in a useful way. It is about national capacity both in NMM and FVA.” 
(Interview No.5) 
6.2. MRV 
The relevance to demonstrate credible emission reductions hinges on the robustness of 
the MRV regime. The CDM´s MRV has evolved to a robust and transparent system, and 
thus can serve as the foundation for SB or PoA based sectoral approaches. Under SCM 
or STM the national government is required to implement rules and procedures for the 
national MRV, and comply with any future MRV provisions.  
“But this MRV needs to start from the baseline setting exercise itself. Measuring the emissions reductions later, 
that’s easy, since you have measurement equipment etc. and this is something that you can observe and measure. 
But verifying a baseline where you just have projections and no actual data, this is much more difficult. So you 
need very clear guidelines and you need guidelines that tell you how to make a sensitivity analysis, how to show 
what would happen under different possible future scenarios. Thus you should not build just one BAU scenario, but 
several ones, considering for instance what happens if there is another financial crisis. Besides, the methodology 
should be unified and transparent and as standardized as possible.” (Interview No.1) 
“It is easiest to start in sectors that are relatively homogenous since it is easier to establish baselines in that kind of 
sectors. And we also see that there are several sectors in which there are already strong institutions and also pri-
vate initiatives that are collecting emissions data like for instance the “Cement Sustainability Initiative”or similar 
initiatives in the aluminum and power sector. So, wherever there is already capacity or a relatively homogenous 
structure of the sector, mitigation instruments with a sectoral scope could be applied.” (Interview No. 2) 
A centrally determined approach from UNFCCC level is probably the most logic ap-
proach, however does not find support in with all parties (as many strive to develop bot-
tom up initiatives such as the JCM, e.g. under the FVA). Auditors could play an increa-
singly important role, and for the NMM they should at least be accredited by interna-
tional authorities under the guidance of the COP. Again, the followers of bottom up ap-
proaches would oppose too strong central governance. 
6.3. Need to define “host country liability” 
The preceding challenges suggest that there are risks for the integrity of certificates. 
The operationalization of the PoA concept has revealed the issue of DOE liability, which 
still needs to be better understood and resolved, as the latest technical paper by the 
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UNFCCC secretariat paper demonstrates (UNFCCC 2014).15 The more important role 
of the host country in future sectoral approaches suggests that there will be a need to 
define “host country liability” for the case of significant deficiencies in certificate is-
suance. This risk is particularly relevant if compliance-grade certificates are tradable 
internationally. Under STM a sanctioning regime is certainly acceptable, while under 
SCM literature and negotiators still often refer to no loose targets. However, dealing 
with these issues is likely to be highly politicized, as it potentially challenges the author-
ity of governments to set rules and issue certificates for domestic measures, which is 
highly likely to be perceived as a challenge to national sovereignty.  
6.1.3 Market participants and investors 
7 Incentive Structure 
As for the host country government, market participants will also experience incentives 
for engaging in a sectoral approach. While one option is that a government simply intro-
duces compulsory policies (such a firm building efficiency standard for new houses with 
sanctions for non-compliance, or a domestic ETS in the power sector), another option 
involves market aspects with trading units. Here, either the government forwards cre-
dits or allowances towards the emitters (under SCM or STM), or emitters could engage 
directly in activities, such as PoAs (e.g. designing CPAs). In this case market partici-
pants are going to lobby for maximizing their profits, both in terms of credit volume and 
value. While this is a legitimate ambition in their role, there need to be sufficient set of 
checks and balances and a governance structure with high degree of integrity that can 
balance these trade-offs.  
7.1. Credibility of incentives 
If a government receives international climate finance support, and forwards those di-
rectly to the emitters - how can market participants be sure that sufficient value will 
reach the market participants, and if that the units are of sufficient quality? This as-
pects directly relate to the design of mechanisms on the international level, the lack of 
ambition and demand for credits, and the credibility of the national government (and 
potentially the openness for lobbying). If no mandatory measures are in place, this can 
easily lead to freeriding patterns (where not all emitters in the sectoral scope perform 
mitigation measures due to lacking incentive, and thus undermine the overarching aim 
of net reducing emissions on the sectoral level). Also the approach needs to be designed 
in a way that covers all respective sectoral emissions, either via inventory based MRV, 
or by clearly identifying all emission sources and covering them under the scope of the 
approach.  
7.2. Need for investment certainty 
15 As a side note, one of the suggestions raised in the paper was to create a market stability reserve, which 
offers interesting links with other aspects of stabilizing price fluctuations and interactions between carbon 
markets and climate finance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          98 
 
 
 Developing Sectoral Mechanisms in the Transition Period towards a New Climate Treaty 
Market actors (from both public and private sector) may be hesitant to invest if no mid-
term investment certainty is signaled by a mechanism - a lesson told by the CDM (In-
terview response “how many lessons do we need to learn”, Interview No 10).  Moreover, 
higher risk results in higher profit margin expectations by investors.  
“[…] The problem is the private sector – why would in a multi-year project an investor build his decision on one or 
two years of CER revenue streams, that is not sustainable. Although there might be some projects ready and may 
obtain “funding” through CERs, business people will not go back into that business. One needs a more stable 
framework, so right now it’s a tough sell for the private sector.” (Interview No. 3) 
7.3. Balancing trade-offs between net mitigation and profitability  
When designing a mechanism environmental integrity is a core principle, however, an 
expensive one for market actors. “Ambitious” baselines, requirements to achieve net mi-
tigation, and overly strict conservativeness go hand in hand with a loss of revenue for 
market actors, depending on the value of the certificates (opportunity costs). Limited 
opportunities to trade units or credits (e.g. limitation to domestic trading only) could foil 
the benefits of economic instruments.  
8 Practicability 
Market participants will find a mechanism or approach the more challenging, the more 
cumbersome and burdening participation becomes. While it is normal to develop the 
respective capacities and get used to an instrument, overly complex and demanding re-
quirements can undermine the practicability of any approach right from the beginning. 
The introduction of simplified rules for small and microscale projects under the CDM is 
a good example for how a mechanism can be adapted to market participants´ reaction 
(and resistance) regarding modalities and procedures.  
8.1. Mode of participation 
Implementing sectoral approaches results in different interactions between govern-
ments and market participants. Participation under the CDM or NAMAs for instance is 
entirely voluntary, while domestic measures such as the EU ETS or regulatory meas-
ures are mandatory. SCM and even more STM may require that participation is com-
pulsory (depending on the government´s translation and application of rules to the do-
mestic level), creating a new set of challenges. Certain actors such as auditors or tech-
nical experts could be required to get accreditation through a central authority, e.g. an 
Accreditation Panel related body.  
8.2. Capacity  
How complicated is the mechanism or instrument for market actors? In case of volunta-
ry participation this can become a decisive aspect, as transaction costs for the imple-
mentation level (i.e. emitters, project developers) can easily exceed the level of incen-
tives and thus become prohibitive barriers. This aspect is assumed to become more prob-
lematic in an increasingly fragmented landscape of mechanisms and approaches. Capac-
ity building activities need to be of good quality and result in sustainable effects and 
recipient ownership. Otherwise one will waste financial and personal capacity.  
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6.2 How to overcome challenges for implementing sectoral approaches  
In a second analytical step, we develop a catalogue of possible actions that promise to be 
effective in order to overcome the challenges which the previous section has raised. As 
several interviewees responded, one promising strategy for further evolution of sectoral 
approaches is not only to focus on progress in the UNFCCC negotiations, but also to 
gain practical experience from piloting activities that are related to the various aspects 
that define sectoral approaches as defined by the indicator-based evaluation in chapter 
5. Moreover, it is important to recognize that some precedents that closely resemble 
such approaches already exist, even though they me be implemented outside the formal 
label of sectoral approaches. Therefore, for each of the respective stakeholder groups 
(UNFCCC; national governments, market participants) we propose options to overcome 
these challenges that focus both on UNFCCC negotiations as well as practical imple-
mentation. These options are presented in a table which lists the challenges raised 
above, and offers briefly described solutions. Due to the vagueness of sectoral approach-
es to date, these are very encompassing and are intended to serve as a basis for discus-
sion rather than drawing up elaborate or fine-grained solutions.  
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Table 9: Catalogue of solutions for challenges to sectoral approaches 
Nr Issues  Challenges Proposed Solutions 
 UNFCCC   
 Common 
rules and 
standards 
1.1. Finding agreement 
on the degree of centrali-
zation 
 
- COP could consider expansion of CDM EB competences and mandate for NMM and/or 
other sectoral approaches  
- COP could establish a new governing body for NMM 
- COP could agree on principles and rules that would allow to transfer regulatory au-
thority to UNFCCC external bodies:  
o Either a designated national government body in host country, registered with 
UNFCCC in order to avoid    
     unclear and or overlapping responsibilities 
o Or international body that oversees a “sector” (e.g. ICAO, IMO) or other sector-
specific associations (e.g. for the steel industry) 
- Seeking synergies between changes to CDM M&P and the development of NMM M&P 
1.2. Negotiating net miti-
gation and “own contri-
bution”  
CDM approaches 
- Further work on improving relevant CDM elements (conservative standardization of 
baselines, additionality and MRV has already strengthened sectoral approaches with-
in the CDM) 
- CER cancellation has become a prominent issue in the ADP which can be used to ac-
count for net mitigation by tracking the origin of CERs. However, cancellation raises 
the challenge of generating financing as well as for administrative and eligibility re-
quirements that need to be met in order to avoid double-counting.  
- CDM M&P reform regarding the length of the crediting period touches on net mitiga-
tion, although this is dependent on technology 
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Alternative approaches 
- Discounting approaches are technically easier to implement and allow for a broad 
range of differentiation by technology or country criteria based, with a high degree of 
transparency 
- Establishing a distinction between the BAU scenario (based on country circums-
tances) and a more ambitious threshold value. Crediting would then take place only 
between the ambitious threshold and project emissions, whereas the difference be-
tween BAU and the ambitious threshold constitute the net mitigation part (The JCM 
has begun to pilot a conceptually interesting model for this approach, although its in-
tegrity depends strongly on the stringency of its implementation) 
1.3. Fragmentation and 
need to integrate 
UNFCCC-external devel-
opments 
 
Bilateral approaches  
- Fragmentation could theoretically be seen as an opportunity if innovative approaches 
can be piloted, provided a sufficient level of environmental integrity is guaranteed. 
This requires that there is accountability towards UNFCCC, e.g. through guidance and 
authority of the COP (see also 1.1.),  
UNFCCC external approaches 
- For different sector-specific mechanisms, COP may require support structure (similar 
to CDM working groups), which allow for a technical understanding  
- If not possible, clear criteria and oversight, or discounting of UNFCCC external initia-
tives could become relevant 
1.4. Safeguarding the 
environmental integrity 
of certificates  
 
- Credible UNFCCC oversight: guidance and authority of COP needs to be sufficiently 
robust, and include accountability provisions between decentralized regulatory enti-
ties and UNFCCC  
- Common accounting systems and criteria for eligibility and baseline are potential ap-
proaches 
- Voluntary standards may be able to mark certificates and thus allow for differentiation 
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that rewards high quality approaches  
- Buyer liability (need to replace deficient credits, concept used in WCI) could be used 
to force buyers to carefully assessing quality of certificates. Provisions and criteria 
would need to be defined at UNFCCC level (e.g. as part of FVA) 
-  
2 Issuance of 
certificates 
2.1. Defining the nature 
of certificates 
 
- All units should be defined as GHG units; units for other outputs (e.g. EE) should be 
convertible to GHG emissions, and thus be made fungible with other units 
- UNFCCC could act as gatekeeper, as high quality is critical for fungibility and tradabili-
ty 
2.2. Lack of clarity on 
who has the authority to 
issue credits, and on 
what basis 
 
- Certificates could preferably be issued directly through a direct representatively com-
posed UNFCCC body, accountable to the COP, based on common rules and the support 
structure of the UNFCCC Secretariat (adjusting the current CDM support structure to 
new responsibilities) 
- If this is not politically palatable with some parties, a designated national body could 
issue credits. Ideally, it’s fundamental rules would be based on common design prin-
ciples, reports to the UNFCCC and include some gatekeeping and/ or accountability 
provisions.  
2.3. Lack of mitigation 
mechanism “infrastruc-
ture” 
- Adjust roles of CDM project cycle and support structure, including UNFCCC Secretariat 
as well as working groups (e.g. to assess integrity of baselines). Depending on the 
role of this support structure, such operations are likely to require that fragmented 
mechanisms would need to be levied in order to cover costs. 
- Adjustments to the functionality of the CDM registry, as well as potentially operational 
rules and procedures for external registries and their link with the CDM or other 
UNFCCC registry.  
- If CER cancellation becomes more important as currently discussed in the ADP, specif-
ic host country accounts within the CER cancellation account could be established in 
order to track mitigation efforts and prevent double counting. 
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3 Lack of de-
mand and 
market 
oversight 
 
3.1. Lack of mitigation 
ambition leads to “un-
derdemand” 
 
- Progressive countries should work towards a higher level of mitigation ambitions, 
through raising mitigation targets, as well as piloting. This includes the EU.  
- Targeted support for innovative high-quality CDM activities in desirable sectors and 
regions that contribute to further evolution of the CDM’s methodological toolkit and 
regulatory framework (similar to existing Ci-Dev or Future of the Carbon Market Foun-
dation) 
- Advanced developing countries could create further demand through offsets for do-
mestic ETS or carbon taxes 
- Build acceptance for CERs in emerging mechanisms including the aviation MBM 
- Transitioning key high-impact (sub)sectors such as HFCs and N2O to non-offset me-
chanisms would allow to achieve cost-efficient net mitigation based on operational 
(CDM) methodologies and reduce supply from the CDM.  
3.2. There is an “institu-
tional vacuum” for con-
taining certificate price 
volatility  
- Work towards better understanding and higher acceptance of price stabilization 
measures in order to contain CER price depression and volatility  
- Proposals for a CER reserve (UNFCCC 2014) could contribute to market stability (in ad-
dition to mitigating other risks such as liability or permanence of credits) should be 
analyzed for their potential to be embedded in the emerging institutional landscape 
for climate finance (e.g. GCF). 
 National Governments 
4 Governing 
National 
Implementa
tion 
4.1. Balancing global and 
national responsibilities 
 
For sectoral approaches with multilateral regulatory bodies (CDM+, NMM) 
- Building on new roles in CDM standardization, explore whether DNAs or other gov-
ernment bodies will have certain responsibility and expand support for DNAs to un-
derstand and practice new responsibilities e. g. in CDM standardization  
- For regions and DNAs with less resources, the approach taken in CDM regional colla-
boration centres could be extended to also cover sectoral approaches. This could be-
gin immediately with efforts that focus on scaling up PoAs to NAMAs, and be extended 
to other innovative sectoral approaches  
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For sectoral approaches with national regulatory body (FVA) 
- Accountability towards UNFCCC as precondition for eligibility to generate compliance-
grade certificates  
(please also refer to (1)) 
4.2. Capacity constraints  - Capacity development and technical assistance can contribute to safeguarding a cer-
tain regional balance as a key factor for the legitimacy of emerging sectoral ap-
proaches (need to be done sustainably) 
- Global standardization can reduce the need to build domestic capacity, although 
there may be trade-offs with adequately addressing specific country circumstances  
- DNAs and other national bodies may need to introduce fees for their services in order 
to allow for the operations and to cover the costs of extended responsibilities 
4.3. Vulnerability to lob-
bying  
- Transparency such as publicly available methodological approaches, easily accessi-
ble documentation, public  commenting periods, and other measure to safeguard en-
vironmental integrity  
- UNFCCC oversight and accountability as a part of the checks and balances 
5 Incentive 
Setting 
5.1. Is it attractive for a 
country to participate in 
sectoral approaches?  
 
- Most importantly, this depends on finding solutions for under-demand (see 3), as this 
is a precondition for sufficient value of certificates 
- The co-benefits of advanced technologies can be a strong pull factor towards mitiga-
tion mechanisms (e.g. health impacts, reduced pollution e.g. from fossil fuel combus-
tion) 
- Building certainty for long-term mitigation goals and the relevance of the climate re-
gime 
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5.2. How to define, 
measure and implement 
net mitigation and “own 
contribution” 
 
- This is required only if there are no centralized rules e.g. for establishing baselines 
and additionality on global (UNFCCC) level 
- Capacity building for improved understanding of domestically adjusted methodologi-
cal elements (e.g. additionality, ideally building on top-down defined approaches and 
rules)- 
 (see also 1.2) 
5.3. Lack of access to 
finance 
- Access to finance can be facilitated by targeted public finance (including through 
MDBs) that underwrites and/or mitigates investment risks in developing countries 
(GCF is considering such instruments, which is another instance of the potential lin-
kages between carbon markets and climate finance) 
- Raise awareness within the mainstream financial sector for GHG emission certificates 
as legitimate assets 
5.4. Sustainable deve-
lopment  
 
- Consolidating the concepts and criteria that DNAs are using in the CDM context 
- CDM SD tool can be improved 
- Screen specific provisions for sectoral approaches such as NAMAs which often aim at 
“transformative effects” as an eligibility criterion  
- The insistence of a country’s right to self-define SD impacts domestically based on the 
principle of national sovereignty, however, cannot be circumvented 
6 Certificate 
Issuance 
6.1. Governance structu-
re for certificate issuance 
 
This challenge is only relevant if national governments have the authority to issue cre-
dits 
- Preference should be given to “neutral” multilateral bodies (ideally under the direct 
authority of the COP) 
- In case national governments directly issue credits, there needs to be a minimum lev-
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el of UNFCCC oversight that needs to be guaranteed. National bodies with broad man-
dates have not performed well e.g. in JI. JCM and WCI propose bilateral agreements as 
gatekeepers between buyer and seller country, however, without moderating “neu-
tral” international regulatory body, this can be seen as a risk for environmental integr-
ity 
- Possibly UNFCCC could accredit national issuance bodies for short periods of time (1-
2 years) only, which could be renewable in case of diligent and credible implementa-
tion. However, it may be politically difficult to enforce compliance. 
- Transparent rules for how to establishing sector-specific baselines and other metho-
dological elements, for how certificates are generated and issued or directly applica-
ble default values 
 - Depends strongly on design and feature of units, possible ways of mitigation risks 
include visible differentiation between different sectors, which allow buyers to select 
high quality approaches and mechanisms 
6.2. MRV 
 
Independent checks and balances of CDM need to be preserved:  
- UNFCCC should determine competences of auditory and necessary work steps that 
need to be performed 
- Accreditation could then take place on national level (if desired), based on global 
rules 
- Definition of responsibilities of national level and implementing entities (emitters) 
- Reporting could be integrated into BURs 
6.3. Need to define “host 
country liability” 
 
- Lessons from DOE liability from PoA context needs to be carefully analyzed 
- Host country liability would operate on larger scale and be more politically sensitive 
- “Insurance”-type of approaches operating with certificate reserves acting as buffer 
accounts, e.g. as proposed in a recent technical paper for changes to CDM M&P could 
be an important and “apolitical” function of a future global institutional architecture 
for market-based approaches, and offer linkages with issues related to market over-
sight and climate finance (see 3.2.) 
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 Market Participants and Investors 
7 Incentive 
structure  
7.1. Credibility of 
incentives 
 
- Can be mitigated through strengthened rules for MRV of support to enhance transpa-
rency 
- Building trust: Dependent on progress of evolution of post 2020 climate regime (de-
sign of mechanisms on the international level, the lack of ambition and demand for 
credits, and the credibility of the national government). 
7.2. Need for investment 
certainty 
 
- Stabilization of certificate value requires active market oversight (see 3.1.) 
- Requirements differ strongly by (sub)sector, mitigation and transaction costs 
7.3. Balancing trade-offs 
between net mitigation 
and profitability  
- Conservativeness should be safeguarded through neutral checks and balances at 
multilateral level, but prevent  
excessive rigor that would produce too many “false positives” (Interview 4) 
- Higher level of conservativeness of standardized methodological tools allows for ap-
plicability in broader range of countries: easing use, reduces transaction costs 
- A more innovative results-based approach could blend the use of existing market me-
chanisms climate finance instruments. For instance, provision of upfront finance 
could be made subject to the condition to retire a corresponding share of the resulting 
CERs in the CER cancellation account, which would lead to immediate net mitigation 
impacts 
8 Practicabilit
y 
 
8.1. Mode of 
participation:  
 
- Voluntary participation in sectoral approaches would increase acceptance and ease 
implementation 
- compulsory participation in sectoral approaches would potentially increase effective-
ness and prevent leakage, but be subject to stiffer resistance 
- Both varieties could employ an adjusted CME-CPA relationship to a new type of inte-
raction between public and private sector (regulating and implementing entity), e.g. 
through standardized templates for “CPA” integration and contractual conditions 
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  8.2. Capacity 
 
- Evolving sectoral approaches can immediately draw on operational improvements of 
the CDM. Further conservative standardization of CDM tools (baselines, MRV) reduces 
R&D costs  
- Top-down standardization reduces transaction cost on host country level and frag-
mentation for market participants 
- Capacity building activities must be designed sustainably, otherwise they may have 
contrary effects 
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7 Conclusions & Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusions  
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of existing sectoral ap-
proaches within the CDM, as well as emerging sectoral approaches such as sectoral cre-
diting and trading, and other measures and policies that are relevant for NMM, FVA 
and NAMAs. The analysis offers a multi-dimensional perspective on these approaches, 
which has allowed us to define critical challenges and possible solutions for their further 
evolution, both within the CDM and within emerging mechanisms.  
Key findings of the study include that some sectoral approaches have evolved from a 
theoretical discussion to practical implementation within the CDM (SBs, PoAs). After 
many years of conceptual debate, these approaches have become fully operational and 
have visibly influenced the CDM portfolio. In line with the CDM Policy Dialogue’s rec-
ommendation cited above, our findings strongly suggest that further reform of various 
elements of the current CDM, including standardization of baselines, additionality and 
MRV, in combination with programmatic approaches could move the CDM closer to-
wards some of the objectives of sectoral approaches that are now primarily discussed in 
the context of new mechanisms. It is important to recognize that the evolution of these 
existing sectoral approaches is still in a rather early stage, and the realization of their 
full potential is inhibited by the under-demand for CERs as a lack of mitigation ambi-
tion, which is a far cry from the scientific recommendations on what is necessary to 
achieve the 2° C goal.  
The sectoral approaches found in the CDM are also highly relevant as methodological 
elements for emerging mechanisms. Still, other concepts such as policy crediting have 
moved to new debates on future mechanisms. It is becoming clear that sectoral ap-
proaches are likely to be implemented in a broader range of market and non-market 
mechanisms than the currently relatively coherent CDM, which was initially designed 
as a technology-neutral mechanism that was open to any sector. Although these con-
cepts remains primarily theoretical as of yet, first practical examples are beginning to be 
explored, e.g. in the context of PMR. Some progressive developing countries have al-
ready moved even beyond sectoral approaches by as they are considering establishing 
multi-sectoral ETS – possibly in combination with domestic offsets based on the CDM. 
This is another indication of the wide range of possible uses of existing operational 
frameworks. In addition, political dynamics inside and outside of the UNFCCC process 
suggest that some subsectors may transition entirely away from the CDM (industrial 
gases). Other sector-specific mechanisms such as REDD are moving closer to becoming 
operational, while others remain in embryonic stages of development (aviation). 
This increasing diversity of sectoral approaches and mechanisms results in a larger de-
gree of fragmentation within the carbon market and the overarching climate regime. 
This requires understanding and highlighting the potential trade-off between flexibility 
for sector and host country contexts and environmental integrity and the ability to go-
vern this architecture effectively. It remains an open question whether and how the 
FVA will be able to credibly coordinate this “devolution” in the climate regime. Despite 
the high level of uncertainty in anticipation of the 2015 climate agreement, our interpre-
tation of the relevance of different drivers towards centralized and decentralized institu-
tional designs suggests that – just like the overarching climate regime in which they are 
embedded – sectoral approaches and market mechanisms are headed towards a hybrid 
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architecture. This means that centralized mechanisms such as the CDM, and possibly 
the NMM will co-exist with more decentralized vehicles coordinated by the FVA. Still, in 
order for these approaches to contribute to the ultimate objective of the convention, and 
as a dominant majority of our interviewees urged, environmental integrity needs to re-
main at the key principle of this more diverse set of sectoral approaches. This conclusion 
draws attention to the role of effective governance arrangements which can deliver cred-
ible oversight. 
In order to consolidate these findings, we attempt to contribute to adjusting the termi-
nology that is used for various sectoral approaches in order to capture these important 
recent developments and the differences between them. The observations made in the 
analysis above suggest that at least three ideal types of sectoral approaches have been 
emerging, based on the approaches that have been discussed:  
▸ Sector-oriented approaches: take into account entire (sub)sectors, for instance by 
developing mandatory SBs. These approaches still operate on a crediting basis, 
which may include projects, programmes, and even policies such as renewable ener-
gy feed-in tariffs (REFIT). Yet, due to their voluntary nature, they may not necessar-
ily cover all emitters in a country or sector. 
▸ Sector-wide approaches: refer to approaches that scale up mitigation action by cover-
ing entire (sub)sectors, e.g. by relying on PoA approaches. Yet, compulsory participa-
tion ensures complete coverage within the respective subnational, national or re-
gional contexts. Likely early examples could include an STM or SCM approach that 
is targeting e.g. emissions-intensive industries. 
▸ Sector-specific approaches: refer to mechanisms that are designed specifically for 
(sub)sector or even a single technology with highly idiosyncratic features, e.g. REDD, 
HFCs, aviation, shipping), and may operate across multiple countries. “Sector-
specific” can imply broader definitions of sectors (energy, forestry), or also narrower 
subsectors (HFCs as subsector of industrial gases, coal power as subsector of indus-
trial EE). A potentially high degree of net mitigation could be achieved if these me-
chanisms – in particular those with very low costs per tCO2e reduced – can be tran-
sitioned away from offsetting.16  
7.2 Recommendations  
While the above analysis was able to evaluate on recent developments regarding sector-
al approaches within the climate regime, it was not able to fully elaborate on certain 
aspects, such as in general the added value of new mechanisms compared to a reformed 
CDM+ with changed modalities and procedures. It also is beyond the scope of this study 
to provide solutions for solving the deadlock in the climate negotiations on the NMM or 
showing opportunities for avoiding a strong fragmentation trend away from the NMM 
towards the FVA. Here, it needs to be further assessed which incentive structures could 
convince countries and market participants to engage in potentially transformative in-
terventions in key sectors of their economies.  
Section 6.2. has already proposed solutions to some of these aspects, based on the pre-
vious analysis. In order to establish the link between the previous analytical exercise 
above – which sometimes consciously does not factor in political feasibility in order to 
16 One of the few positive aspects of the current market depression is that it makes this more feasible as 
there are no perceived losses by project owners. 
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explore a broader range of possible concepts – and the UNFCCC negotiations we also 
propose a set of recommendations for further research and potential input to the 
UNFCCC debate and negotiations on sectoral approaches:  
Research and practical piloting 
Further research into emerging sectoral approaches can allow better understanding re-
cently emerging trends:  
▸ Enhance and promote increased CDM standardization due to the particularly high 
applicability for both the CDM and emerging mechanisms. This could also contribute 
to strengthening the role of the CDM versus UNFCCC external mechanisms, and 
ensure that the methodological tools of the only fully operational market mechanism 
are preserved. 
▸ Approaches that scale up PoAs to NAMAs, in particular with regard to differences in 
MRV and incentive structures. This applies particularly to subsectors such as effi-
cient household appliances or transport, which aggregate a large number of indivi-
dually small mitigation actions and therefore require more complex conceptual de-
signs. A specific research direction that captures recent debates could be to assess 
the pros and cons of policy crediting under an NMM versus NAMA crediting ap-
proaches.  
▸ In general, an analysis of the potential and role of NAMAs with sectoral character: 
This could cover sectors that are feasible for full coverage through NAMAs, and an 
assessment of  the existing NAMA pipeline.   
▸ The roles and responsibilities of host country governments in sectoral approaches, 
and their relationship with the UNFCCC level needs to be much better understood. 
This could be pursued by investigating further lessons from the evolving CDM, but 
also of JI for NMM and FVA, in particular with regard to problems that are related 
to the authority to issue credits by the host country without strong multilateral over-
sight. Host country liability has received little attention until now, but our research 
indicates that this may become a major issue that could take years to resolve once 
sectoral approaches begin to be operationalized. 
▸ Consider linkages between carbon markets & climate finance, including sector-
specific RBF mechanisms based on CDM methodologies, as well as provisions to mi-
tigate carbon price volatility, including through institutional linkages to the GCF. 
Such studies could focus specifically on:   
▸ CER cancellation as a RBF mechanism, in particular for those sectors and 
project types with high mitigation impact (HFCs) or high sustainable devel-
opment impact. This can also lend a lifeline to struggling “good projects”, 
and thereby contribute to restoring trust in UNFCCC mechanisms. 
▸ Exploring designs of a CER reserve and possible functions, including price 
stabilization and serving as a buffer account to ensure against liabilities in 
case of significant deficiencies (proposed for DOE liability in the context of 
PoAs), which could in the future potentially also become relevant for host 
country liability. An additional function could be to act as a buffer account 
for land use and forestry projects that are still subject to highly unattrac-
tive restrictions related to the permanence of certificates in the CDM, even 
though voluntary carbon standards have generated operational alterna-
tives. 
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▸ Support preparation and practical implementation of pilot activities for sectoral ap-
proaches in interested countries – these should closely build on the CDM (RBF) or 
other widely tested NMA approaches such as REFITS or REC schemes. A large 
number of interviewees stressed the importance of building practical experience as 
important complementary initiative to conceptual debates. Before starting the im-
plementation of pilot activities, certain preparatory steps should be undertaken, 
such as scoping of sectoral action17 and potential opportunities, elaboration of prac-
tical policy concept notes and conduction of a stakeholder engagement process. In 
line with the political objectives of the UNFCCC process, such pilots should aim at 
balancing host countries at different levels of development, technologies and geo-
graphical regions. 
▸ Assess the nuts and bolts of possible institutional linkages between UNFCCC and 
other international regimes and organizations such as Montreal Protocol (for HFC 
sector specific (RBF) mechanism), ICAO (aviation), IMO (shipping), e.g. with a focus 
on MRV, accounting and financing approaches.  
Negotiations  
In addition to our suggestions for further applied and academic research, the following 
recommendations for input to the UNFCCC negotiations can be derived from this study:  
▸ Consider the potential of a “CDM+” as a complementary mechanism to NMM, FVA 
and NAMA:18 This could be done by establishing and assessing the linkages and po-
tential synergies between the changes to the CDM’s modalities and procedures and 
the conception of the NMM modalities and procedures. The proposed changes to the 
CDM’s M&P do not consider sectoral approaches specifically, but aspects related to 
PoAs, DOE liability as a precedent for possible host country liability, extending ap-
proaches to assess additionality, and – with limitations – also the length of the cre-
diting period as a possibly tool to achieve the net mitigation touch on issues that are 
also key to the design of the NMM.  
▸ Regarding negotiations on the NMM/FVA:  
▸ Political progress requires further work towards mutual understanding 
among key parties. This is to a large extent hinging on trust related to the 
overarching issues of finance and mitigation ambition. Yet, practical expe-
rience and pilot activities of innovative approaches could contribute to make 
the concepts more tangible, and to building a supportive constituency in the 
implementing host countries. 
▸ In order to achieve the highest degree of effectiveness, further work on 
NMM M&P could focus on concepts that are clearly outside of the scope of 
the CDM’s M&P, e.g. exploring approaches for policy baselines as well as 
possible ways to define and quantify net mitigation, and make this political-
ly palatable. This should also consider possible governance architectures, 
17 Scoping of domestic opportunities is for instance done under the PMR. 
18 The discussion often focuses on the notion that an NMM will succeed the CDM, which then may fade 
from the limelight. However, the progress of sectoral approaches within the CDM, the remaining length of 
possible crediting periods of the existing CDM pipeline, and particularly the CDM’s commonalities with 
many open issues that are now discussed in the context of new mechanisms, indicates that it would be 
premature to conclude that the CDM will necessarily fade away completely. This seems to depend most 
strongly on a sufficient level of demand of offset credits, which is a direct function of mitigation ambition. 
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i.e. the mandate and competences of the regulatory body and its accounta-
bility to both the UNFCCC and host countries.  
▸ Support relatively progressive negotiation alliances such as AILAC, the 
LDC group, or others in formulating positions on (sectoral) market mechan-
isms.  
▸ Regarding NAMAs, further work on MRV as well as drawing attention to the poten-
tial linkages between carbon markets and climate finance e.g. through CER cancel-
lation as highlighted in the ADP, or through linkages with the Green Climate Fund 
(Private Sector Facility, different financial instruments, including for risk mitigation 
for private investment e.g. through sectoral approaches) could be explored. 
▸ Regarding the consideration of UNFCCC external processes, e.g. as a platform for 
sector-specific approaches for industrial gases or aviation. 
▸ Within the EU: strong advocacy is needed for the eligibility of international offsets 
both from the CDM and the NMM as a way to enhance mitigation ambition for the 
2030 target. This could have positive effects on the negotiations, as well as on the 
ongoing deliberations within other key parties which are still in earlier stages of 
preparing their proposed “contributions”. Sticking to the exclusion of any interna-
tional offset credits adds further policy uncertainty to the evolution of sectoral ap-
proaches in a highly sensitive market environment, and could be the final nail in the 
coffin of an embryonic NMM. CDM projects and PoAs can have lifetimes of up to 21 
and 28 years, respectively, which makes it very difficult to communicate to Non-
Annex I parties that have invested in the CDM, and are now requested to make fur-
ther efforts for new mechanisms, why CERs should not be eligible for supplementary 
contributions to achieving 2030 targets. The CDM has demonstrated a significant 
level of responsiveness of reform demands, even though the politics have moved on 
by adding new demands. While this can be an important driver of further reform, 
achievements that have been made in response to earlier critiques should not be 
dismissed quickly, as valuable time, effort, and resources have been invested, which 
are just now beginning to be fruitful.  
Finally, we stress again that at the most fundamental level, the most important precon-
dition for effective sectoral market-based approaches is to increase the level of demand 
for certificates.   
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Annex 1: List of Interviewees 
 
Interview-No Date Interviewee Category 
1 20.01.2014 
Latin American Climate Policy Researcher 
with market focus 
experts / academia 
2 23.01.2014 European UNFCCC negotiator policy-maker 
3 14.02.2014 European policy consultant experts / academia 
4 24.02.2014 climate policy advisor to industry market participant 
5 25.02.2014 European UNFCCC negotiator policy-maker 
6 25.02.2014 Multilateral development bank market participant 
7 26.02.2014 Climate Policy Consultant experts / academia 
8 03.03.2014 Climate Policy Consultant experts / academia 
9 03.03.2014 Market mechanisms expert experts / academia 
10 04.03.2014 Carbon market investor market participant 
11 05.03.2014 Latin American UNFCCC negotiator policy-maker 
12 07.03.2014 (former) Latin American UNFCCC negotiator policy-maker 
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Annex 2: Overview of 2013 submissions with reference to sectoral approaches 
NMM submissions 
Party / NGO Statement contents Type of statement Page Submission link 
Alliance of 
Small Island 
States 
The most promising broad segments of the economy for voluntary inclusion in sectoral trading or sec-
toral crediting under the New Market Mechanism would be those in which: (1) substantial emission 
reductions need to be achieved; (2) data is readily available; (3) the degree of uncertainty in emission 
estimates is low; (4) substantial potential to contribute to the host country’s sustainable development is 
present; and (5) it can be shown that real and additional reductions in emissions that would otherwise 
have occurred to the atmosphere can be achieved.  
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
5 
http://unfccc.int/file
s/cooperation_suppo
rt/market_and_non-
mar-
ket_mechanisms/ap
plication/pdf/nmm_a
osis_12112013.pdf 
These considerations support the creation of opportunities for  voluntary developing country participa-
tion in sectoral trading and crediting approaches within the  energy sector (power generation) and for 
industrial emissions (e.g., iron and steel production, cement production).  The power generation  sector  
typically has few players in each country, significant investments will be needed, and data is more likely 
to be readily available to governments than in other sectors. For certain industrial sectors, such as iron 
and steel production and cement production, reliable data is also likely to be available and opportuni-
ties for realizing emission reductions are well known.   
  
The transport sector may be amenable to inclusion in certain countries if sectoral boundaries can be 
established. The  forestry sector may be  more challenging  to include, given  the enormous data uncer-
tainties in this sector, the large swings in annual emissions due to year-to-year variability in the climate, 
and the increasing likelihood of large-scale carbon stock losses due to the consequences of projected 
climate change itself. 
 
Policies that support emission reductions in the LULUCF sector or reduced emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD) may benefit in the near term from non-market based financing mechan-
isms, or from a system that is clearly segregated from the trading of units representing emission reduc-
tions from the power generation or industrial sectors.  
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
5 
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Nepal 
As indicated, the LDC Group believes that the NMM should apply to major emitting countries and should 
be based on economy wide quantified emission limitation or reduction targets.  
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
2 http://unfccc.int/file
s/cooperation_suppo
rt/market_and_non-
mar-
ket_mechanisms/ap
plication/pdf/nmm_n
epal_29102013.pdf 
Sectoral approaches should be applied within non market based NAMAs. 
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
2 
World Bank 
The prompt  start phase  should be  inclusive  in  terms of participation  requirements  (e.g.,  coun-
tries with  or  without  national  GHG  emissions  caps,  at  different  levels  of  readiness  in  terms  of  GH
G accounting  and  tracking  systems).  It should cover  broad  segments  of  the  econo-
my  while accommodating for new approaches for mitigation actions at different scales and scopes. This
 would effectively  complement and  support domestic efforts,  starting with  incentive  schemes at  the  
sub‐sectoral,  city‐level,  sub‐national  and  national  levels  to  domestic  emis-
sion  trading  schemes  and economy‐wide  instruments  such  as  carbon  tax  or  reform  of  fuel  pric-
ing.  The prompt start  phase should also recognize a variety of possible uses of emission reductions, in
cluding but not  limited to the use for compliance against a pledge or target in another country.   
[...] 
The  rules  and  provisions  relating  to  the  conservative  baseline  setting  for  broad  segments  of  the e
conomy, are  further strengthened by  the principle of achieving net emission  reduc-
tions  (through crediting  thresholds  and/or  trading  caps),  and  therefore  should  be  consi-
dered  as  demonstrating additionality in an appropriate and sufficient way. 
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
3, 5 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/igo/112.pdf 
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In the absence of clarity of the future architecture of the post‐2020 agreement, a growing number of do
mes-
tic initiatives are already shaping the landscape where developed and developing countries are  under-
taking  efforts  to  design  and  implement market  and  non‐market  based  instruments  of climate  poli-
cy.  This  reflects  domestic  objectives  and  priorities, and  takes  into  account  their particular  circums-
tances  (such  as  the  socio‐economic  context,  structure  of  economy  and ma-
jor emitting sectors, institutional capacity). These initiatives are seeking to introduce a domestic and/or 
internation-
al carbon price signal through a variety of instruments starting incentive schemes at the sub‐sectoral,  ci
ty‐level,  sub‐national  or  national  levels  to  domestic  emission trading schemes 
and economy‐wide instruments such as carbon tax or reform of fuel pricing.    
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
2 
IATP, IPS, 
TWN and  
Indigenous 
Peoples' 
Internation-
al Centre for 
Policy Re-
search and 
Education 
The approaches considered by the framework should move beyond the failed carbon trading mechan-
isms and consider national non-market-based approaches, including policies and regulatory measures 
such as:  
[...] 
d) Direct compensation of net avoidance of emissions based on a programmatic and cross-sectoral 
approach. 
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
6 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/ngo/327.pdf 
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CMIA and 
PD-Forum 
To stimulate mitigation across a broad segment of the economy, a wide range of sectoral benchmarks 
and reference levels should be proposed. Initial benchmarks could be set at levels that would enable 
rapid take up, while being fine-tuned and tightened soon after to avoid the creation of excess supply.  
  
It may be possible to extrapolate from sectors with large number of CDM/JI projects, or sectors where 
standardised baselines are currently being developed under the CDM. Also, several methodologies 
already use benchmarks, which could be used for NMM. While CDM baselines are often a conservative 
interpretation of “business as usual”, NMM sector baselines should include an own-effort element. As 
proposed above, we advocate accurate monitoring to derive the real reductions achieved from all ap-
proaches followed, and believe that the own-effort element should be quantified as the mitigation 
share. The mitigation share is further elaborated in our Carbon Market Architecture (annex 1) and a 
separate paper (annex 2).  
  
In principle all sectors may be covered in NMM, but data availability is likely to restrict the initial pro-
posed sectors to those with the largest GHG emissions and greatest energy use. In practise, even after 
NMM is effectively running, smaller emission sources are likely to be covered under  
other approaches.  
  
Initially NMM could be proposed in some sectors with high emissions and large point sources, for ex-
ample the power sector, cement, iron and steel, fertiliser, etc. It would seem unlikely that there is one 
single NMM, but rather there are various component NMM being proposed and being built up over time, 
with some sectors and countries graduating from the other approaches.  
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
10 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/ngo/324.pdf 
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The COP’s definition of NMM is still very broad. We understand that NMM are sector-based approaches 
using targets, benchmarks, standardised baselines or allowances. They key candidates for NMM should 
be large point sources or fossil fuel users, such as power plants, industrial sites, refineries, oil/gas 
flares, and possibly also planes and ships. Disaggregated or under-developed sectors are not suitable 
for sectoral schemes, for example the agricultural sector, but can be effectively addressed through the 
project-based approach of the CDM. 
[...] 
The COP’s definition of NMM is still very broad. We understand that NMM are sector-based approaches 
using targets, benchmarks, standardised baselines or allowances. They key candidates for NMM should 
be large point sources or fossil fuel users, such as power plants, industrial sites, refineries, oil/gas 
flares, and possibly also planes and ships. Disaggregated or under-developed sectors are not suitable 
for sectoral schemes, for example the agricultural sector, but can be effectively addressed through the 
project-based approach of the CDM. 
 
New Market-based (allowance) Mechanism, i.e. cap-and-trade. Allowance-based NMM, providing even 
greater efficiency, should be limited to the capped environment or to constituencies with particularly 
strong enforcement capabilities. An example of an allowance-based NMM is a trading scheme such as 
the EU ETS. However, where the system operates under economy-wide targets or agreed (legally-
binding) sectoral targets under the Durban Platform (see level 6 below), it would be unnecessary for this 
to be separately defined as NMM. 
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
22, 24 
CEPS 
For the purposes of this paper NMM will be considered to include a Sectoral Trading Mechanisms and a 
Sectoral Crediting Mechanism.  
[...] 
Step 1 – COP 19 (Pilot Phase)  
1.  Start developing the Modalities  & Procedures for Sectoral Trading and Sectoral Crediting. This 
should be done in SBSTA. There are excellent submissions by Parties, especially the EU one, which can 
make the basis of negotiations going forward. 
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
4, 16 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/ngo/323.pdf 
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EDF 
Context for a framework:  In previous submissions, EDF has proposed that any country that chooses to 
establish a binding commitment – under a clear transparency, compliance, and enforcement framework 
– to limit total GHG emissions on a national, subnational, or sectoral level (a “QELRC Party”), should be 
able to gain access to the global carbon market; countries that choose not to make a binding emissions 
limitation commitment would not participate in international carbon markets.   
[...] 
see Table 1 on page 6 
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
2/3, 6 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/ngo/326.pdf 
IETA 
While the CDM provides an important foundation for crediting mechanisms of the future,  voluntary 
markets  in many ways  have  additionally  been  the  test  beds  of climate innovation and should also 
serve in a similar role as a crediting mechanism alongside  the CDM--including REDD+ and  frameworks  
for  crediting REDD at both the jurisdictional and project levels; and the development and use of perfor-
mance methods for crediting individual firm performance within a sectoral context. All  new  crediting 
mechanisms  should  build  on  the  experience  garnered  through the CDM, including its MRV and stan-
dards.   
Any new crediting mechanism will have its inherent risks. In order to mitigate such risks,  the mechan-
ism  should  include  a  tool  that  provides  a  guarantee  to  private sector  investors,  at  least  in  the 
mechanism’s  early  stages,  against  unacceptable risks. This could come in the form of an international 
body that provides a financial guarantee  that  such  a  system  is  safeguarded  from  policy  and  eco-
nomic  risks.  A case can be made  that  the Green Climate Fund  (GCF)—and/or  the World Bank—could  
provide  guarantees  or  insurance,  or  provide  incentives  to  support  pilot 
projects and investments, in order to attract and lead private sector investors into sectoral  credit  
projects  or  other  crediting  mechanisms  as  they  are  introduced.  
Under  certain  circumstances,  however,  the  host  country  could  provide  the guarantee.  Pilot  
projects  and  real  experiments  are  key  to  progress  towards  new crediting  mechanisms.  Also  we  
expect  that  the  GCF  will  provide  incentives  to various mitigation and adaptation projects- depending 
on the amount and scale of public and private financial commitments.  
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
7 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/ngo/330.pdf 
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EU 
24. Recalling the principle of stimulating mitigation across broad segments of economy (paragraph 80 
(d) of the decision 1/CP.16), the EU wishes to reiterate the importance of agreeing on a common ap-
proach to define the broad segment of economy.   
 
25. Regarding “Broad segment of the economy” the EU envisage that this would mean one or more sec-
tor, category or sub-category listed in Annex II of the UNFCCC guidelines on reporting and review, as 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties in decision 15/CP.17.  
 
26. The EU envisages two basic forms of implementation of the NMM: crediting and trading, which both 
cover broad segments of economy and can be described as sectoral approaches.   
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
5, 6 http://unfccc.int/file
s/documentation/su
bmissions_from_part
ies/application/pdf/
nmm_eu.pdf 
27. The Implementing Party should determine in its initial report one or more sectors, categories or sub-
categories which should be included in the Implementing Party’s broad segment of the economy.  
 
28. The Implementing Party may propose in its initial report to include one or more sectors, categories 
or sub-categories in the Implementing Party’s broad segment of the economy that diverge from the 
definition of sectors, categories or sub-categories pursuant to Decision 15/CP.17. For the purpose of 
carrying out the technical assessment of this proposal in the context of the initial report, the following 
criteria should be taken into account:  
-  the proposal must be sufficiently justified on the basis of, inter alia, the unsuitability of the definitions 
of sectors, categories and sub-categories  
pursuant to Decision 15/CP.17 and the need to avoid leakage and double counting;  
- alternative definitions must be clearly defined and relate to a specific product or service. Definitions 
should not relate to a specific technology.  
 
29. If the broad segment of economy proposed does not have specific methodologies adopted by the 
IPCC for estimating GHG emissions, the proposal from the Implementing Party should include metho-
dologies for the estimation of these emissions that should be approved by the IRT and the IC.  
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
26. The EU envisages two basic forms of implementation of the NMM: crediting and trading, which both 
cover broad segments of economy and can be described as sectoral approaches.   
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
6 
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Environmen-
tal Integrity 
Group 
The new market mechanism is designed in the context of efforts to raise mitigation ambition before 
2020 and to ensure that the post-2020 climate regime will be robust and ambitious. Therefore, the new 
market mechanism need to scale-up mitigation action in comparison to the CDM and JI. Building on 
these experiences and as a means to complement the project-based approach, the new market mechan-
ism need to scale up mitigation actions by facilitating their implementation on a broader scale, such as 
segments, sectors, subsectors or policies.  
[...] 
Guidance on common requirements for baseline setting for broad segments of the economy is needed, 
while leaving the responsibility to participating country Parties to propose adequate baselines, recog-
nizing the host Party’s own responsibility on mitigation. 
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
3, 4 
http://unfccc.int/file
s/documentation/su
bmissions_from_part
ies/application/pdf/
nmm_eig.pdf 
Morocco 
1)  The post  2012 framework should consider  new mechanisms  that are market based or non market 
based  to harness  every single potential mitigation opportunity, with the purpose of achieving the over-
all objectives of preserving environmental integrity.  It should include the sectoral,  sub-sectoral  and  
project-based approaches.  However, it should be noted that economics should not prevail at the ex-
pense of environmental and social aspects.  
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
1 
http://unfccc.int/file
s/documentation/su
bmissions_from_part
ies/application/pdf/
nmm_morocco.pdf 
New Zealand 
8  We would also  identi-
fy a number of other elements which should be considered as part of the new market‐based mechanism
s work programme, including:    
-  Application to all Parties;  
-  
The relationship between new market‐based mechanisms, the Framework and  sub‐national, national an
d regional mechanisms;  
-  The  relationship  between  new market‐based mechanisms and  other mechanisms and  institu-
tions  under  the UNFCCC  including  international  assessment  and  re-
view (IAR) and international consultation and analysis (ICA); and   
-  The  kind  of  approaches  ‘covered’  by  new market‐based mechanisms,  for  exam-
ple project‐based and/or sectoral crediting.   
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
2 
http://unfccc.int/file
s/documentation/su
bmissions_from_part
ies/application/pdf/
nmm_new_zealand.p
df 
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Norway 
Norway supports the development of a sector-based mechanism  - covering broad segments of the 
economy - that encompasses a two-track system, one for crediting , where credits are issued ex post for 
emissions reduction achieved according to an ex ante defined crediting threshold, and one for trading, 
where trading units can be issued ex ante according to an ex ante defined emission cap.    
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
2 
http://unfccc.int/file
s/documentation/su
bmissions_from_part
ies/application/pdf/
nmm_norway.pdf 
4.  The mechanism should provide a means to stimulate mitigation across broad segments of the econ-
omy, as defined by the participating Parties, including on a sectoral and/or project specific basis.  [...] 
Unlike the crediting track, sectoral trading will set a cap up front, on emissions for sources within the 
given sector.  The host Party, under this track, would establish the target(s) for sectors to be included 
under this track and report to a governing body.  This track would function similar to Article 17 trading 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The host Party can sell emission reduction units before the reductions occur. A 
trading mechanism will therefore  
imply that the host Party will need to purchase reduction units for emissions above the cap.  
The trading track would probably be more suitable for segments of the economy where a host party has 
in place systems necessary to trade under a binding cap, and the level of guidance from any UNFCCC 
governing body for a trading track should take this into account.  A sectoral crediting mechanism pro-
vides Parties with greater opportunity to reduce emissions within a sector while improving infrastruc-
ture, providing greater access to low carbon technologies and financing.  Under this track, the host 
Party identifies appropriate sector(s) for inclusion in the mechanism; business as usual baselines are 
developed in accordance with guidance to be provided by an appropriate governing body. Also in this 
case the sector covered by the NMM has to be defined in a clearly and transparent manner in order to 
compare the ex post emission with the ex ante defined crediting thresholds. A stringent crediting thre-
shold should be set below the business as usual baseline.    
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
1, 2 
Tunisia 
The definition of the “broad segment of  economy” is at the discretion of the host country; existing in-
ternationally agreed  definitions such as the IPCC inventory guidelines may be applied. Common MRV 
and accounting rules will permit to avoid double counting.  
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
1, 2 
http://unfccc.int/file
s/documentation/su
bmissions_from_part
ies/application/pdf/
nmm_tunisia.pdf 
World Bank 
14. The prompt  start phase  should be  inclusive  in  terms of participation  requirements  (e.g.,  coun-
tries with  or  without  national  GHG  emissions  caps,  at  different  levels  of  readiness  in  terms  of  GH
ness  in  terms  of  GHG accounting  and  tracking  systems).  It should cover broad segments of the econ
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
3, 4 http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
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tems).  It should cover broad segments of the economy while accommodating for new approaches for mi
tigation actions at different scales and scopes. This would effectively  omplement and  sup-
port domestic efforts,  starting with  incentive  schemes at  the  sub‐sectoral,  city‐level,  sub‐national  a
tive  schemes at  the  sub‐sectoral,  city‐level,  sub‐national  and  national  levels  to  domestic  emis-
sion  trading  schemes and economy- wide  instruments  such  as  carbon  tax  or  reform  of  fuel  pric-
ing.  The  prompt  start 
phase should also recognize a variety of possible uses of emission reductions, including but not  li-
mited to the use for compliance against a pledge or target in another country.  
the economy“ sn/igo/113.pdf 
5.  
In the absence of clarity of the future architecture of the post‐2020 agreement, a growing number of do
mes-
tic initiatives are already shaping the landscape where developed and developing countries are  under-
taking  efforts  to  design  and  implement market  and  non‐market  based  instruments  of climate  poli-
cy.  This  reflects  domestic  objectives  and  priorities,  and  takes  into  account  their particular  cir-
cumstances  (such  as  the  socio‐economic  context,  structure 
of economy and major emitting sectors, institutional capacity). These initiatives are seeking to introduce
 a domestic and/or international carbon price signal through a variety of  instru-
ments starting incentive schemes at the sub‐sectoral,  city‐level,  sub‐national  or  national  levels  to  do
mestic  emission  trading  schemes  and economy‐wide instruments such as carbon tax or reform of fuel 
pricing.    
[...] 
14. The prompt  start phase  should be  inclusive  in  terms of participation  requirements  (e.g.,  coun-
tries with  or  without  national  GHG  emissions  caps,  at  different  levels  of  readiness  in  terms  of  GH
G accounting  and  tracking  systems).  It  should  cover  broad  segments  of  the  econo-
my  while accommodating for new approaches for mitigation actions at different scales and scopes. This
 would effectively 
complement and support domestic efforts,  starting with  incentive  schemes at  the  sub‐sectoral,  city‐l
evel,  sub‐national  and  national  levels  to  domestic  emis-
sion  trading  schemes  and economy‐wide  instruments  such  as  carbon  tax  or  reform  of  fuel  pric-
ing.  The  prompt  start 
phase should also recognize a variety of possible uses of emission reductions, including but not  li-
mited to the use for compliance against a pledge or target in another country.  
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
2, 4 
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IGES 
General views  
-  The IGES believes in the important role of  market-based mechanisms as efficient and effective policy 
instruments to address climate change mitigation.   
-  The design of new market-based mechanism (NMM) can complement existing Kyoto mechanisms by 
increasing its coverage to a broader segment of economy.  
-  NMM should build on lessons learnt from Kyoto mechanisms, particularly the clean development me-
chanism.   
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
1 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/ngo/340.pdf 
CEPS 
To produce M&P for UN defined, approved and operated market mechanisms, which will stimulate miti-
gation actions across broad sectors of the economy, and  may be project specific, or sectoral, in nature. 
This is somewhat surprising as there already are UN market mechanisms that operate on project-by-
project basis (CDM and JI). It must be concluded that some Parties wish to continue to explore an organ-
ic link  between the existing KP 
project mechanism and the broader sector approaches. Indeed, some feel that the existing CDM could 
be expanded and/or merged into the NMM.  
[...] 
7.  For the purposes of this paper NMM will be considered to include a Sectoral Trading Mechanisms and 
a Sectoral Crediting Mechanism.  
[...] 
New Market Mechanisms  
NMM are envisaged to have a number of characteristics, with few of them enshrined right now in any 
decision text:  
-  The NMM will be mechanisms that will incentivize GHG reductions and will be designed, created and 
operated under the authority of the COP.  If the CDM did not exist it could potentially be created as a 
NMM.  
-  They will be sectoral in nature as UNFCCC  and project-based,  even if the project-based approaches 
already exist (CDM & JI).  
[...] 
Step 1 – COP 19 (Pilot Phase)  
1.  Start developing the Modalities  & Procedures for Sectoral Trading and Sectoral Crediting. This 
should be done in SBSTA. There are excellent submissions by Parties, especially the EU one, which can 
make the basis of negotiations going forward.  
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
3, 4, 6, 
16 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/ngo/323.pdf 
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CMIA and PD 
Forum 
To stimulate mitigation across a broad segment of the economy, a wide range of sectoral benchmarks 
and reference levels should be proposed. Initial benchmarks could be set at levels that would enable 
rapid take up, while being fine-tuned and tightened soon after to avoid the creation of excess supply.  
  
It may be possible to extrapolate from sectors with large number of CDM/JI projects, or sectors where 
standardised baselines are currently being developed under the CDM. Also, several methodologies 
already use benchmarks, which could be used for NMM. While CDM baselines are often a conservative 
interpretation of “business as usual”, NMM sector baselines should include an own-effort element. As 
proposed above, we advocate accurate monitoring to derive the real reductions achieved from all ap-
proaches followed, and believe that the own-effort element should be quantified as the mitigation 
share. The mitigation share is further elaborated in our Carbon Market Architecture (annex 1) and a 
separate paper (annex 2).  
  
In principle all sectors may be covered in NMM, but data availability is likely to restrict the initial pro-
posed sectors to those with the largest GHG emissions and greatest energy use. In practise, even after 
NMM is effectively running, smaller emission sources are likely to be covered under  
other approaches.  
  
Initially NMM could be proposed in some sectors with high emissions and large point sources, for ex-
ample the power sector, cement, iron and steel, fertiliser, etc. It would seem unlikely that there is one 
single NMM, but rather there are various component NMM being proposed and being built up over time, 
with some sectors and countries graduating from the other approaches.  
Statement for 
„broad segments of 
the economy“ 
10 
http://unfccc.int/res
ource/docs/2013/sm
sn/ngo/336.pdf 
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FVA submissions 
Party / NGO Statement contents 
Type of state-
ment 
Page Submission link 
EU 
The EU believes that the COP should guide the definition of the Framework, including market based and non-market based ap-
proaches, to enable and secure a robust system that stimulates mitigation across broad segments  of the economy while safe-
guarding environmental integrity. This would include common accounting rules and MRV requirements that would allow for the 
recognition of these efforts. 
[...] 
The EU further recalls the general principles relating to market-based mechanisms in the Cancun Agreement, including stimulat-
ing mitigation across broad segments of the economy, safeguarding environmental integrity and ensuring good governance and 
robust market functioning and regulation [Decision 1/CP.16, para 80].  
Statement for 
„broad seg-
ments of the 
economy“ 
1 
http://unfccc.int/fi
les/documentation
/submissions_fro
m_parties/applicat
ion/pdf/fva_eu.pdf 
Environmen-
tal Integrity 
Group 
Baseline setting for broad segments of the economy, while leaving the responsibility to participating country Parties to propose 
adequate baselines, recognizing the host Party’s own responsibility on mitigation; guidance should ensure that:  
- Baselines are demonstrably below projected business-as-usual scenarios;  
- Conservative methodological approaches are applied when setting baselines and determining additionality, for example when 
using simplified approaches that would result in increased uncertainty; this includes taking into account that some mitigation 
outcomes can become common practice over time and should be included in the business-as-usual scenario after a specific pe-
riod of time when the host Party carries out the periodical revision of the baselines (e.g. after 5, 7 or 10 years);  
- Perverse incentives at national levels to delay mitigation policies are avoided;  
- The length of crediting periods is adjusted when simplified baseline approaches that increase uncertainty are used;   
- Regular revisions of baselines take place.  
Statement for 
„broad seg-
ments of the 
economy“ 
3 
http://unfccc.int/fi
les/documentation
/submissions_fro
m_parties/applicat
ion/pdf/fva_eig.pd
f 
USA 
Information provided at the program level should include the following:   
(...) 
Types of mechanisms: Description of the types of mechanisms that are implemented (e.g., emissions trading system; type of 
offset mechanism, such as sectoral crediting, project-based, program-of-activities, credited NAMA, etc.).  
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
8 
http://unfccc.int/fi
les/documentation
/submissions_fro
m_parties/applicat
ion/pdf/fva_usa.p
df 
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Coalition for 
Rainforest 
Nations 
6.  The FVA should cover various approaches, domestic and/or international, including sectoral mechanisms, seeking internation-
al recognition, that result in net reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks.  
[...] 
22. The new market based mechanism will be sectoral in nature and under the authority of the COP. It shall be used by Parties on 
a voluntary basis and taking into account national circumstances.  
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
2, 6 
http://unfccc.int/fi
les/documentation
/submissions_fro
m_parties/applicat
ion/pdf/fva_cfrn.p
df 
IETA 
IETA proposes a stepwise approach to the goal of a global carbon market, through an arrangement  that allows  linkage between 
approaches within  the FVA, utilizing existing  market  approaches  and  the  New Market Mechanism  to  establish  both initial  
supply  and  demand  for  carbon  pricing  units.  A  national,  sub-national  or sectoral  level  approach  recognized  under  the  FVA  
may  choose  multilateral participation  in  the developing global  carbon market by accepting a  fixed  carbon emissions  budget  
for  a  given  future  period  in  the  form  of  tradable  international allowances (an FVA unit, or FVU). 
[...] 
While the CDM provides an important foundation for crediting mechanisms of the future,  voluntary markets  in many ways  have  
additionally  been  the  test  beds  of climate innovation and should also serve in a similar role as a crediting mechanism along-
side  the CDM--including REDD+ and  frameworks  for  crediting REDD at both the jurisdictional and project levels; and the devel-
opment and use of performance methods for crediting individual firm performance within a sectoral context. 
[...[ weiter Seite 7: 
A case can be made  that  the Green Climate Fund  (GCF)—and/or  the World Bank—could  provide  guarantees  or  insurance,  or  
provide  incentives  to  support  pilot projects and investments, in order to attract and lead private sector investors into sectoral  
credit  projects  or  other  crediting  mechanisms  as  they  are  introduced.  
Statement for 
„sectoral“ 
4, 7 
http://unfccc.int/r
esource/docs/201
3/smsn/ngo/330.
pdf 
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